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To my feminist foremothers, to my mother,
and to all the women who’ve raised me
and walked with me.
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I have no interest in making work that doesn’t elicit a feeling.

Kara Walker

Eventually, to behold is to become beholden to.

Jenny Odell, How to Do Nothing
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INTRODUCTION

A Personal History of this Project
In my mind, this dissertation began in two places—an art museum and a classroom. As I
introduce this project, I’d like to return to them both, because I think they help explain what I
hoped to do here, which I believe is rather different than what I’ve actually accomplished. In
short, I set out to write a treatise on feminist aesthetics that would make sense of some of my
deep feelings about art and a philosophical intuition I had that German idealist aesthetics and
contemporary feminism shared a similar set of core critiques of Western (particularly modern)
philosophy. In the end, I wrote three idiosyncratic chapters that I think of as imagined dialogues
between German idealist thinkers and twentieth century feminist theorists, bringing together
Alexander Baumgarten, Immanuel Kant, and Friedrich Schiller with Sara Ahmed, María
Lugones, and Audre Lorde. While I’m still attracted to the phrase “feminist aesthetics,” I don’t
think that’s actually what I’ve produced here. So I’d like to open in the spaces of the art museum
and the classroom, because I think the distance between the beginnings of this project there and
what I’ve ended up arguing here contextualize the value and the contributions of the project
itself.
First, the museum. On September 25, 2016, I visited the Museum of Contemporary Art in
Chicago. It was the closing day of the exhibition Kerry James Marshall: Mastry, and I don’t
remember why I went to the museum that day specifically, just that I biked there down the Lake
Shore path, many, many miles from my Edgewater apartment to the Streeterville museum.
Because I was alone, I was able to linger in the exhibition at my own pace. I read every panel. I
took in each work. I stood for a very long time in front of a painting of a Black woman posing
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only in her underwear in front of a mirror. She was smiling and holding her naked breasts. The
mirror appeared to be in her bedroom, and you could see clothes scattered across the floor
beneath her, a striped, grey cat watching tentatively from behind. There were notes taped to the
mirror’s frame, a string of lights around it, and a hanger balanced precariously on its corner. As
much as the painting included many things, the woman’s smile was an obvious focal point.
In front of that painting, I was transfixed by my relation to yet distance from the woman
portrayed there. I had certainly stood that way in front of my mirror just that morning. I had
smiled at myself half-dressed as I prepared to leave for the museum. My cat had stared blankly
from behind. I was overwhelmed by my identification with her. But I had also immersed myself
in the Blackness of Marshall’s work. I had taken his gaze, his claims, and his critiques seriously.
So, I was aware that I might have no right to that sense of identity—her blackness and my
whiteness in relation. I read the panel on the wall next to the painting:
As Marshall has observed, images of the black body as traumatized are common, but it’s
rare to see representations of black people as self-satisfied individuals. In this painting,
that’s exactly what is shown: a woman stands in front of her bedroom mirror, confident
and pleased—she’s not posing for anyone but herself.
This work, like others in this gallery, represents a black subject involved in creating her
own image, an image associated with beauty, desire, or joy. In doing so, Marshall has
also drawn attention to the act of looking, setting up a complicated negotiation in the
painting between the subject, the viewer, and the artist himself.1
I stood there immersed in the mixed feelings of that complicated negotiation between the subject,
me, and the artist himself. I felt our similarities and our differences starkly but still in tandem. I
thought of something I’d read by Audre Lorde: “The future of our earth may depend upon the
ability of all women to identify and develop new definitions of power and new patterns of
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Museum label for Kerry James Marshall, Untitled (Mirror Girl), included in the exhibition Kerry James Marshall:
Mastry curated by Dieter Roelstraete and Karsten Lund, Museum of Contemporary Art Chicago, 25 September
2016.
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relation across difference” (SO 123). I wondered if this moment was a new pattern of relation
across difference. I wondered what work art could do to develop those new definitions and
patterns, knowing Lorde herself saw that potential in poetry.
As I left the gallery that day, I didn’t have any answers for these queries or feelings. I
stopped in the bathroom and took a photograph of myself in the mirror. I wanted to capture
something about my self-image as I’d just felt it in relation to the painting of the other woman in
the mirror. I’m not sure the photo did that, but I remember that feeling each time I look at the
painting and at the selfie I took right after. I consider what it means to place them side-by-side,
and I feel expansive, connected, and critical.

Figure 1: Untitled (Mirror Girl) by Kerry
James Marshall, MCA Chicago, 9/25/16

Figure 2: Photograph of myself, taken at
MCA Chicago, 9/25/16

That art museum is the first point of origin for this dissertation. The gallery, the painting,
the bathroom where I took the selfie. For me, those spaces hold the moment where I felt
something about a work of art so deeply that I needed to know more about how art works. That
painting represents a sudden, gut-felt belief that art was capable of redistributing meaning
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between bodies in space and that that redistribution could allow for the possibility of respecting
racial difference without giving up relation.
While I wasn’t aware of all the implications of those newfound beliefs that day, looking
back I can see how I was intuitively bringing ideas about aesthetics and politics that are found
here. In that museum, I needed to know how racial difference is to be thought of and respected
(among women) while also not necessarily giving up the possibility of relation. And I was
feeling that perhaps that was an aesthetic question, because it was a question about the
distribution of bodies in the space, the way we relate to one another when it comes to how we
appear to one another, and what these appearances mean once they are charged with political,
social and cultural values. So while my dissertation does begin in a museum and with a painting,
something I think it shows is how aesthetics is not only about art and the work art does, but also
about how certain political and ethical questions can be answered from an aesthetic perspective
or dimension that changes the frames of the conversation.
Now, I’d like to turn to the second place where this dissertation began, the classroom.
Often when I say “the classroom” I’m referring to a general sense of a classroom as the space in
which I learn and teach. “The classroom” could be any classroom, as the phrase is simply a
marker of a pedagogical positioning. Throughout these pages, I’ve often written as if I was
teaching; I’ve made straightforward diagrams and raised discussion questions like I would for
my students. So, when I say that one of the points of origin of this dissertation is the classroom,
on the one hand I do mean the classroom in this broader sense as it’s shaped my ability to learn
and teach philosophy.
On the other hand, when I say that one of the points of origin of this dissertation is the
classroom, I also have a specific classroom in mind: SAC 200 at DePaul University. That’s

4

where my aesthetics seminar with Dr. María del Rosario Lopez Acosta was in the fall of 2015. I
can still remember the afternoon light in that room as roughly thirteen of us gathered there every
week. We read Hume, Baumgarten and Kant in the fall, Schiller and Hegel in the winter. The
course traced the emergence and development of aesthetics, and throughout, we considered
whether aesthetics was an extension of modern epistemology that addresses sensuous and
embodied knowledge or if it represented a more radical challenge to traditional philosophical
categories that established a new area or mode of study around feeling, beauty and art. We raised
questions about the meaning of beauty, what’s at stake in art, and how we’re transformed by
sublime encounters. I wrote papers on the pedagogical potential of love in Kant’s aesthetics and
the role of the beautiful object for Schiller. In studying aesthetics, I finally felt closer to answers
to my questions about how to cultivate more ethical relationships with the people and things
around us—questions I’d begun pursuing in my undergraduate thesis on Levinas but was always
frustrated by when approaching them through that framework.
In my memory, the aesthetics seminar and the visit to the museum happened
contemporaneously. I thought I had encountered the painting at the same time I’d begun reading
those texts, but when I looked back at the dates to write this introduction, I realized that I’d been
in that course the year before I went to the Marshall exhibition. I’d read all these German idealist
thinkers before I’d seen that painting and felting that feeling. Were I to conjecture, I’d guess I
collapsed those moments in my mind because that exhibition made the ideas from the seminar
real in my body. While I’d long believed art was valuable and powerful, learning about
aesthetics helped me better explain how that painting of the woman in the mirror made me feel
so expansive and expanded.

5

What aesthetics didn’t resolve, however, were the complicated feelings I felt about the
racial difference between myself and the woman in the painting. If anything, reading Kant’s
sexualized and racialized account of the sublime and beautiful in Observations on the Feeling of
the Beautiful and the Sublime exacerbated those feelings and made me question whether
aesthetics actually had anything to offer in explaining my encounter. Would applying Kant (and
his predecessors and followers) to this situation always be a mistake, just pointing me back
toward the white, patriarchal systems I was hoping to resist and dismantle in this newfound,
aesthetic relation?
The solution, I was hopeful, might be found in or created from feminist theory. In 2014, I
had taken two seminars in the Women and Gender Studies department at DePaul and there, for
the first time, I’d learned to think critically and competently about how race and gender shape
and are shaped by philosophical ideas and material realities. I knew that if I wanted answers to
my questions about racial difference and gender identification in my experience with that
painting, I was going to need intersectional feminist resources as well as aesthetic ones to find
them.
All of this (and more, of course) was swirling in my mind as I proposed my dissertation
in the spring of 2017. There I traced a trajectory through Baumgarten, Kant, Schiller, and
Irigaray that focused on the force of epistemology and ethics in their work. While this project
doesn’t necessarily resemble that one, there is one sentence of my proposal that I think still
captures what I hope to illustrate here, even now:
The German idealist aesthetic tradition begins with an attempt to understand the
incomprehensibility of certain objects and works its way to respect for them and their
freedom, while the feminist tradition cited here begins with the necessity of respect for
otherness and then cultivates new modes of encountering and embracing
incomprehensibility.
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In bringing together Baumgarten, Kant, Schiller, Ahmed, Lugones, and Lorde here, I think that I
am still trying to understand how the former three begin with the incomprehensibility of
beautiful objects and build to Schiller’s call of the beautiful object to “Be free like me!” and how
the latter three all begin with the necessity of taking seriously the gendered and racialized
material differences in our identities and lived experiences and cultivate new modes of being
together without diminishing those differences.
This project is, I think, a way of rereading the history of German idealist aesthetics
through a feminist lens, and of more thoroughly considering the aesthetic underpinnings of the
feminist thinkers I address. Doing this pushes both disciplines to be understood differently, but
what I learned in writing all this is that bringing together the fields of feminist theory and
aesthetics doesn’t necessarily produce feminist aesthetics, or what I had hoped feminist
aesthetics might be.

What is Feminist Aesthetics?
I want to reserve the phrase “feminist aesthetics” for philosophical and artistic work that
deeply integrates gender at the core of aesthetic experience without essentializing it there. I want
feminist aesthetics to put feminism first, so that feminist aesthetics can be meaningfully
differentiated from what we might call aesthetic feminism or aestheticized feminism (although
I’m not entirely sure what either of those latter concepts might be without their contrast of
feminist aesthetics clearly present). I want feminist aesthetics to be richly material and embedded
in bodies, so as to resist or perhaps correct the highly conceptual theorizing around aesthetics in
philosophy. I want feminist aesthetics to be a practice and praxis as much theory. I want feminist
aesthetics to be felt as much as it is understood—the difference between those being something

7

aesthetics can certainly help us identify if not always integrate. I want feminist aesthetics to
make as much sense—in their minds and their bodies—to artists and people who experience art
as it does to philosophers and people who write about art. I want feminist aesthetics to help me
feel more about my relationship with the woman depicted in Marshall’s painting so that I can
know what questions and answers to take away from that moment.
When I think of feminist aesthetics, I think of the performance art of Marina Abramovic
that interrogates the function of the body and our commitments to each other, never forgetting
that her body is a woman’s body and those commitments are shaped by gendered expectations. I
think of the art historians working so hard to insert Hilda af Klint’s metaphysical paintings into
the canon of abstraction so as to “correct” the erasure of women there. I think of adrienne maree
brown’s Pleasure Activism and her deeply collaborative work and polygamous politics. I think of
the rich language of “women’s writing” in Helene Cixous’ Laugh of the Medusa. I think of the
racially and sexually charged nature of Kara Walker’s “A Subtlety, or the Marvelous Sugar
Baby.” I even think of the conversations I have in my own podcast Fifty Feminist States with
feminist activists and artists across the United States, how they center gender in their artistic and
organizing work to imagine radically different futures we could share. I think of the practice of
deep listening I’ve cultivated through that work, and of the radical trust I cultivate with the
people I talk to.
All of these are high expectations for and examples of feminist aesthetics, and I hope they
illustrate why I have been hesitant to call this dissertation feminist aesthetics even as it does
clearly bring together the traditions of aesthetics and feminism. Rather than feminist aesthetics, I
consider this project a series of conversations that serve as feminist provocations to aesthetics
and aesthetic provocations to feminism. In the following section, I’ll share what I see as the
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overarching trajectory of those conversations before returning to each conversation in turn to
preview what each chapter of this project will accomplish.

Inverse Through Lines: How These Six Thinkers and Two Traditions (Do Not)
Come Together
As I wrote previously, the overarching intention of this project is to trace two inverse
through lines (so-called because I see them as are common themes across both bodies of work
that operate in opposite directions) in German idealist aesthetics and contemporary feminism: (1)
how the German idealist aesthetic tradition begins with an attempt to understand the
incomprehensibility of certain (beautiful) objects and works its way to respect for them and their
freedom, and (2) how the feminist tradition cited here begins with the necessity of respect for the
positions of others and then cultivates new modes of encountering and embracing
incomprehensibility between us.
In order to do this work, I have to accomplish a few different things. First, I have to
illustrate each of these through lines in the traditions and thinkers I’m exploring. In the case of
German idealist aesthetics, this means working through how Baumgarten, Kant, and Schiller
acknowledge and address the challenges that our experiences of beautiful objects pose to a
rationalist or strictly logical framework that posits the purpose of the subject as making sense of
and taking ownership over the world. For Baumgarten, this means inventing the science of
aesthetics, and, as I argue in the first chapter, establishing it as a “sister science” to logic that
upends traditional philosophical hierarchies. Kant, building from Baumgarten, then integrates
aesthetic experience into his larger critical system as a way of understanding how judgments of
taste evoke the universal in our singular experiences vis-à-vis subjective universality and sensus
communis. Schiller, then, reorients the experience of beauty entirely around the beautiful object,
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such that our relationship to it shifts from an individual’s allowance that the object “be what it
will” to the subject heeding the call of the object to “be free like me.” In tracing this trajectory, I
hope to illustrate how Baumgarten’s recognition that the sensuous can be as powerful and as
meaningfully knowledgeable as the logical was a step toward Kant’s recognition of how
aesthetic experience moves us outside of our individual subjectivity toward others in the sensus
communis which was a step toward how Schiller sees that as establishing an aesthetic state in
which our own freedom is only cultivated through the freedom of those around us, including
objects around us. The result of this trajectory cannot be understated: in German idealist
aesthetics we see an opportunity for philosophy and our experiences of the world to be entirely
reoriented around our ethical and political obligations to others, as particularly mitigated through
our aesthetic experiences of beautiful (and sublime) objects and events. This isn’t always
obvious when reading the projects of Baumgarten, Kant, or Schiller, and it’s certainly not always
successful in their work, but it represents a certain promise of aesthetics that I don’t always see
present in many other areas of philosophy: the promise that we can have experiences that
intuitively guide us to be closer and better to each other and the world. And the argument that
those experiences happen in art and in our aesthetic encounters with the world.
Alongside tracing this trajectory in Baumgarten, Kant, and Schiller, I also have to
illustrate what I’ve called the “inverse” of this through line in the feminist thinkers I’m citing in
this project: Ahmed, Lugones, and Lorde. A core difference in those efforts is that while
Baumgarten, Kant, and Schiller have an obvious historical continuity having read and cited each
other’s work, that isn’t the case with Ahmed, Lugones, and Lorde. There isn’t a direct lineage
between them, and I’m not trying to draw the same sort of continuous evolutionary trajectory,
perhaps most readily noticeable in that I haven’t cited them chronologically. (Lorde, who
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appears in this dissertation last, died before Ahmed or Lugones began publishing.) While all
three are feminist theorists, they also work in different areas with different theoretical
orientations. Ahmed’s philosophical background is in postmodernism, phenomenology and
affect theory, all of which she applies to and integrates with her writings on post-coloniality,
queerness, and feminism (divisions which she attempts to disintegrate in her most recent works).
Lugones is a decolonial theorist who centers gender in her efforts to theorize coalition among
women of color as they resist multiple oppressions. And Lorde is a poet whose work is not about
conceptual or philosophical analysis, although, as I will argue in the third chapter, it does speak
directly to multiple levels of feeling and knowing in the lives of the oppressed as they (we) work
to reclaim and share liberation.
Ahmed, Lugones, and Lorde are certainly different kinds of thinkers, but they are all
women of color, they are all feminists, and in their work they all use the conceptual and material
tools they have to bring women together to resist oppression. In bringing them together in this
project, I hope to show their congruences and correspondences without diminishing their unique
positions and qualities. As I’ve mentioned previously, the commonality I will trace here is how
they all begin with the necessity of respect for otherness, for differences between people and
particularly between women, and then they cultivate new modes of encountering and embracing
that difference, the incomprehensibility each of us faces in the face of another person, the
indissolvability of our unique positions and experiences as mitigated through structural
oppression and personal joy. For Ahmed this is a matter of being a feminist killjoy and living a
feminist life, for Lugones it’s about “world”-travelling and loving perception as a callejera, and
for Lorde it’s the cultivation and expression of the erotic in poetry.
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As I’m hoping might be more apparent now, tracing the two inverse through lines I’ve
identified in the German idealist aesthetic and contemporary feminist thinkers I include here
requires a specific, perhaps relatively idiosyncratic reading of each thinker at hand. I have to
explain how Baumgarten reorganizes the philosophical hierarchy between logic and aesthetics to
revalue sensuous experience. I need to elaborate on the moments in Kant’s system where play,
pleasure, and interest move us beyond our subjective experiences and toward our commonalities
with others. I must articulate how Schiller makes the shift from “may it be what it will” to “be
free like me” and what the aesthetic state succeeds and fails in establishing. I also have to explain
how Ahmed’s critique of happiness vis-à-vis the feminist killjoy allows for the possibility of
revolution to break through a harmonious system. I need to elaborate on how Lugones’ concepts
of play, “worlds”, and coalition allow for the development of double vision that provides a
liminal space for resistance against oppression. I must organize Lorde’s poetic speech to unpack
what she says about feeling, knowing, the erotic and poetry.
Any one of these efforts could likely be an entire dissertation project, and while I attend
to each thoroughly and with care here, I don’t make a dissertation of each one or present them as
a tidy series. My goal is not simply to present six readings of different thinkers and then in the
end argue how they all serve a certain, shared end. I never intended to write (and haven’t here
written) a reading of the German idealist aesthetic tradition and then a reading of a sampling of
the contemporary feminist tradition brought together by a “compare and contrast” section at the
end. While these two overarching through lines are perhaps what hold the project together from
start to finish, I’ve shaped it as three conversations, each between one German idealist aesthetic
thinker and one feminist thinker.
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I chose this method because of my dream of writing something on feminist aesthetics. I
didn’t want to hold the two traditions apart as I developed a separate reading for each, in my
mind signaling this is aesthetics and that is feminism, and when I add them together I produce
feminist aesthetics. Instead, I wanted to read these thinkers together so as to understand how
reading one might totally change what I attend to when reading another. From my aesthetics
seminar, I knew that reading Schiller had totally changed what I attended to when reading Kant,
but how would reading Lorde totally change what I attend to when reading Schiller? I was far
more interested in the potential reverberations of bringing two unlikely thinkers together than in
presenting my own readings of each tradition separately, so I’ve organized this dissertation by
staging three conversations: one between Baumgarten and Ahmed, one between Lugones and
Kant, and one between Lorde and Schiller.
My hope is that presenting the project in this way will allow me to tease out the feminist
resonances in aesthetic theory and the aesthetic resonances in feminist theory, not only through
larger claims about the through lines of these traditions, but also in the deep minutiae of each
thinker, in going to their texts and lining up concepts and asking how they work. In seeing how
Baumgarten’s use of happiness signals harmony to his peers but subversiveness to Ahmed’s
feminist killjoys. In understanding how the loving playfulness that Lugones posits requires an
aesthetic understanding of play and how her critique of common sense unravels Kant’s universal
claim to it. In feeling how Schiller’s idea of the oscillation of reason and sense in his discussion
of the play drive aligns with Lorde’s fusion of feeling/knowing and thinking/understanding in
her conception of the erotic. These moments can only happen in close conversation and coalition.
This is a lesson I’ve learned from these feminist and aesthetic thinkers themselves. In how
they’ve shared that the aesthetic encounter surprises and overwhelms us as all-encompassing in a
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particular moment. In how attending to each other requires killing joy for the sake of opening up
revolutionary shared space. In how “world”-travelling requires loving playfulness and crashing
stones. In how the erotic is a deep connection felt without forsaking radical difference.
Having now explored the overarching themes of the dissertation and explained the
structure of the project, in the next section, I’ll elaborate on each of these conversations,
explaining what’s at stake and what emerges in each.

Three Chapters, Three Conversations
Baumgarten and Ahmed
This project begins with Baumgarten and Ahmed, and in structure, the first chapter is
rather different than the two that follow. It opens with an extended reading of Baumgarten’s
project across his three main texts: Reflections on Poetry, Metaphysics, and Aesthetics. In that
reading, I argue that when Baumgarten invents aesthetics he establishes it as a sister science to
logic and makes a more radical break with his rationalist predecessors than most readers
recognize. I explore how his explanation of extensive clarity characterizes the new aesthetic
realm that he identifies and consider how this leads him to develop the perfection of thinking
beautifully as an ethos for the happy aesthetician.
From there, I focus on the character of the happy aesthetician in an effort to better
understand the role of happiness there. I look back through Baumgarten’s writings in search of a
definition of happiness and follow up potential ideas left unfinished by Baumgarten’s death in
the work of his student Meier. In the end, I argue that Baumgarten failed to define or thematize
happiness in his work, and therefore we have to raise questions about the role of the happy
aesthetician.
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At this point in the chapter, I turn to Ahmed and her critique of happiness vis-à-vis the
feminist killjoy. There she provides a helpful reframing of my analysis of happiness: I had been
searching for what happiness is for Baumgarten, but what if I instead asked what work happiness
does for him? After exploring Ahmed’s work on its own terms, I reflect this question back onto
Baumgarten and the happy aesthetician, eventually coming to the conclusion that while
Baumgarten seems to designate the aesthetician as happy in order to mask her subversive
potential, perhaps she is “happy” precisely because she has reorganized the hierarchy of
philosophical sciences and her own experience of the world.
I flagged that this chapter is different than the others in structure, because this is the only
chapter where I begin with an extended discussion of the German idealist aesthetic thinker before
turning to the feminist theorist. It’s also the only chapter where I discuss only one aspect of that
feminist theorist’s work and primarily discuss it in order to put it to performative use in reading
the aesthetic thinker. In some ways, I worry that this doesn’t do justice to Ahmed and even sets
up a structure in which her work appears lesser than, reactionary to, or an afterthought of
Baumgarten’s in some way. I don’t want to give that impression. Rather, I think that this is
simply how the work of the feminist killjoy functions. It’s a matter of pulling at loose threads of
joy wherever you see them and finding what “happiness” is covering up there. So while I could
have, perhaps, provided a more systematic treatment of Ahmed’s body of work (as I do with
Lugones and Lorde), I think that the act of becoming a feminist killjoy in order to kill joy
(specifically the happiness of the happy aesthetician) is perhaps the very best way to include her
here.
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Lugones and Kant
In the second chapter, I open a dialogue between Lugones and Kant in which I develop
and compare their treatments of the concepts of play, health, love, and common sense. In doing
this, I intend to illustrate how attending to their different constructions of and concerns with
those concepts can teach us a lot about both thinkers’ projects and raise important questions
about the transcendental and material conditions of each. To treat each concept in brief, in this
chapter I articulate: how in disconnecting play and ease, Lugones helps us question the status of
disinterestedness in Kant’s aesthetic system; how in developing a theory of health as an
immersion in the feeling of life, Kant helps us better understand what health might mean to
Lugones while further embedding material inequities in his transcendental aesthetics; how loving
playfulness and the sublime disposition might represent similar ways of being in the world and
relating to others in their “worlds”; and how Lugones’ characterization of la callejera can help
us see both the failures of Kant’s universalization of common sense and the disruptive potential
of his aesthetics.
In working through each of these points, I have two specific goals in mind: (1) to see how
reading Kant’s aesthetic system through Lugones’ decolonial project helps us see material
concerns even in a transcendental structure, and in turn how reading Lugones’ decolonial project
through Kant’s aesthetic system helps us raise questions about the structural conditions of
oppression not always obvious in the material concerns; and (2) to take up Lugones’
methodology of double vision as a preparation for “world”-travelling and loving perception in
order to create a liminal space through and in which this dialogue can occur.
As this latter goal suggests, like the first chapter, this one has a performative aspect. In
performing double vision throughout the chapter, I am attempting to hold open a dual reality in
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which, as Lugones puts it, “one eye sees the oppressed reality, the other sees the resistant one”
(CC 78). In doing so, I can also practice a double tongue, in which there are “at least two
conversations here occurring at once, through one speech act,” one in opposition to the dominant
discourse and the other marking “a portal to life lived differently” (CC 82). The intended result is
twofold: to create a liminal space between and within the “worlds” of both thinkers (and my own
“world”) such that new, resistant possibilities can emerge there, and to practice the types of
coalitional work Lugones sees as necessary for a feminism that grapples with the differences
between women to ever exist and liberate them. As I share in the chapter, I think there are places
where I am more and less successful in this final goal. I certainly see it as an ongoing practice,
rather than a perfected process.

Lorde and Schiller
In the third and final chapter, I share extended readings of both Lorde and Schiller and
then bring the two thinkers into conversation around their conceptions of the erotic and the
aesthetic. Of the three chapters here, this one most resembles a comparative reading, as I develop
my thoughts on each thinker before returning to them together.
First, I present a reading of Lorde in which I organize her writings around the themes of
feeling, poetry, and the erotic. I work to show how she elevates the role of feeling in our lives,
suggests a new “fusion” of thinking and feeling in her work, considers poetry to be a way of
being, and develops the erotic in three primary functions: the erotic as a source of power, the
erotic as a connection to that source, and the erotic as a mode of connecting to others. Taking
each of these moments in turn then allows me to show how poetry is a matter of people coming
together for Lorde, and how each moment of people coming together is a poem.
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From there, I turn to Schiller to present my reading of his aesthetic system. My goal
throughout that reading is to show how across the Kallias Briefe and the Letters on the Aesthetic
Education of Man, Schiller conceives of an aesthetic disposition/dimension that becomes the
ethos for his play drive in the aesthetic state. Accomplishing this requires articulating how
Schiller reconfigures Kant’s articulation of reason in to reorient aesthetics around the beautiful
object (rather than the experience of the subject) and attending to the transformation of freedom
and appearance in Schiller’s articulation of the encounter with the beautiful object. I also explain
and critique Schiller’s development of the aesthetic state, arguing that his articulation fails
because he risks losing the critical factor that makes his system valuable—the emphasis on
tension and difference—and replacing it with harmony and sameness.
After sharing these readings, in the third section of the chapter I attempt to bring Lorde
and Schiller together on three points: (1) their shared critiques of reason alone and heightened
attention to sense/feeling; (2) their desire to resolve those critiques through an understanding of
the oscillation and/or fusion of opposing drives; and (3) how they see poetry and aesthetic
education as key to building a better world. In the end, I argue for how these thinkers represent
the culmination of the inverse through lines I trace across the three chapters of this project, best
illustrating how the German idealist aesthetic tradition offers a theory of respect for the freedom
of certain object and how the feminist tradition cited here cultivates new modes of encountering
and embracing incomprehensibility.

Having now shared the personal history of this project, made an argument about its
overarching context and goals, and provided an overview of how the argument will be structured
and proceed, I will now move into chapter one on Baumgarten and Ahmed.
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CHAPTER ONE
The (Re)invention of Aesthetics in Baumgarten and
its Radical Potential as Recognized by the Feminist Killjoy
What would it mean to care for something, whether or not it breaks?
Maybe we can reorient caring from caring for someone’s happiness
to caring what happens to someone or something: caring
about what happens, caring whatever happens … Our care
would pick up the pieces of a shattered pot. Our care would not
turn the things into a memorial, but value each piece;
shattering as the beginning of another story.
Sara Ahmed (LFL 266)

In this chapter, I argue that Baumgarten makes a critical intervention in rationalist
epistemology by introducing aesthetics as a science distinct from logic and, on my reading, equal
or perhaps even superior to logic. I contend that traditional readings of Baumgarten that
represent him as positing aesthetics to be a lesser science than logic fail to recognize how
Baumgarten breaks from the framework that he inherits. But the failures of these readings are
likely attributable to Baumgarten himself, because he undermines the radical potential of his own
work by positing it as harmonious in the eyes of the “happy aesthetician.”
Recognizing the radical quality of Baumgarten’s aesthetics, I argue, requires a sort of
feminist killjoy reading of his texts à la Ahmed that can be critical of how happiness is deployed
there. Performing this reading allows me to make visible and reject the harmonious covering up
of the break with tradition that I see as Baumgarten’s most valuable contribution not only to
philosophy but also to those of us trying to make sense of our aesthetic experiences. In
uncovering that break, I hope to show how performing a feminist reading of Baumgarten’s work
really serves the work itself, as well as illustrating the ongoing value of Ahmed’s conception and
utilization of the feminist killjoy.
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To illustrate all of this, I will begin by rereading Baumgarten’s three primary texts,
Reflections on Poetry, Metaphysics, and the unfinished Aesthetics, to elucidate how
Baumgarten’s invention of aesthetics doesn’t simply carve out a space within philosophy for an
aesthetics that is lesser than logic, but rather establishes aesthetics as uniquely related to logic.
This work begins at the beginning of aesthetics, or rather, the moment when the term
“aesthetics” is coined by Baumgarten in 1735. He invents the word “aesthetics” in an attempt to
place poetics within the realm of philosophy by delimiting its specific role in cognition.
Following rationalists such as Leibniz, Baumgarten capitalizes on the traditional, Greek
distinction between the higher faculty of cognition (concerned with things known by the mind
[noêta]) and the lower faculty of cognition (concerned with things perceived by the senses
[aisthêta]) to reject the rationalist distrust of sensory perception and argue that both knowledge
and perception must be included in the science of reason.
In order to make this claim, Baumgarten produces a science of sensory perception—
aesthetics—grounded in its own faculty (the lower faculty of cognition) and cultivated by its own
method (confused representation and extensive clarity, concepts he borrows from Leibniz). In
explaining how this is the case, Baumgarten grants aesthetics a newfound autonomy, not only
bringing it into philosophy by arguing that it is a rightfully philosophical science, but also
establishing it as a separate field from logic.
That these claims are Baumgarten’s aims and accomplishments in his dissertation and
following texts has widely been reinforced by a number of contemporary readings of
Baumgarten’s work.2 Something all of these readings have in common, however, is the ways in
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For examples of these readings see: Fredrick Beiser, Diotima’s Children: German Aesthetic Rationalism from
Leibniz to Lessing (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Colin McQuillan, “Baumgarten on Sensible
Perfection,” Philosophica 44 (2014): 47-62; Stefanie Buchenau, The Founding of Aesthetics in the German
Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
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which they gloss over the fact that Baumgarten has established aesthetics as an autonomous
philosophical science. Most readers emphasize that Baumgarten calls aesthetics an inferior
science, as it is the science of the lower faculty. The mistake that this reading makes, however, is
to miss the significance of how Baumgarten positions aesthetics by failing to see the ways in
which his use of the language of a “lower faculty” only inherits an existing framework while
Baumgarten’s text itself works to shed the baggage of the hierarchical nature of the higher/lower
dichotomy.
In fact, Baumgarten describes aesthetics as the science of cognition “beyond the
perimeter” of logic, using the term Pomerium to suggest a symbolic boundary between aesthetics
and logic where aesthetics takes the place of the beyond. While Baumgarten himself only
gestures toward this beyond and the new relationship between aesthetics and logic it imagines,
that gesture itself was vital for the development of aesthetics, even though it remains largely
unacknowledged by contemporary readers.
While the bulk of the work of this chapter will be to carefully reconstruct how
Baumgarten introduces aesthetics in relationship to logic, it’s important not to lose sight of
what’s at stake in the reconfiguration of this relationship: if Baumgarten introduces aesthetics
simply to subsume it under logic, then at most he has produced a novel philosophical treatment
of sensuous experience that can be tidily footnoted in his predecessors’ rationalist projects; but if
Baumgarten introduces aesthetics in order to establish it as a separate, equal science to logic,
then his project takes on a new, critical lens. As such it allows us to question to position of logic
in philosophical hierarchies and to see aesthetics not only as Baumgarten’s attempt to
philosophize poetics but as an entirely new (to philosophy) realm of human experience that lies
beyond the logical but remains full of meaning and truth all the same.
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Here, I will obviously be arguing for the latter reading of Baumgarten. In order to do that,
I will proceed in three steps: (1) first, I will begin with Leibniz to explain how he introduces the
concept of confused cognition that Baumgarten will take up in his own writings; (2) then I will
turn to Baumgarten’s early writings to explore how he builds on confused cognition to develop
extensive clarity as a marker of poetic perfection; (3) from there, I will move to Baumgarten’s
later writings where he discusses aesthetics as a realm and a science to understand how it relates
to logic.
At that point I will transition into my discussion of Baumgarten and Ahmed in tandem,
exploring how Baumgarten introduces the concept of happiness in his work and fails to define it
throughout. This failure leads me to question why Baumgarten wants to insist on happiness as the
value and utmost marker of the person who perfects aesthetic cognition. To pursue that
questioning I turn to Ahmed whose feminist critique of happiness urges readers to ask not what
happiness is for a number of prominent philosophers but rather what work happiness does in
their projects. I will propose that the work happiness does for the “happy” aesthetician is to cover
up the ways in which her achieving the perfection of thinking beautifully must in some sense kill
the joy of logic. While Baumgarten himself seems to belie this dissonance by asserting the
harmony and agreement of his system, I call this a killjoy reading so as to illustrate how I think
we must undermine Baumgarten’s own affirmations in order to uncover an implicit, aesthetic,
and dissonant truth. In concluding the chapter, I argue that Baumgarten’s “happy” aesthetician is
only “happy” in the subversively powerful way that Ahmed’s feminist killjoy is joyous. I will
also show how uncovering her subversive happiness allows us to also reconsider the subversive
potential of Baumgarten’s aesthetics in how it establishes aesthetics as alongside and beyond
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logic—the sensuous, subversive sister science to its rational, reasonable brother. But first,
Leibniz.
1.1 Aesthetic Predecessors: Confused Knowledge in Leibniz
as Precursor to Baumgarten’s Aesthetics
While Baumgarten is the philosopher who coins the term “aesthetics,” the text in which
he does so is deeply indebted to the work of Leibniz. Leibniz was not necessarily a philosopher
of art, beauty or poetry—as might mark an aesthetician and does characterize the aesthetic works
of Baumgarten, Kant, and Schiller—but his rationalist epistemology includes certain forms of
knowledge that were very influential for early aesthetic thought. Most notably, Baumgarten takes
the doctrine of clear and confused knowledge from Leibniz and expands on the meaning and
value of confused knowledge to establish the value of aesthetics as a philosophical subject. One
cannot understand Baumgarten’s aesthetics without understanding Leibniz’s conception of clear
and confused knowledge; thus, it will be briefly explicated here.
For Leibniz, the doctrine of clear and confused knowledge is a part of the explanation of
perfect knowledge or the process of perfecting knowledge, and he elucidates this in his 1684 text
Meditations on Truth, Knowledge, and Ideas and 1686 Discourse of Metaphysics. In both of
those works, Leibniz establishes a series of binaries that characterize knowledge through a
hierarchical categorization of perfection. These categories—one of which is clear and
confused—will be explored here briefly in order to explicate Baumgarten’s point of departure for
his own aesthetic works that this chapter will read in full.
In one sentence, Leibniz outlines the perfection of knowledge as follows: “Knowledge is
either obscure or clear; clear knowledge is either confused or distinct; distinct knowledge is
either inadequate or adequate, and also either symbolic or intuitive” (MTKI 291). As one can
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see, Leibniz begins his definition of knowledge with the distinction between dim knowledge and
vivid knowledge. Knowledge that is vivid allows the knower to recognize the thing it represents.
This is opposed to dim knowledge which knows only a sense of something but not enough to
recognize it. In Meditations on Truth, Knowledge, and Ideas, Leibniz provides the example of a
flower to explain this, saying that one may have a memory of seeing a certain flower but the
knowledge of it is too dim to recognize the flower upon seeing it again. Vivid knowledge of the
flower would allow one to recognize that flower each time one sees it, or at the very least, as
Beiser puts it, “to distinguish a buttercup from daisies and petunias upon seeing a garden.”3
Notably, two years later in Discourse on Metaphysics, Leibniz abandons this metaphor of the
flower and uses the example of art to explain vivid knowledge. He asserts that a poem or
painting may have “a certain ‘something, I know not what’ [je-ne-sais-quoi] which either
satisfies or repels us” immediately, without doubt (DM 318-319). Knowledge with this sort of
immediacy, Leibniz argues, is vivid.
Vivid knowledge, then, can be clear or confused. Vivid knowledge that is clear is
knowledge that provides the defining characteristics of the thing in knowing it. This is opposed
to confused knowledge which recognizes the thing but cannot distinguish its characteristic
marks. To take back up the example of a flower, recognizing a buttercup upon seeing it in a
garden is vivid knowledge, but that knowledge is only clear if one also knows all the
characteristics that make it a buttercup and distinguish it from the daisies and petunias.
Considering the example of the painting, the immediate pleasure is a mark of vivid knowledge,
but that knowledge only becomes clear in determining exactly why and how the painting causes
that pleasure.
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Beiser, Diotima’s Children, 38.
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If one views the painting and knows that it has that special something about it, without
knowing why or how, then that knowledge remains confused. But it’s not simply that the je-nesais-quoi of the painting is indefinable or indistinguishable. As Beiser explains, knowledge is
confused “not only because [it is] indefinable but also because it is composite, i.e., [it] consist[s]
in the combination of many separate elements.”4 Because the senses perceive many things
together in the perception of each object, “to be confused is literally to be fused together, for
many things to be seen as one.”5 In using art as an example of confused knowledge, Leibniz
suggests a core challenge of the knowledge of art that will be taken up by Baumgarten, Kant, and
Schiller: that it is almost impossible to break the knowledge of art down into elements that offer
an exact explanation of the pleasure art provides.
While the example of the painting foreshadows the discussion of aesthetics that
Baumgarten develops from reading Leibniz, Leibniz himself provides a different example of
confused versus clear knowledge that appears in both the 1684 and 1686 texts: gold and the
assayer. He argues that a gold assayer determines a substance is gold through the use of marks
and tests that distinguish the object as gold. This is how clear knowledge functions: it knows
through tests and marks that provide nominal definitions; it breaks the thought down to its
simplest, distinguishing elements. Knowing these elements, then, means knowing the thing at
hand.
Leibniz continues with this example to explain the next distinction between adequate and
inadequate knowledge. Adequate knowledge is knowledge for which every ingredient of the
clear idea is itself clearly known; this requires the completion of the analysis of the original
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notion and all notions it is founded on. In the example of gold, this requires the assayer knowing
gold by its characteristics (such as, Leibniz notes, “heaviness, colour, solubility”) and also
knowing the nature of those characteristics themselves (e.g. the marks that determine heaviness,
colour, and solubility). That said, Leibniz himself seems unable to provide an example of this
type of knowledge, noting that he “[is] not sure that a perfect example of this can be given by
man, but our concept of numbers approaches it closely” (MTKI 292).
To finally complete his definition of perfect knowledge, Leibniz describes the two forms
of adequate knowledge: symbolic and intuitive. Knowledge is symbolic when words stand in for
thoughts. This means that all of the characteristics of the object are completely analyzed, but
they are not held in the mind at once. Rather, the mind produces a word that represents all of
those notions at once. Here, Leibniz gives the example of the “chiliagon,” which is, apparently, a
polygon with one thousand equal sides. In thinking the chiliagon, he argues, one most often does
not simultaneously think the thousand sides and/or the nature(s) of a side, of equality, and of
thousand-fold-ness (MTKI 292). Instead, the word “chiliagon” stands in for the object, and the
meaning of those deterministic characteristics remains dim in one’s mind (rather than vivid).
This knowledge is adequate in that its analysis has been completed (one can geometrically
explain a thousand-sided shape), but it is symbolic in that this thought does not also contain that
analysis. The word “chiliagon” stands in for the analysis.
In contrast, adequate knowledge is intuitive when all of the components of the thought
are held in the mind at once. As a result, Leibniz argues, our knowledge of basic notions is
always intuitive because they are composed of only one component (or rather, they are the notion
themselves and composed of no components) and thus can only be thought intuitively. And thus,
we finally arrive at the completion of Leibniz’s hierarchical categorization as “either obscure or
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clear; clear knowledge is either confused or distinct; distinct knowledge is either inadequate or
adequate, and also either symbolic or intuitive” (MTKI 291).
While this rationalist sort of definition of perfect knowledge perhaps seems irrelevant to
aesthetics, it is important to note that Leibniz seems to conceive of the perfection of knowledge
in two ways here: as an idea of “perfect knowledge” that makes the terms of his definition the
criteria (almost a checklist) against which knowledge might be judged as ideally vivid, clear,
adequate, and intuitive; and as a process of perfection with each criteria noting stages in the
development of knowledge. One can think of the perfection of knowledge here almost as a
process of climbing stairs, moving from one level to the next as knowledge develops, perhaps
visualized like this:

Figure 3: Visual Depiction of the Levels of the Perfection of Knowledge

To provide an example of this stair-step process: upon encountering a four-wheeled
object, my knowledge of it may be dim; then I may recognize that it is a wagon, making my
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knowledge vivid (and, as such, confused); then I may realize that it is a Radio Flyer wagon and
that I know the exact specifications of that type of wagon, making my knowledge clear (yet still
inadequate, as I cannot define those specifications in and of themselves). Each of these thoughts
is in itself a moment of knowledge that can be assessed and assigned a place in Leibniz’s
hierarchy, but these thoughts also develop my knowledge toward perfection. Built into this
experience, as derived from Leibniz’s epistemology, is the dual-notion that knowledge is both
fixed and fluid, both constructed of individual thoughts that can be assessed singularly and
composed of a more holistic sense of knowing that develops in the process of thinking.
This dual-sense of knowledge as both ideally perfect product and perfecting process
provides the space for Baumgarten’s unique reading of Leibniz that opens from this moment of
confused knowledge to consider the je-ne-sais-quoi at stake there.6 Understanding this sense of
confused knowledge is critical for understanding Baumgarten’s aesthetics and the radical
changes Baumgarten makes to rationalist epistemology when he introduces the philosophical
discipline of aesthetics.

1.2 Extensive Clarity and Poetic Perfection in Baumgarten’s Aesthetics
While Leibniz’s epistemology provides an account of the perfection of knowledge with only the
briefest gesture toward art, Baumgarten capitalizes on that fleeting moment of the mention of je-
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Other prominent readers also emphasize Leibniz’s inclusion of the je-ne-sais-quoi of art in his epistemology to
make different, if similar, points. Menke notes that Leibniz inclusion of the je ne sais quoi also points to the way
Leibniz splits the phrase into two parts, the sais and the quoi, distinguishing between the knowing and the thing
itself, and thus “between the ability to know and the ability to define.” In doing so, Menke argues that “Leibniz
transforms the domain of the senses into an object that is open to epistemological inquiry: the object of ‘aesthetics.’”
Force, 15. Beiser also importantly notes that Leibniz’s recognition of this je ne sais quoi “is significant because it
amounts to the admission that reason finds some limit in sensible aesthetic experience,” even if Leibniz seems to
accept this idea in some passages and deny it in others. Diotima’s Children, 40. The status of sensible aesthetic
experience in relation to the intellect, Beiser argues, is a persistent tension in Leibniz’s work, “for if aesthetic
pleasure is in principle entirely reducible to intellectual pleasure, as Leibniz implies, there is no place for the ‘Je ne
sais quoi’ as a source of pleasure that comes from the senses.” Ibid., 40-1.
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ne-sais-quoi in confused knowledge to argue that that is the place in which art belongs in a larger
philosophical system. In making that argument, Baumgarten aims to establish the philosophical
study of art (which he calls aesthetics) as a science equal to logic. To understand this claim and
how Baumgarten justifies it, one must first consider his conception of extensive clarity as a new
standard for confused knowledge.
Baumgarten opens his philosophical dissertation, Reflections on Poetry (1735) by
agreeing with Leibniz on the value of vivid representations. Baumgarten emphasizes, first, that
the two primary modes of garnering knowledge are sensate representation (representations
perceived by the senses) and abstract representation (representations which always remains
abstract or intellectual) (RP §3-4, 38-39). He then follows Leibniz to argue that sensate
representations, like the knowledge Leibniz considered, can be more or less vivid. Baumgarten
says, “In obscure representation there are not contained as many representations of characteristic
traits as would suffice for recognizing them and for distinguishing them from others, and as, in
fact, are contained in clear representations” (RP §13, 41). So like Leibniz, Baumgarten values
clear (vivid) representations above obscure (dim) ones. Baumgarten especially notes here that it
is wrong to suppose that “the more obscure and intricate their [the representations’] effusions,
the more ‘poetic’ their diction” (RP §13, 41). Poets should not be praised for obscurity; the
knowledge found in a poem must still be clear, even if it may be apprehended differently
(sensately) than other (abstract) knowledge.
While Baumgarten, like Leibniz, values vivid representations in favor of obscure ones, he
breaks from Leibniz when considering the next category in the perfection of knowledge: clear
and confused representations. While Leibniz was only considering the perfection of knowledge
as logic or philosophical knowledge, Baumgarten takes seriously the premise with which he
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opens: that knowledge is garnered through sensate representation and abstract representation.
Baumgarten takes this bifurcation of knowledge to mean that there must also be a bifurcation of
the modes of perfecting knowledge. Philosophy is the realm of abstract representation for which
Leibniz presents the appropriate mode of perfection vis-à-vis logic. But poetry, Baumgarten will
argue, is the realm of sensate representation for which Baumgarten himself invents a new mode
of perfecting: “aesthetics.”
For Baumgarten, developing this new standard for the perfection of poetic knowledge
begins at precisely the point that Leibniz identified the challenge of the je-ne-sais-quoi of art.
Expanding Leibniz’s analysis, Baumgarten argues that “Distinct representations, complete,
adequate, profound through every degree, are not sensate, and, therefore, not poetic” (RP §14,
42). Distinct representations, Baumgarten argues, are the goal of philosophy, which “pursues
conceptual distinctness above everything else” (RP §14, 42). Poetry, in contrast, is not a matter
of obtaining conceptual distinctness and thus is not about distinct representations. Poetry is about
sensate representations and sensate representations are perfected differently and thus must be
judged by a different standard.
As a result of this conclusion, Baumgarten offers his next theorem: “Since poetic
representations are clear representations, 13, and since they will be either distinct or confused,
and since they are not distinct, 14, therefore, they are confused” (RP §15, 42). In this theorem,
one can see the way that Baumgarten has read Leibniz through Baumgarten’s own poetic agenda.
Like Leibniz he follows that “Knowledge is either dim or vivid [and] vivid knowledge is either
confused or clear,” but unlike Leibniz he does not dismiss confused knowledge as failing to
distinguish characteristic marks (as Leibniz noted with the gold assayer). Rather, Baumgarten
aligns confused representations with the poetic, introducing a new valuation for confused

30

knowledge and in turn a new standard for judging the value of knowledge: philosophy is
valuable in its perfection vis-à-vis clear knowledge and poetry is valuable for its perfections visà-vis confused knowledge.
Having argued that “confused knowledge” is now valuable as a standard for poetry,
Baumgarten must now explain the function of confused knowledge such that it isn’t simply the
failure to clarify knowledge (as in the failure of Leibniz’s gold assayer); Baumgarten must
provide some standard by which confused knowledge can be assessed and perfected. Among
confused representations, Baumgarten argues that, “When in representation A more is
represented than in B, C, D, and so on, but all are confused, A will be said to be extensively
clearer than the rest” (RP §16, 43). Thus, extensive clarity is the category that Baumgarten
introduces for assessing confused knowledge.
Baumgarten contrasts the extensive clarity of confused knowledge with the intensive
clarity of Leibniz’s clear knowledge. While extensive clarity represents more sensately, intensive
clarity “plumb[s] the depths of cognition” (RP §16, 43). Intensive clarity is characterized by the
depth of cognition of a particular object or experience. In contrast, extensively clear
representations represent more than less extensively clear representations.7 Baumgarten clarifies
this by saying that “the more that is gathered together in a confused representation, the more
extensive clarity the representation has” (RP §18, 43). As opposed to being characterized by the
depth of cognition, extensive clarity is characterized by, as Beiser puts it, the breadth of

7

Beiser offers some helpful background on this choice of terminology: “We should keep in mind the original Latin
meaning of confus. It derives from the verb confundere, which is a compound of the prefix ‘‘con-’’, which means
together or with, and the verb fundere, which means to pour, stream, gush forth, spread out and extend. Confusion is
therefore spreading out or extending—hence Baumgarten’s choice of the term extensive—many different things all
together and at once.” Beiser, Diotima’s Children, 127.
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cognition, by how much is gathered together in the representation.8 The more that can be
sensately represented in one representation, the more extensively clear (and thus closer to
aesthetic perfection) it is.
The examples that Baumgarten gives of extensive clarity seem to rest on the status of the
“more” that extensive clarity represents and secondary literature seems to take this “more” to
simply mean extended enumeration. 9 Baumgarten cites Homer’s long lists from the Illiad in
which Homer enumerates “leaders and chieftains, commanders of ships, and all the fleet,” those
who cross Hector’s path, the places sacred to the gods, and more (RP §19, 43). In doing so,
Baumgarten elevates these lists as the elegiac results of “study and effort” (RP §19, 44) that
determine the things they represent as far as possible and in every respect, seemingly just as a
result of the list containing many items.
But in addition to characterizing the “more” of extensive clarity in terms of the amount or
number of things described (making a list of five better than a list of three, etc.), Baumgarten
also emphasizes a certain specificity of description that must be achieved which is often
overlooked by contemporary scholars who emphasize enumeration. Baumgarten argues that
since specific determinations applied to a genus establish the species, and since generic
determinations establish the inferior genus under the superior, the representations of the species
and of the inferior genus are more poetic than those, respectively, of the genus or of the superior
genus (RP §20, 44). To explain this, Baumgarten cites the specificity of Horace:
If there were no merit in putting narrower concepts for broader ones, why, then, in this
poem “great-grandsires” for ancestors, “Olympic dust” for the dust of the Games fields,
“the palm” for the prize, “Libyan threshing-floors” for productive countries, “the
circumstances of Attalus” for affluence, “Cyprian beam” for a trading ship, “Myrtoan
8

Beiser, Diotima’s Children, 128.

9

See McQuillan who argues that enumeration is the primary quality of the more as a paradigmatic example of this
reading. “Baumgarten on Sensible Perfection,” Philosophica, 59-60.
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sea” for a dangerous sea, “Africus struggling against the Icarian floods” for the wind,
“Old Massic” for a well-aged wine, “the Marsian boar” for a destructive animal, and so
on? (RP §20, 44).
Through these citations, it can be seen how Baumgarten values the specificity of each instance
that makes it less generic than the possible substitutes he provides. It is not simply through
enumeration that the poet achieves perfection, but also by being more specific. Through this dual
attention to enumeration and specificity, the poet provides a more determinate description and
thus a more poetic one.
If enumeration were the only characteristic of the “more” that characterizes extensive
clarity for Baumgarten, it seems that it would be hard for him to distinguish between a poetic list
and a prosaic list or to judge the merit of a poem by anything other than its length. For instance,
take Georgia Heard’s brief list poem, “Recipe for Writing an Autumn Poem”:
One teaspoon wild geese.
One tablespoon red kite.
One cup wind song.
One pint trembling leaves.
One quart darkening sky.
One gallon north wind.
The poetic value (or potential perfection) of this poem isn’t simply the fact that it provides a list
of quantities and items, but rather it’s the specificity of those items and the summation of their
parts. Were that not the case, then an extended grocery list would somehow be more poetically
perfect than this poem.
Thus, when one considers that Baumgarten sees extensive clarity as an actual measure by
which poetry can be judged and toward which it should be perfected, it seems that more, for
Baumgarten must not simply mean a long list of things or a greater amount of options included
in the description provided (as a list could be full of generic descriptions, and a more generic
choice of descriptor would seemingly include more options the way that ancestors may be more
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inclusive than “great-grandsires”). Rather, the “more” that extensive clarity gathers together
seems to hinge on the richness of the descriptor itself and how it may be able to bring to mind a
more rich, full, and powerful image than a simple list or generic representation may provide.
Baumgarten himself will affirm this reading a few sections later when he considers
examples and concepts. Examples for Baumgarten clarify something less determined by
providing reference to something more determined. And following his emphasis on specificity
already cited, he will argue that “individual examples are, of course, the best” (RP §22, 46). This
is precisely the sort of thing described previously to elucidate Baumgarten’s understanding of the
“more” of extensive clarity: the more determinate a description may be, the better an example it
may serve. As a better example, it attaches itself to the more generic idea and provides a more
powerful evocation of both.
Baumgarten explains this in terms of simple and complex concepts. He argues that
“Concept A, which, independent of the characteristic traits of concept B, is represented along
with concept B, is said to adhere to it. That concept to which another adheres is called a complex
concept, as opposed to a simple concept to which no other adheres” (RP §23, 47). Following the
poetic valuation that Baumgarten wants to give to confused knowledge (over the distinct
knowledge that Leibniz values) and the reading of examples that values extensive clarity and
specificity over generic reference and intensive clarity, Baumgarten argues that “since a complex
concept represents more than a simple one, confused complex concepts are extensively clearer,
16, and hence more poetic than simple concepts” (RP §23, 47). Yet again in this description of
extensive clarity, Baumgarten works to value that which Leibniz’s system devalued. Where
Leibniz valued the simplest of concepts—the intuitive knowledge of basic notions to which no
other things adhere—Baumgarten values complex concepts that include the most examples. For
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Baumgarten, rather than the complex concept representing the genus to which all examples of
such may attach and establish its superiority (a marker of how intensive clarity functions), it is
the example, the specific descriptor to which the genus attaches, which is most important. In the
realm of confused representations, genera are empty signifiers and the examples that determine
the genera provide more value. This is the power of poetry and what makes it distinct from
philosophy.
As Baumgarten explicates a few sections later, poetry is a language of partial images in
which “when a partial image has been represented the image of the object recurs as a whole and
so far constitutes a complex concept of it” (RP §30, 49). The partial image—the example—
contains the whole and serves as a complex concept. Take the example of Georgia Heard’s poem
“Recipe for Writing An Autumn Poem” again:
One teaspoon wild geese.
One tablespoon red kite.
One cup wind song.
One pint trembling leaves.
One quart darkening sky.
One gallon north wind.
Each line of the poem contains the whole. The “autumn poem” is recalled by each partial image
or example, bringing with it the complex concept it seeks to represent. Within the red kite is the
wild geese, the wind song, the trembling leaves, the darkening sky, and the north wind, all
recurring as an autumn poem. This example serves to better elucidate the role of the example in
Baumgarten’s conception of extensive clarity, and following this idea through in the next two
sections of his text gets Baumgarten back to something important about extensive clarity that
enriches the idea so much more than its original articulation as a list of more specific descriptors.
In the next section, Baumgarten argues that “that which in respect to place and time, is
coexistent with a partial image belongs with it to the same whole … to represent everything, and
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so to determine images by disclosing things which coexist in place and time, is poetic” (RP §3132, 49-50). The most poetic representations include the representation of things that coexist with
that thing which is being represented. Thus, extensive clarity is marked by the inclusion of the
context of the thing described in addition to that thing. Rather than intensive clarity penetrating
the depths of an object (and only that object) in order to represent it, extensive clarity
circumscriptively travels around an object and represents it in terms of its environment, that with
which it coexists.
While Baumgarten presents this as simply another theorem following from his previous
conclusion, when reflected back against intensive clarity, one can see that these are now two
markedly different epistemological modes that not only reflect different degrees of clarity among
distinct representations but different modes of thinking between distinct and confused
representations. A new example may help elucidate this. Consider the following descriptions:

Description A10
Classic, safe and versatile, this award winning wagon is a favorite for children and parents alike.
• Full-sized, all-steel seamless body with no-scratch edges
• Extra-long handle for easy pulling
• No-pinch ball joint keeps fingers safe
• Controlled turning radius
• 10” durable steel wheels with real rubber tires
Ages:
For ages over 1½ Years
Handle to Floor:
38.5”
Body Dimensions: 39.57” L x 17.56” W x 14.37” L
Interior Body:
33.5” & 14.5”
Wheels:
10” x 1.5”
Weight:
33.29 lbs.
Weight Capacity:
150 lbs.
Body Dimensions: 39.57” L x 17.56” W x 14.37” H
Carton Dimensions: 37.35” L x 5.25” W x 17.65” H
Model:
#18
10

“Classic Red Wagon.” Red Wagon: Classic Red Metal Wagon | Radio Flyer.
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Description B11
so much depends
upon
a red wheel
barrow
glazed with rain
water
beside the white
chickens.
The first representation—a description of a red wagon from the Radio Flyer website— provides
an analytic account of a red wagon, emphasizing its features and dimensions. This representation
is specific but remains abstract. One could perhaps make a model of the wagon from this
representation, but one yields no sense of what it would be like to see the wagon, to sit in the
wagon, or to encounter the wagon in any environment. This is a rudimentary example of an
intensively clear representation, providing distinct details that fully determine the object at hand
by specifying its terms in precise measurements and functions.
This description can be contrasted with the second representation—popular poem “The
Red Wheelbarrow” by William Carlos Williams. This poem seemingly provides only one
qualifying detail about the wheelbarrow: that it is red. Rather than wholly determining the
wheelbarrow itself, the poem describes the wheelbarrow through appeal to its environment, and
it uses sensate details to do so. Here, one can feel the cool touch of the rainwater, hear the
clucking of the chickens, and see their white feathers contrast against the red of the wheelbarrow.

11

William Carlos Williams, “The Red Wheelbarrow.”
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While there is no enumeration of a list here, I’d argue that this is extensive clarity: in
these few words an entire scene has been painted; the object at hand has been contextualized and
more has been gathered together in this representation. Where the intensively clear
representation in Description A ensures the reader that “no-pinch ball joint keeps fingers safe,”
the extensively clear representation in Description B invites the reader to feel how their fingers
touch the wheelbarrow. And while Description B crafts a rich backyard scene for the reader,
Description A tells the reader precisely how much space this wagon might take up in one’s
backyard and how to put it to use there. As mentioned before, Beiser summarizes the distinction
between intensive and extensive clarity that this example seeks to explain nicely, saying, “one
that has depth, another that has breadth; one that penetrates into the inmost recesses of things,
another that spreads over their entire circumference.”12
While these examples demonstrate the difference between philosophical and poetic
representation, they also serve to illustrate the very different modes of thought occurring in
distinct and confused representations. Distinct representation can be aligned with traditional
modes of knowing that, as Baumgarten puts it, “plumb the depths” of cognition. This is not the
colloquial idea of poetic depths in which one may describe something as “deep” to mean
evocative or thought-provoking. Rather this idea of “plumbing the depths” of cognition is closer
akin to colloquial notions of “getting to the bottom of things” or “finding the essence of it.” In
stark contrast, confused representation—whose philosophical thinking Baumgarten will call
aesthetics—thinks the object circumscriptively, contextually, and ecologically. This mode of
knowing does not approach the depth of the object, as such. Rather, confused representation

12

Beiser, Diotima’s Children, 128
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describes the object of thought vis-à-vis the object’s features in relation to the world around the
object or other through appeal to the senses.
To consider how a few secondary scholars highlight Baumgarten’s work on extensive
clarity: as Seel argues, in poetic cognition “something is not determined as something; rather, it
is apprehended in the repleteness of its features.”13 In doing so, the object is apprehended and
conceptualized in terms of its environment, and as Eagleton puts it “the more unity-in-variety
they [the objects] attain – the more clear, perfect and determinate they become.”14 In many ways
then, this mode of knowing avoids the penetrative nature of distinct, abstract representation, and
it is one of Baumgarten’s most important philosophical contributions. As Buchenau argues,
“Baumgarten’s addition of ‘extensive clarity’ in his Meditations philosophicae was a major
verbal invention, indicating a fundamental redistribution of functions … [Poetry] represents a
different, auxiliary, or complementary kind of logic.”15 As has been argued here, throughout
Reflections on Poetry, Baumgarten is working to elevate the status of confused knowledge as
equal to clear knowledge (in Leibniz’s terms) and to understand its perfection through extensive
clarity. Baumgarten’s ultimate aim is to establish poetry, as Buchenau puts it, as a
complementary kind of logic that makes aesthetics a science equal to philosophy. In order to
understand how Baumgarten makes that claim, one must turn to Baumgarten’s “invention” of
aesthetics at the end of Reflections on Poetry.
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Martin Seel, Aesthetics of Appearing, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), 2.
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Terry Eagleton, The Ideology of the Aesthetic, (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1990), 15.
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Buchenau, The Founding of Aesthetics in the German Enlightenment, 137.
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1.3 Inventing Aesthetics: The Scope and Form of Baumgarten’s “Philosophical Poetics”
While the previous section explored how Baumgarten’s invention of extensive clarity
was an important philosophical contribution, Baumgarten is best known in contemporary
philosophy as the philosopher who coined the term “aesthetics.” And to the extent that
Baumgarten is canonized or anthologized, it is most often simply to gesture toward this moment
in which “aesthetic” is used for the first time.16 This section will consider how Baumgarten’s
invention of aesthetics makes a much more profound contribution to philosophy than simply
adding a new term to the discipline’s lexicon, arguing that Baumgarten, in fact, expands the
boundaries of philosophy to include the aesthetic in new and important ways that, as I’ve already
foreshadowed, reconsider the predominance of logic.
While aesthetics is now taken to mean a variety of philosophical methods of studying art,
beauty, architecture and other artistic objects/endeavors, Baumgarten’s original articulation of
aesthetics in Reflections on Poetry is specifically an attempt to place poetics within the realm of
philosophy by delimiting its specific role and value within cognition. Thus, the bulk of his text is
spent defining poetry, describing its elements, and illustrating its potential perfection. In the final
sections where Baumgarten defines aesthetics, however, Baumgarten is concerned with “poetic
cognition” and its relationship between (in his terms) higher and lower cognitive faculties. To
jump ahead to the definition before returning to trace his steps: in the penultimate section of the
text, he writes “things known are to be known by the superior faculty as the object of logic;
things perceived [are to be known by the inferior faculty as the object] of the science of
perception, or aesthetics” (RP §116, 78).

16

For an overview of the reception of this new term in Baumgarten’s era see: Hans Reiss, “The rise of aesthetics:
Baumgarten's radical innovation and Kant's response,” Journal for Eighteenth-Century Studies 20 (1997): 53-61.

40

As he does with extensive clarity, Baumgarten presents this definition of aesthetics as if it
simply follows from the work of rationalist thinkers like Leibniz and Wolff. In describing the
relationship between higher and lower faculties throughout his work, however, Baumgarten once
again breaks with his rationalist predecessors Leibniz and Wolff—this time by flattening this
cognitive hierarchy of higher and lower faculties. I’ll trace his development of aesthetics to
explain: Having introduced the relationship between the sensate and the poetic as opposed to the
conceptual and the philosophical previously, Baumgarten now argues that philosophical poetics
is “the science guiding sensate discourse to perfection” (RP §115, 77). Traditionally, he says,
logic is considered the faculty that guides cognition. Logic is “the science for the direction of a
higher cognitive faculty in apprehending truth” (RP §115, 77). It governs understanding and
produces truth in the correspondence of a concept with reality. The problem with logic, however,
is that it “by its very definition should be restricted to the rather narrow limits to which it is a
matter of fact confined” (RP §115, 77). Logic is only the science of “knowing things
philosophically” (RP §115, 77). In contrast to this, the poet and poetry, in their relationship to the
sensate, know things sensately. Therefore, they require the guidance of a different faculty.
In this case, Baumgarten argues that there is a lower cognitive faculty which guides and
perfects “knowing things sensately” (RP §115, 78). Baumgarten explains the distinction between
higher and lower faculties through an appeal to Greek thought. On his reading, Greek
philosophers distinguish between “things perceived” and “things known” (RP §115, 78, italics in
original) as two modes of apprehending objects or producing knowledge. Baumgarten argues
that “it is entirely evident that they did not equate things known with things of sense, since they
honored with this name things also removed from sense (therefore, images)” (RP §115, 78). As a
result, he says that things known are discerned by the higher cognitive faculty—logic—and
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things perceived are discerned through the lower cognitive faculty. This “inferior faculty,” he
argues, belongs to “the science of perception, or aesthetic” (RP §115, 78, emphasis in original).
This is where Baumgarten first coins the term “aesthetic,” defining it as “the science of
perception.”
In this trajectory that leads Baumgarten to define aesthetics, it is important to note two
things: (1) that aesthetics for Baumgarten is inherently epistemological and falls within the
philosophical study of knowledge and (2) that Baumgarten comes to aesthetics through the
attempt to produce a specific realm within philosophy/epistemology that recognizes a different
cognitive mode. Thus, Baumgarten argues that there must be a science of the particular cognitive
mode of perceiving the sensate and that this science is aesthetics. As Christoph Menke argues,
“the fundamental move of aesthetics in the sense Baumgarten gave to it consists in showing that
the sensible, too, can be subjected to a philosophical inquiry of this sort”—and then illustrating
why this sort of inquiry is important and what can be gleaned from it.17
For people reading Baumgarten following Leibniz and Wolff, this addition of a new
category does not seem like such a stretch—perhaps it is even a welcome addition, making a
place for the study of art and poetry in the rationalist tradition. In his work, however,
Baumgarten doesn’t simply make poetics philosophical by inventing a new category within
philosophy/epistemology in which the study of poetry (and/or art) can now nicely reside. Unlike
his rationalist predecessors, his work much more critically considers the role of logic and its
relationship with the world at large. Breaking from Leibniz and Wolff, Baumgarten is willing to
consider whether logic is as comprehensive a solution as they presume and to think about the
spaces in which logic may not be the best or only way to seek or find truth.

17

Menke, Force, 13.
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While the rationalist tradition sees logic as ubiquitous, when Baumgarten discusses the
realm of logic, he speaks in spatial language that suggests he sees it as bounded rather than
limitless. As cited above, he argues that logic is “restricted” and “confined” to the “rather narrow
limits” of a certain type of cognition18, and that thus, there must be a new science produced in
order to perfect other modes of cognition, particularly here, sensate cognition. While other
rationalist thinkers certainly recognized that sensate cognition was a part of cognition, for
Baumgarten it is its own, separate part of cognition that must be considered apart from logical
cognition. The consideration of sensate cognition as its own then requires the invention of a
science to study it that Baumgarten names aesthetics.
As Buchenau notes, one of Baumgarten’s primary philosophical contributions is that he
establishes aesthetics as “autonomous to the extent that it is grounded in a separate principle, or
faculty, to be cultivated by a separate method.”19 The aesthetic is not logical cognition and must
be something else; it is both a new mode of thinking (sensate cognition) and the philosophical
treatment of a new subject matter (here, poetry; later, aesthetics). The aesthetic is its own
philosophical realm. In the next section, I’ll explore how Baumgarten develops this aesthetic
realm in the writings that follow Reflections on Poetry and what this means for the relationship
between aesthetics and logic.
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In the original Latin this phrasing is “si ergo quos arctiores in limites reapse includitur LOGICA etiam per ipsam
definitionem in eosdem redigeretur.” It is translated in German as “allzu engen Grenzen gezogen wäre, in die sie in
der Tat einge schlossen ist.” Baumgarten, Meditationes philosophicae de nonnullis ad poema pertinentibus =
Philosophische Betrachtungen über einige Bedingungen des Gedichtes : Lateinisch-Deutsch, translated by Heinz
Paetzold, (Hamberg: F. Meiner, 1983), 84-5.
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1.4 The Aesthetic Realm: Baumgarten’s Reconsideration of Hierarchy
and Boundary in Metaphysics and Aesthetics
While Baumgarten’s discussion of the “aesthetic” is limited to the final three sections of
Reflections on Poetry, important points are made about this realm in his 1739 text Metaphysics
and 1750/8 text Aesthetics, particularly concerning the spatiality of these realms and the
relationship between the cognitive faculties. In this section, it will be argued that in his later texts
Baumgarten even more clearly establishes aesthetics as its own realm distinct from logic and
considers how aesthetics is actually even a necessary condition of logic, a fact which uniquely
characterizes the boundary between the two realms.
To consider Metaphysics first, it is helpful to note at the outset that these two texts are
very different in scope and form. While Reflections on Poetry is Baumgarten’s relatively short
doctoral dissertation, Metaphysics is a lengthy textbook meant to serve as a complete course in
metaphysics. As such it explicates ontology, cosmology, psychology, and theology. Here,
aesthetics and logic are both subsciences of psychology that illustrate that their truths are not
independent of the human mind. Like his predecessors, Baumgarten breaks his psychology into
two categories: empirical psychology (based on experiences) and rational psychology (based on
a priori deductions).
Baumgarten turns to the “inferior cognitive faculty” in the second section of his chapter
on empirical psychology. Much of his argument here traces the argument found in Reflections on
Poetry. To recap the similarities briefly: here Baumgarten argues that the inferior cognitive
faculty is the “faculty of knowing something obscurely and confusedly, or indistinctly” (M §520,
202). He also cites intensive and extensive clarity again, saying that “greater clarity due to the
clarity of notes can be called intensively great clarity, while greater clarity due to the multitude
of notes can be called extensively greater clarity” (M §531, 204). And two sections later, he
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reformulates his definition of aesthetics as “the science of knowing and presenting with regard to
the senses” (M §533, 205).
Amidst these similarities, Baumgarten also makes a very important advance concerning
the inferior cognitive faculty in this text. Foremost, he further explains the status of this faculty’s
“inferiority.” As mentioned before, when Baumgarten uses superior and inferior to designate the
faculties, he is following the common parlance of the Leibnizian-Wolffian school. In section
eight of the empirical psychology chapter of Metaphysics, however, Baumgarten argues that “all
of these [lower faculties of cognition], in so far as they are similar to reason in representing the
nexus of things, constitute the analogue of reason, or the collection of the soul’s faculties for
representing a nexus confusedly” (M §620, 233). Here, the “lower” faculties of cognition are
analogous or similar to rather than inferior to reason. Because Baumgarten has established
confused representations as an analogous counterpart to clear representations, he must reverseengineer that analogy to consider how the faculty concerning sensate cognition (the “lower”
faculty) is analogous (not inferior) to the faculty concerning conceptual cognition (the “higher”
faculty). The lower faculty knows indistinctly rather than distinctly, but now it can be seen that
this is a difference in kind not in value. Thus, even though they are named “higher” and “lower”
faculties, these two cognitive modes exist alongside rather than above or below each other. As a
result, rather than two hierarchical realms (a higher and lower) or one realm nested within
another (a genus and example), we have two analogous realms existing alongside each other. 20
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This point is important for Baumgarten because, as previously explained here, his entire
project hinges on the establishment of the aesthetic realm and its relationship to the logical
realm. If the aesthetic realm is always less important than the logical realm, the value of
Baumgarten’s project decreases dramatically. Additionally, when these two realms are valued
equally, their respective perfections become equal epistemological modes. Thus, extensive
clarity (as developed in Reflections on Poetry) becomes as valuable as intensive clarity and the
cultivation of poetic/aesthetic sensibilities as lauded as logical ones. Throughout his writings,
Baumgarten has consistently praised and valued poetry, so it only makes sense that he would
continue to elevate their philosophical treatment.
Baumgarten adds to this picture of his motivations in his final, unfinished text, Aesthetics.
A textbook like Metaphysics, Aesthetics opens by again defining aesthetics as “the science of
sensuous cognition” (A §1). Many of the opening sections, then, defend aesthetics as a true
science, one that recognizes the value of confusion and serves as a “sister” to logic (A §13). This
adds further support for the argument that aesthetics and logic are not higher and lower sciences,
but rather sister sciences, equal in value if different in cognitive mode. Continuing, Baumgarten
argues that the usefulness of aesthetics is that it:
1) provides the sciences, which are predominantly based on the cognition of the
understanding, with appropriate material, 2) adapts scientific findings to the power of
comprehension of everyone, 3) extends the improvement of cognition also beyond the
perimeter of the things which we cognize distinctly, 4) provides appropriate principles for
the efforts of mild mannered endeavors and the liberal arts, 5) has advantages in everyday
life, as long as, all of the necessities of life have been attended to (A §3).
We can take each of these value propositions individually, noting that the first three have been
previously substantiated by Baumgarten in Reflections on Poetry and Metaphysics while the
fourth and fifth would be addressed further in Aesthetics (primarily in portions of the text that
were not finished).
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1) [Aesthetics] provides the sciences, which are predominantly based on the cognition of
the understanding, with appropriate material.
Insofar as aesthetics is the science of the inferior cognitive faculty, and insofar as the inferior
cognitive faculty includes sensation and sensuous cognition, aesthetics is the science of the
faculties which guide the senses and bring in the sensory information for understanding to
process. This suggests that aesthetics is perhaps in some way prior to or foundational for logic, as
it is the science that brings in sensory material for processing whether that processing be vis-àvis logical or aesthetic modes.
2) [Aesthetics] adapts scientific findings to the power of comprehension of everyone.
Insofar as aesthetics is a science, insofar as it is a science of sensuous cognition, and insofar as
everyone experiences sensation, then aesthetics allows for a science to be made of and applicable
to everyone’s powers of sensation and sensuous cognition. Here Baumgarten seems to suggest
that aesthetics is a more accessible science than logic, a science for “everyone.” In this premise,
we can see precursors of the work of Kant and Schiller who will find in aesthetics modes of
cognizing ethical and political ideas in their immediacy (through art and beauty) rather than as
conclusions of logical arguments. While Baumgarten himself doesn’t extend this point that far,
here he begins the suggestion that aesthetics provides a mode of cognizing even logical findings
through sensate means.
3) [Aesthetics] extends the improvement of cognition also beyond the perimeter of the
things which we cognize distinctly.
Insofar as aesthetics is the science of sensuous cognition and sensuous cognition is guided by
confused representations rather than distinct representations, it includes new modes of cognition
beyond the original “perimeter” of distinct cognition. Thus, aesthetics has expanded the realm of
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philosophy by opening new spaces previously inaccessible to logic for philosophical
consideration—an important point that I’ll return to at the conclusion of this list of premises.
And finally:
4) [Aesthetics] provides appropriate principles for the efforts of mild mannered
endeavors and the liberal arts, [and] 5) [Aesthetics] has advantages in everyday life, as
long as, all of the necessities of life have been attended
With these two premises, we see the social and ethical implications that Baumgarten hoped to
establish for aesthetics that would later be taken up by Kant and Schiller. In the fourth premise,
Baumgarten argues that the science of aesthetics can provide guidance for the liberal arts and for
everyday life. In the fifth premise, Baumgarten adds the caveat that aesthetics can accomplish
these ethical goals only if “the necessities of life have been attended to.” This, of course,
hearkens to Kant’s formulation of disinterestedness in the third critique, where Kant finds a way
to make this consideration a transcendental criterion for aesthetic experience, thus almost
inverting Baumgarten’s list of aesthetic priorities here by making his final consideration the
primary one.
Having considered this list of arguments for the usefulness of aesthetics, I want to return
to premise three, as it adds to our understanding of aesthetics as its own philosophical realm and
“sister science” to logic. There, as I highlighted earlier, Baumgarten specifically notes the way
that aesthetics extends beyond the “perimeter” of distinct cognition. To describe what is
translated as a “perimeter,” Baumgarten actually uses the term Pomerium which references the
sacred and legal boundary of ancient Rome. The pomerium was the symbolic boundary of the
city, not it’s literal wall. It was a space of religious and military significance.21 Thus Roman
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magistrates who had the authority to condemn to death within the walls of the city, could only
harm or main in the pomerium. Furthermore, ancient Romans could not inhabit or farm the area
of the pomerium, it was a space rich with nutrients but uncultivated in any traditional sense.
Extending this metaphor, if logical cognition has previously guided all that was sacred or legal
within philosophy, then aesthetics is that which extends beyond that boundary. While it still
“belongs” to philosophy in the way that territory beyond the official pomerium still belonged to
Rome, rules and values are different there. Logic is not the only ruler. And in many ways, it is
the pomerium which defines Rome itself. It is the sensate immediacy of this boundary that
undergirds the codes and cognition of everything it confines.
In this careful use of the word “pomerium,” Baumgarten identifies a boundary around
logic in a way that the rationalists like Leibniz and Wolff before him failed to.22 Where they
maintained an optimism that logic could reach indefinitely (perhaps like the Romans did about
their empire), Baumgarten identifies a realm in which logic is not the faculty of cognition. In
identifying logic’s boundary, he illustrates its limitation and bounds it by a perimeter, thus
bounding it as a realm. He then identifies the realm that is found alongside and beyond this new
boundary—the realm of aesthetics as the science of sensuous cognition.
Having articulated this aesthetic realm in Aesthetics, Baumgarten goes on to more
specifically than ever emphasize the value of sensuous cognition as a complementary faculty to
logical cognition. He cites the objection to his theory that “confusion is the mother of error” and
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refutes it by saying that “confusion is the necessary condition for discovering the truth, since
nature does not leap from obscurity to distinctness” (A §7). Here Baumgarten argues that
confused representations are not only not errors, but they are actually the necessary condition for
distinct representations to present logical truths. Rather than confused representations and
aesthetic cognition being strictly outside of or lesser than logical cognition, they become the
necessary condition for distinct representations that lead to logical truths. This does not mean, for
Baumgarten, that confusion simply collapses into distinct cognition, rather it means that
aesthetics undergirds logic in every way; confusion is always alongside distinction. This makes
the boundary between these realms a particularly unique one in which its always-alongside
ephemerality characterizes both realms, perhaps much like the constant shifting of all of the
territory beyond Rome came to define Rome itself.

1.5 Baumgarten’s Aesthetic Ethos: The Ethics of Thinking Beautifully
and the Introduction of Happiness
Thus far, it has been shown how Baumgarten establishes the new aesthetic realm of
sensate cognition alongside logic and develops the mode of knowing of that realm as
poetic/aesthetic cognition which is characterized by confused but extensively clear
representations. All of that argued, it is now important to consider the potential social and ethical
implications of this new realm and its epistemological modes. While Baumgarten did not present
an ethics or theorize an aesthetic ethos specifically, he (following Wolff) does see aesthetics and
moral philosophy to be more deeply connected than many of his contemporaries. As Buchenau
notes, “for Baumgarten, aesthetics forms part of practical philosophy, and art is to be judged by

50

the principles of moral philosophy.”23 Aesthetics is to be applied and can guide the improvement
of everyday life, as he argues in his opening defense of aesthetics is Aesthetics (A §3). Thus,
Baumgarten obviously meant to develop a better explanation of the relationship between his
aesthetics and an ethics or moral philosophy in the portions of Aesthetics left unfinished when he
died.
In what exists of Aesthetics, Baumgarten suggests that the way aesthetics impacts
everyday life is not in concerning oneself with the perfections or imperfections of sensuous
cognition. While this intuitively seems to contradict Baumgarten’s emphasis on the perfection of
sensate discourse found in Reflections on Poetry, what Baumgarten wants to get at here is that
the perfection of sensuous cognition is not marked by perfection as such because that would
require a distinct understanding of what is being perceived which would bring aesthetics into the
realm of logic. Rather, sensuous cognition is judged by beauty, which Baumgarten breaks down
into the beauty of things and thoughts, the beauty of order, and the beauty of signification, all of
which define beauty as agreement, whether between things and thoughts, among the order of
thoughts, or of the agreement of signs.
Importantly for Baumgarten, beauty is not simply a property of the thing perceived,
rather he places an emphasis on beauty as a property of cognition itself. He argues that “the
beauty of things and thoughts must be distinguished from the beauty of cognition … ugly things
can be thought beautifully, and more beautiful things can be thought as ugly” (A §18). Beauty
here is the evaluative measure of sensuous cognition. It is a quality of cognition in addition to a
quality of things themselves. Aesthetics then becomes not only the science of sensuous cognition
but a practice of thinking beautifully. This gives it social and ethical force in a way that a mere
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science of sensation would not attain and explains why the final, unwritten portion of
Baumgarten’s Aesthetics was to be an explication of the “happy aesthetician” (§27) who would
train their aesthetic faculties to think beautifully and thus improve everyday life.
Before more thoroughly discussing (and critiquing) the happy aesthetician, I’d like to
highlight that Baumgarten makes one more important advance in Aesthetics that contributes to
the construction of the ethos of his aesthetics. Whereas in Reflections on Poetry, sensuous
cognition and aesthetics at large was characterized only by extensive clarity, in Aesthetics
Baumgarten includes a number of other capacities of the inferior cognitive faculty including
“richness, greatness, truth, clarity, certainty, and life of cognition” (A §22). As McQuillan notes,
“his [Baumgarten’s] treatment of the richness, greatness, truth, certainty, and life of sensibly
perfect cognition throughout the Aesthetics also suggests that the perfection of sensible cognition
extend far beyond clarity.”24 These aesthetic cognitive dispositions become new modes of
thinking for the happy aesthetician, and Trop argues that “each [one] … and each in its own way,
gives way to an ethos; each indexes a way of being in the world that takes a potential weakness
or limitation of human sensuous cognition and resignifies it as a potential source of strength.”25
Thus, we see once again the way Baumgarten has shifted the values of logical cognition
to make aesthetic cognition its complement and how in doing so he produces a new system of
values that serve as complement to—or insofar as he argues that confusion is a necessary
predecessor of distinct thought—perhaps even as foundational to the value system ascribed by
logical cognition. This new value system Baumgarten proposes values extensive clarity
alongside intensive clarity, contextual descriptions alongside those that “plumb the depths,”
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richness alongside narrowness, liveliness alongside lifelessness, and new modes of truth, clarity,
and certainty alongside those functioning within logical faculties. Aesthetics is an autonomous
realm alongside and beyond logic with its own standards for perfection. Standards that should be
considered as valuable and meaningful as those for logical truth.
Now that we have (1) thoroughly characterized the aesthetic realm as Baumgarten develops it
through Reflections on Poetry, Metaphysics, and Aesthetics and (2) established that the autonomy
of that realm is an important, and often overlooked, contribution of Baumgarten’s project to the
history of philosophy, I’d now like to zoom in on his discussion of happiness so as to analyze
and uncover how Baumgarten utilizes the concept throughout his work and why the “happy
aesthetician” makes such a final and fated appearance in his work.
To begin, I will first consider where and how Baumgarten presents happiness in his
philosophical writings, ultimately exploring how he fails to define the term in his early texts and
provides a very undeveloped discussion of it in his later texts.
In Reflections on Poetry, Baumgarten uses the word happiness only once and only in its
adverbial form. The word appears in the second to last section of the text where Baumgarten is
explaining how aesthetics is the science of the lower cognitive faculty and should be considered
as a science alongside logic, the science of the higher cognitive faculty. He argues that even
though philosophers study the higher cognitive faculty, they “might still find occasion, not
without ample reward, to inquire also into those devices by which they might improve the lower
faculties of knowing, and sharpen them, and apply them more happily for the benefit of the
whole world” (RP §115, emphasis added). In the syntax of this sentence, it is not entirely clear if
“more happily” modifies the application of the lower faculties, the lower faculties directly, or the
philosopher doing the applying. Is happiness a matter of philosophizing in the right way or a
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product of doing so? At this point, Baumgarten does not clarify, and he provides no explanation
for how a philosopher might apply the lower faculties of knowing “more happily” for the benefit
of the whole world. While this lack of explanation seems rather inconsequential in this text, it is
an early sign of how Baumgarten is grappling with happiness in relation to aesthetics from the
very beginning of his work and also shows the underdevelopment of happiness that remains
throughout his work.
Happiness is not a major concept in Baumgarten’s Metaphysics either, where it is
included briefly in both the empirical and rational psychologies without being thematized. In the
empirical psychology—which is also where Baumgarten locates aesthetics—happiness is
included as a quality of memory, particularly extensive memory. Baumgarten says there that “a
greater memory is called GOOD and HAPPY, and insofar as it can recognize many great things,
it is called EXTENSIVE (rich, vast)” (M §585). Here, Baumgarten is exploring what it means to
recognize a representation that one had previously produced (to remember it), and happiness is a
marker of a memory that can recognize many things. The ability to recognize many things is then
named extensive, which echoes Baumgarten’s discussion of extensive clarity in Reflections on
Poetry, where he argues that extensively clear representations gather many things together. In
this way, Baumgarten seems to connect happiness to aesthetics even in his discussion of
memory.
Happiness, here, is also directly aligned with the good, as Baumgarten calls the greater
memory “good and happy.” Considering this and, it is also of note, that in this same section,
Baumgarten identifies many other qualities of memory—firmness, tenacity, capability,
vigorousness, and readiness (M §585)—each of which relate a single quality to a single function
of memory: a memory that can recognize less intense representations among other
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representations is firm; a memory that can recognize something after a long time is tenacious; a
memory that can recognize something reproduced only rarely is capable; a memory that can
recognize more intensely is vigorous; and a memory that requires little for it to remember is
ready. It is only with extension that a memory is one thing and another. “Good and happy” are
the only two qualities of memory that come together, and Baumgarten provides no reasoning
why goodness might imply happiness or vice-versa. As in the Reflections on Poetry, the lack of
explanation of happiness is rather inconsequential in this text, but it does provide another data
point illustrating the vagueness that pervades Baumgarten’s discussions of happiness—a concept
which he seems to relate to aesthetics and the good without exploring what happiness itself may
be or how this relationship works.
As mentioned previously, happiness is also included in the rational psychology of
Baumgarten’s Metaphysics. In that section of the text, it is used to describe non-human spirits.
Baumgarten says that, “The SPIRITS endowed with a higher essential degree of intellect than
human beings are SUPERIOR, whereas those that have a lower grade are INFERIOR. They are
both finite, and either happy or unhappy §790). The former are GOOD SPIRITS (beautiful
spirits), and the latter, EVIL SPIRITS” (M §796). One again, happiness here is used as an
adjective, to describe the quality of certain spirits. Finite spirits that are happy are good spirits—
notably they are also beautiful spirits. While Baumgarten doesn’t explain this parenthetical
addition, it provides further support of the tentative connections Baumgarten is drawing between
happiness, aesthetics and the good in Metaphysics. It is also of note here that while happiness
was a guiding motivation of many ethical theories that preceded Baumgarten, his own writings
emphasize obligation rather than happiness as the motivating and regulating force of morality. In
the context of his rational psychology, this even leads Baumgarten to argue that we have a
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certain kind of obligation toward happiness in our religious duties.27 Perhaps it could even be
said that Baumgarten’s removal of happiness from moral philosophy allows him to relocate it in
aesthetics, putting the concept of happiness to different work there. But that remains to be seen.
While happiness plays only very minor roles in Reflections on Poetry and Metaphysics, in
Aesthetica the concept of happiness is much more apparent in the character of the happy
aesthetician, and it is in the discussion of this character that one can see the extent and effects of
Baumgarten’s failure to characterize happiness. Baumgarten first introduces this character in §27
of the text, where he proposes to explore “the genesis and the idea of the one who thinks
beautifully, the CHARACTER OF THE HAPPY AESTHETICIAN, and enumerate the more
closely related causes of beautiful thinking in a soul” (A §27). A primary focus of this text, then,
is to define what it means to think beautifully such that one might cultivate the character of the
happy aesthetician.
For Baumgarten, thinking beautifully means perfecting sensuous cognition, and the
beauty of thought is measured by its perfection. While it was suggested in Reflections on Poetry
that the perfection of thinking beautifully is a matter of extensive clarity—which was seemingly
a singular mode of perfection in that early text—in the Aesthetica, Baumgarten introduces a
whole list of perfections of cognition: richness, greatness, truth, clarity, certainty, and life of
cognition (ubertas, magnitudo, veritas, claritas, certitudo et vita cognitionis) (A §22).28 To
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explain each briefly: by richness, Baumgarten has in mind the “copiousness, abundance,
multitude, treasure, [and] wealth” of either a beautiful object (objective richness) or of a means
of representing objects (subjective richness) (A §115). This category takes up Baumgarten’s
previous conception of extensive clarity to consider how much can be represented in a singular
image. By greatness, Baumgarten means transcending simplicity of thought; akin to descriptions
of the sublime, greatness entails both beautiful things that transcend the ability to be thought and
an ability to think things bigger than oneself (A §364-368, §422). In the case of truth,
Baumgarten distinguishes from a logical truth of metaphysical correspondence vis-à-vis Leibniz
(§424, 429) and requires the sensual recognition of the object’s possibilities in their unity (A
§439). This is not entirely divorced from logical truths, but rather in these sections, Baumgarten
creates the category of the aesthetico-logical truths (A §440, §443). And the category of clarity
hearkens again to Baumgarten’s earlier discussions of extensive clarity. Aesthetic clarity or
“light” is extensive clarity (A §617, 618), and Baumgarten speaks poetically about how objects
and ways of thinking that represent many in the singular “shine with a beautiful shimmer” (A
§618, 631) as he concludes the first volume of Aesthetica.
By the time Baumgarten actually writes of certainty in the second volume of Aesthetica,
certainty (certitudo) has been replaced in his table of contents by persuasion (persuasio). The
two, however, are related for Baumgarten. Certainty in logical truth, he argues, is conviction;
certainty in aesthetic truth is persuasion (A §832). The aesthetic perfection of certainty is a
beautiful object or beautiful thought’s ability to persuade. The final perfection of aesthetic
cognition necessary for thinking beautifully is “life,” but Baumgarten did not complete the
sections of Aesthetica on life before he died. While he describes the qualities of “lively” works
of art in Reflections on Poetry (RP §112) and aligns lively cognition with extensive clarity in the
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Metaphysics (M §517), he never produced an extended discussion on what liveliness in aesthetic
cognition might entail.29
After Baumgarten’s death, Meier took up the project of completing Baumgarten’s
aesthetics and his discussion of life is the best suggestion readers have of what Baumgarten may
have intended. Like Baumgarten, Meier aligns liveliness with extensive clarity. He also goes on
to explain the aesthetic life of cognition in terms of the powers of desire and the ability of beauty
to invoke emotion. Additionally, Meier emphasizes life as a preeminent perfection of aesthetic
cognition, and for Meier aesthetic liveliness becomes the ultimate perfection of beautiful
thinking.30 Baumgarten himself does refer to life as “the foremost gift of beautiful cognition” in
Aesthetica (A §188), but it is unclear whether he would have given it the ultimate status that
Meier did.
Considering these six perfections of aesthetic cognition, however, does not seem to take
Baumgarten (or the reader) any closer to a definition of happiness. Nothing in Aesthetica makes
an argument for why the happy aesthetician would be happy or why happiness would be the
result of beautiful thinking. One way to attempt to resolve this question may be to turn to
Baumgarten’s late work Initia Philosophiae Practicae (1760), where Baumgarten comes the
closest to actually defining happiness. In this text, he distinguishes between theoretical and
practical philosophy to consider human obligation. In §98 of the text, he defines complete law,
which requires him to distinguish between human and divine law. He then distinguishes between
external happiness and internal happiness, arguing that the perfection of divine law yields
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external happiness and the perfection of human law yields internal happiness. Happiness is
obtained by fulfilling different kinds of law, and the achievement of happiness is what makes the
law complete. In other words, happiness is the result of a perfection—here, the perfect
fulfillment of human or divine law.
While this is not exactly a definition of happiness, it is the closest thing to a definition of
happiness that Baumgarten has provided thus far. Carrying this notion of happiness as the effect
of achieving perfection into Baumgarten’s aesthetic texts suggests that happiness is the result of
the perfection of aesthetic cognition. Having just reviewed Baumgarten’s list of cognitive
perfection in Aesthetica, this raises the immediate question of ‘which perfection?’ Does
Baumgarten intend that the happy aesthetician perfect all six of the cognitive perfections he lists?
Must the happy aesthetician perfect richness, greatness, truth, clarity, certainty, and life of
cognition? Or might Baumgarten have had in mind what Meier later argues and thought that life
(or one of the other perfections) was preeminently important? These questions are not clarified in
Baumgarten’s texts.
Additionally, there also seems to be a deeper problem at stake in Baumgarten’s utilization
of happiness: that in Aesthetics Baumgarten has no mechanism through which to explain how or
why happiness would be the result of beautiful thinking. Baumgarten’s aesthetic theory is based
on aesthetic cognition, and his definition of beauty is based on the perfection of aesthetic
cognition. The beauty of cognition itself, for Baumgarten, is the result of the perfection of
beautiful thinking, as it is comprised of the agreement of the six aesthetic perfections he
introduces in Aesthetica (§22). In fact, Baumgarten opens §27 where he introduces the happy
aesthetician by saying “because the beauty of cognition is an effect of the one who thinks
beautifully…” (A §27). In reading Baumgarten, then, it is unclear how happiness is an
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additional, cognitive result of the perfection of aesthetic cognition when the beauty of cognition
already results from this same cognitive perfection. This further raises the question, that if we are
to rely on this understanding of happiness as a cognitive perfection, why would a purely
cognitive conception of happiness be satisfactory in the first place? Does happiness require an
affective dimension? And if so, does Baumgarten have the means in his texts to explain or
explore one? Does this point to a much larger failure of Baumgarten’s aesthetic system to
meaningfully attend to sensuous experience that undermines the contributions argued for in the
first half of this chapter?
One can perhaps turn again to Baumgarten’s student Meier to gain some clarity around
how happiness might be a result of beautiful thinking and whether it is purely cognitive. The
place of affect in philosophy and particularly aesthetics was a focus of Meier’s work, and the
ways in which Meier imports it into Baumgarten’s system of cognitive perfections can be seen in
the following excerpt of Meier’s “Consideration on the First Principle of all Fine Arts and
Sciences” where he recounts Baumgarten’s aesthetic perfections and then adds new emphases
and perfections of his own:
For sensible representation to enjoy the greatest possible beauty, the following is
required: 1) The wealth of these representations. A beautiful cognition must represent a
great variety in a single image. Variation is pleasing. And the most beautiful cognition is
to be considered like a broad region that contains infinitely many and different treasures.
2) The magnitude of cognition, the noble, the sublime, etc. For the sake of this beauty
sensible cognition must not only represent great, suitable, important, noble objects, and
so on, but must represent them in a way that is suitable and proportion- ate to their
magnitude. 3) The truth of cognition. Without truth cognition is mere illusion, and thus
the sensibly beautiful cognition must be as true as possible. 4) The liveliness and
brilliance of cognition. 5) Its certitude. A sensible cognition, when it is to be properly
beautiful, must not only produce conviction of its own beauty, but also conviction of the
correct representation of its object. 6) The touching. A beautiful cognition must not only
itself be as delightful as possible, but must also produce a proper gratification or
dissatisfaction with its object. 7) The beautiful order in the entire fabric of a sensible
representation, and in the interconnection and interweaving of all the individual
representations, insofar as a whole is composed out of them. 8) The beautiful designation
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of sensible cognition. We can hardly ever or never think if we do not attach our thoughts
to certain signs, which are related to the thoughts as the body is related to the soul. And
thus if sensible cognition is to be as beautiful as possible, then so to speak not only its
soul but also its body must have the greatest possible beauty.31
Wealth (richness), magnitude, truth, liveliness, and certitude are aesthetic, cognitive perfections
that Meier takes from Baumgarten, but he also adds touching, order, and designation to this list.
His emphasis on touching is particularly important for understanding how the perfection of
aesthetic cognition may result in happiness as it considers the affective relationship between
beautiful cognition and a beautiful object. For Meier, a key aspect of aesthetic perfection is the
ability of beauty to “touch” us, to invoke feeling in the aesthetician who shall then feel
gratification or dissatisfaction as a result of the experience.
Meier develops his discussion of how we are “touched” by beauty in his explanation of
the “sensible life” of cognition in the first volume of Foundations. There he argues that “a
cognition is alive when it causes pleasure or pain, desire or aversion, through the intuition of a
perfection or imperfection” (AKW §35). Here Meier directly connects the cognitive faculty to
the faculty of desire, bridging the divide between thought and feeling. He explains later in
Foundations, that just like the faculty of cognition is divided into higher and lower faculties
which provide for the science of logic and the science of aesthetics, the faculty of desire is
divided into higher and lower faculties—the will and feelings of pleasure and pain (AKW
§178).32 Meier then argues that beautiful objects (and other, particular kinds of representations)
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can invoke these feelings, either through distinct living cognition which excites the will or
indistinct living cognition which produces pleasure or pain (AKW §178).
Something akin to this appears in Baumgarten’s Reflections on Poetry where he discusses
the pleasure and pain associated with “sense representations” that can be either clear or confused
(RP §24-25) and explores the pleasure in the perfection of sound (RP §91-97). Baumgarten
expands this in the empirical psychology of Metaphysics where he considers pleasure and pain in
relation to the appetitive faculty (M Section XV, §656–62). That said, while Baumgarten
emphasizes throughout his works that poetry arouses affects, these discussions largely disappear
in Aesthetica as Baumgarten emphasizes the cognitive perfection at stake in aesthetics. And if
anything, for Baumgarten, perfection is related to the good rather than to happiness (“Something
is good if, when it is posited, a perfection is also posited,” M §100), and the perfection of
cognition to which pleasure is attached would be a marker of goodness not happiness. Thus,
there is still a missing link between beautiful thinking and a conception of happiness that extends
beyond the cognitive. Baumgarten fails to provide a connection between the cognitive faculty
and the faculty of desire that would definitively explain how thought and feeling—and more
specifically, how beautiful thinking and happiness—are connected in Aesthetica.33
It is worth noting here that once again Meier takes up Baumgarten’s work and follows
through this connection between perfection, goodness, and happiness by connecting thought and
emotion vis-à-vis the will or pleasure and pain. In the Foundations, Meier goes a step beyond
Baumgarten in that he includes rules for the arousal of “aesthetic affections” (Anf., §181-§187)
that explicitly connect pleasure, aesthetic cognition, and goodness (or badness). As a result,
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Meier creates the sorts of mechanisms necessary to understand how happiness would be the
result of beautiful thinking (even though he does not use the concept of happiness to characterize
beautiful thinking) and how happiness has both affective and cognitive dimensions. With the
mechanism of aesthetic affections, Meier gives us the means to understand how the happy
aesthetician would be happy as a result of beautiful thinking. But notably, Meier provides no
such character as the “happy aesthetician” in his own work. Rather for Meier, the analogous
character becomes the “beautiful spirit.”34
Resolving the question of how the happy aesthetician might be happy vis-à-vis Meier still
leaves the lingering question of why. In other words, knowing that the aesthetician could be
happy still leaves the question of whether she actually would be. While it is possible to see how
Baumgarten’s aesthetician might become happy as a result of perfecting beautiful thinking, why
happiness? Just as Baumgarten provides no argument for how the aesthetician might be happy,
he also does not suggest why happiness is important for aesthetics. If anything, one might argue
that Baumgarten is relying on an earlier strain of moral philosophy that would understand
happiness to be an obvious goal or sign of an ethical life. But this is particularly ill-suited to
Baumgarten, as Schwaiger points out, because his understanding of morality precisely rejects
happiness as an aim and considers obligation to be foundational for ethics, presenting happiness
most explicitly in connection with duty and goodness.35 What then are we to make of happiness
in Baumgarten? To begin to answer this question, we will now turn to contemporary feminist
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philosopher Sara Ahmed to explore her critique of the concept of happiness and examine how it
can be applied to Baumgarten.

1.6 The Happy Aesthetician and the Feminist Killjoy:
Baumgarten in Conversation with Ahmed
Ahmed opens her book The Promise of Happiness by raising a series of important
questions about happiness. She argues that while happiness is often posited as a universal human
desire, it is rarely defined in its own right and the communal nature of the desire for it is more
often assumed than justified. And while Ahmed does not cite Baumgarten or Meier, she does
reference their most famous reader—Kant—on the opening page of the book to consider his
presumption of the universal striving toward happiness and mournful recollection of its
indeterminacy (PH 1).
Ahmed notes from the very opening of the book that she is not concerned with what
happiness is but rather with what happiness does in the world—precisely the question I want to
ask of Baumgarten in this chapter. Raising the question of happiness, for Ahmed, means
interrogating all of the things that (supposedly) make us happy and why we desire to be happy in
the first place. She is particularly concerned with this idea that things “make” us happy, and the
first chapter of the text considers how our colloquial idea of being “made happy” recognizes that
happiness comes from outside of us. To explain this, Ahmed must note that she has “taken it as a
given that happiness involves good feeling” and that (regardless of various other arguments in
the history of philosophy) she finds it “hard to think about happiness without thinking about
feeling” (13).37
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One of these various other arguments that Ahmed does not engage with here is the discussion among
Artistotelians about Aristotle’s distinguishing between the happy life and the life of pleasure, which Ahmed
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This understanding of happiness that connects an “outside” to a subject through a good
feeling, I would argue, is an aesthetic notion of happiness that could be aligned with
Baumgarten’s own usage of the word. While the focus of the previous analysis was on
Baumgarten’s cognitivist bias in his later aesthetic writings, in his early aesthetic writings, he
purports to be motivated by the consideration of how some objects (foremost poems) arouse
feelings and how we might understand those connections.38 Ahmed’s task, as she sets its for
herself in The Promise of Happiness, is “to think about how feelings make some things and not
others good” (PH 13). One can see then, that Ahmed is situating herself, very critically, in the
midst of the many concepts that this chapter has shown are tenuously related in Baumgarten’s
work—happiness, goodness, and feelings. Therefore, understanding Ahmed’s critiques of these
concepts and returning to Baumgarten with them in mind may prove particularly fruitful in the
efforts to understand Baumgarten’s happy aesthetician.
As mentioned, Ahmed’s interest in happiness is to trace the philosophical gestures
through which happiness becomes aligned with the good.39 To do so, she suggests returning to
the root of the word happiness, which is “hap,” in order to recover the archaic sense of the word

connects or seemingly conflates here (more on her discussion of Aristotle in footnote 13). For those interested in
attending to Aristotle’s distinction between happiness and pleasure, see: J. C. B. Gosling and C. C. W. Taylor, The
Greeks On Pleasure (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982); G.E.L. Owen, “Aristotelian Pleasures,” in Logic,
Science, and Dialectic: Collected Papers in Greek Philosophy, edited by G.E.L. Owen and Martha Nussbaum
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986); Amélie Oksenberg Rorty “The Place of Pleasure in Aristotle's
Ethics,” Mind, 83 (332): 481–93; Urmson, J.O., “Aristotle on Pleasure,” in Aristotle: A Collection of Critical
Essays, edited by J.O. Urmson, (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 1967); David Wolfsdork, Pleasure in Ancient
Greek Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
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See for instance, Reflections on Poetry §25-26: “to arouse affects is poetic”) or §92-94 (“it is supremely poetic to
produce the highest pleasure or displeasure in the ear.”
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Ahmed clearly notes in her work that she is not claiming that “the Aristotelian [or, I would add, Kantian] approach
to eudaimonia can be reduced to this critique.” Rather, she says, “I am simply questioning the gesture that idealized
classical happiness over contemporary happiness” (PH 227). To question this gesture, she puts into conversation
more contemporary, societal and cultural conversations surrounding happiness with classical notions of happiness.
To understand her accounts of Aristotle and Kant’s work on eudaimonia and happiness, see Chapter 1 of The
Promise of Happiness.
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that emphasizes luck or good fortune. Rather than happiness being an earned result of hard work,
as it is often thought of now, happiness, Ahmed argues, must be realigned with its original notion
of chance and contingency. Doing so, she says, will allow us to reconsider how happiness
happens in the world rather than imagining happiness as something we produce or make (PH 22).
Ahmed appeals to John Locke to illustrate the ways in which we make judgments of objects
based on whether they produce pleasure or pain and that we call those objects that produce
pleasure “good.” She argues, however, that this association of pleasure with the good often
moves too quickly and takes pleasure to be too permanent. Instead, she says that “it is not that
good things cause pleasure, but that the experience of pleasure is how some things become good
for us over time” (PH 23).
Ahmed also wants to emphasize that in this schema happiness is conceived of simply as a
particularly great form of pleasure. As we experience that pleasure, we begin to seek it out, and
happiness becomes a particular orientation toward objects that produce pleasure for us. Thus,
Ahmed defines happiness as “an orientation toward the objects we come into contact with” (PH
24). Happiness is not a property of an object nor is it produced by the subject, rather it has a
double or reciprocal mode. When we say that something “makes us happy,” it is not that the
thing has caused our happiness, but that the pleasure we take in the thing involves a happy
orientation toward it, just as the experience of happiness registers that pleasure. As Ahmed
argues, “we are moved by things [and] in being moved, we make things” (PH 25). Certain things
make us happy and in being happy we make those happy things. If we briefly consider this in
Baumgartien aesthetic terms, certain beautiful objects affect us (richly, greatly, truthfully,
clearly, lively-ly) and in being affected we cognize them beautifully. This double or reciprocal
mode becomes one part of beautiful cognition that Baumgarten calls “the beauty of things and
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thoughts.” It denotes how the relationship between object and cognition of the object becomes a
site of aesthetic perfection itself, and how—akin to what Ahmed argues with happiness—this
makes beauty appear to be only a matter of cognition and not objects (or for Ahmed a matter of
our orientation toward the object rather than any particular object itself).
One of the problems with happiness, for Ahmed, is the way it takes on a futural quality.
Ahmed argues that throughout the history of philosophy happiness has been an end rather than a
means. Happiness, she seems to think (following philosophers like Aristotle), is always
teleological, always a desired end—and often the ultimately desired end. As a result, objects
become good insofar as they provide a means to happiness. These objects are simply
instrumental. Ahmed also interprets this teleological quality of happiness temporally, arguing
that insofar as happiness is always something pointed-toward then it is always, in a certain sense,
futural. Thus “we arrive at some things because they point us toward happiness … [but] an
object can point toward happiness without necessarily having affected us in a good way” (PH
27). In that happiness is the ultimate goal, objects can become markers that point toward
happiness without actually producing any pleasure. And as a result, “happiness becomes a
question of following rather than finding” (PH 32). What Ahmed wants to point out here is that if
happiness is taken as the ultimate end of desire, and as such maintains this futural quality, then
happiness is forever a forward direction that can never be perfectly or entirely achieved. It is
only a promise, never actually a reward.
The second problem with happiness that Ahmed wants to emphasize is precisely the
status of this “reward” and how happiness comes to be equated with goodness. As a result of
cultural narratives and philosophical arguments that establish the futural quality of happiness,
“objects not only embody good feeling; they come to embody the good life” (PH 33). Following
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Locke again, Ahmed argues that if happiness is an orientation toward objects, it becomes an
orientation toward particular objects that are regulated by taste. It is here, Ahmed points out, that
happiness loses its “hap,” as taste is not simply a matter of chance but a matter of innate sense
and cultural training over time. The concept of taste illustrates how the pleasure we take in
objects is not just a matter of personal affect and orientation but also of social discourses and
expectations. 40 These expectations teach or train us in regard to what objects to orient ourselves
toward and what objects we should find pleasure in since they are accepted markers of
happiness. Thus, Ahmed argues, “we acquire habits, as forms of good taste that differentiate
between objects in terms of their affective as well as moral value. We have to work on the body
such that the body’s immediate reactions, how we sense the world and make sense of the world,
take us in the ‘right’ direction” (PH 34). Here Ahmed points out how happiness evolves from a
simple taking pleasure in an object to an intensive social training of what objects are not only
pleasurable but also good. When the good feelings of happiness become a matter of good taste,
then the objects take on a social quality in which they are identified as good separately from their
evocation of pleasurable feelings. The goal of happiness then becomes not seeking pleasure but
cultivating the habit of identifying the good or moving in the “right” direction.
Ahmed’s final point of critique in this chapter, though, is not simply that happiness
becomes a habit as a matter of taste, but rather the ways in which that habit disappears and
happiness appears to be free again. Citing a Bourdieuian critique of Kant, Ahmed highlights how
“to have good habits is to be oriented in the right way toward the right objects (not to insist on
being proximate to objects that insist on enjoyment)” (PH 34). What the emphasis on taste in
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One might think of Hume’s discussion of taste here in which he articulates taste as a “natural equality” but then
argues that it is in agreement among critics who have developed and perfected their sense of taste in which the “true
standard of taste and beauty” is found. David Hume, “On the Standard of Taste,” in Essays. Moral, Political and
Literary, edited by Eugene Miller, (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1985), 241.
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relation to pleasure does, Ahmed argues, is attempts to “liberate” happiness from the body by
making happiness merely a matter of cultivating a particular cognitive relation to an object,
separate from sensory enjoyment of the object. “To work on the body such that you have the
right reactions,” Ahmed argues, “allows the body to disappear from view” in that the work of the
body in reacting comes to appear as “natural” or “given” (PH 34). Thus, happiness, which was
originally rooted in the sensation of pleasure prior to a logical cognition of that sensation,
through certain readings of aesthetics becomes almost entirely divorced from sensual experience
of the world. Rather “happiness is about learning to be affected by objects in the right way. The
very possibility that we can affect our affections by action, or through will or reason, becomes
the basis of an ethical imperative” (PH 36).41 Here Ahmed shows again how happiness is aligned
with the good, this time, however, appearing as self-evidently good. We do not just follow our
pleasure toward happiness, rather we establish what makes us happy by cultivating our affects in
the right way. This is an ethical or moral imperative, not simply a sensory drive.
At this point, Ahmed’s critique of happiness can be brought to bear on Baumgarten in
order to see how her reading of the function of happiness is and is not operative in his work.
Remembering that Ahmed’s question is not ‘what is happiness?’ but ‘what does happiness do?’,
it seems evident from the work in this chapter that Baumgarten is precisely one of the thinkers
who presume the universality of happiness while failing to define the term. As has been shown,
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When reading Ahmed on this point, I think about Wesley Morris’ 2018 essay for New York Times Magazine in
which he recounts a conversation with another black man where he admitted to questioning the believability of Issa
Rae’s popular show Insecure. As a result, Moore was admonished by his conversation partner for failing to
recognize the cultural importance of the show and Rae’s status as a black woman. Moore says, “My tablemate
insisted that who and what the show represents are more important than whether the show works for me.” This is
exactly what I think Ahmed is talking about when she critiques how aesthetics becomes a matter of taste at the
expense of pleasure—how Moore’s experience of the show (his lack of pleasure, in this instance) becomes irrelevant
in the face of a larger cultural narrative of taste (which in this case must consider racial representation and its rarity)
that argues he must enjoy the show. Wesley Morris. "Should Art Be a Battleground for Social Justice?" The New
York Times. October 03, 2018.

69

he repeatedly uses the concept of happiness in relation to the beautiful and the good without
giving a definition of what happiness is. What, however, does happiness do for Baumgarten?
That’s not entirely clear either. In reading his work, there is no argument for why the concept of
happiness emerges to describe the aesthetician. In fact, what the aesthetician does is think
beautifully, not happily. Why not call her the beautiful aesthetician, then? As killjoys/readers, we
must ask what implicit work the concept of happiness is doing for Baumgarten when he
describes the aesthetician as happy.
While Baumgarten provides no answer, I would like to suggest (following Ahmed’s
general critique) that he describes the aesthetician as happy in order to align aesthetics with
goodness. It behooves him to mark the aesthetician as happy in order to elevate the status of the
science of aesthetics. Since introducing aesthetics in Reflections on Poetry, Baumgarten
consistently argues that aesthetics is necessary to understand the lower faculties of cognition. In
the opening of Aesthetics, he spends a dozen sections defending aesthetics as a true science, and
he argues that it serves as a “sister” to logic (A §13). If Baumgarten identifies happiness with
aesthetics (rather than logic, which he identifies with knowledge of the truth), then he gives
aesthetics a stronger valence of the good and makes it a more desirable category. There is no
“happy logician” for Baumgarten (or other early modern thinkers), but he argues that there is a
“happy aesthetician.” As Ahmed says, “when happiness is assumed to be a self-evident good,
then it becomes evidence of the good” (PH 13). Insofar as Baumgarten saw happiness to be a
self-evident good, then branding the aesthetician as happy provides evidence of the good in
aesthetics. It seems that Baumgarten precisely uses happiness in the way that Ahmed critiques.
By failing to provide any substantive definition of or function for the concept, he employs it
instrumentally for external aims.
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Ahmed’s critique of happiness, of course, extends beyond this use of happiness as
evidence of the good, and she is also concerned with how happiness becomes a habit that makes
it appear as a free affect when it is in fact a cultivated reaction. Baumgarten’s happy aesthetician
is certainly actively cultivating her aesthetic habits. Baumgarten devotes a large part of his plan
for Aesthetica, in fact, to outlining the habits of the happy aesthetician in terms of innate
aesthetic temperament, aesthetic exercises, aesthetic teaching, aesthetic enthusiasm, and aesthetic
improvement (A Sections II-VII). All of these, he suggests, are means of thinking beautifully as
one develops the perfections of sensuous cognition that is rich, great, truthful, clear, certain, and
lively.
The problem with happiness in relation to habit for Ahmed, however, is not simply that
habits exist but the way that they disappear as cultivated responses and appear to be free
reactions. As previously mentioned, Ahmed is openly critical of aesthetic thinking that locates
the aesthetic in the disappearance of consciously cultivated good habits into the “freedom” of
disinterested aesthetic experience and taste (PH 35). Baumgarten’s continual emphasis on habit,
however, does not allow it to disappear so easily. To achieve the perfection of beautiful thinking
the happy aesthetician must cultivate a number of aesthetic habits. One might be able to see how
the disappearance of those habits may be an ultimate goal for Baumgarten as those habits would
perhaps be less necessary or appear given were perfection to be obtained, but Baumgarten
himself makes no such assertion.42 Therefore, while one can see in Baumgarten’s presumption of
happiness the implicit suggestion of an aesthetic good, there is not yet the more dangerous (for
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In fact, Kant has to get rid of the notion of perfection all together in order to establish his aesthetic system that
frees aesthetics from habit (as Ahmed claims), so this liberatory quality that Ahmed critiques which conceals habit
as freedom doesn’t seem to be at play in Baumgarten because of his reliance on perfection.
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Ahmed) articulation of aesthetics in which the habitual cultivation of happiness is mistaken for
free sensation.
Using Ahmed’s critique of happiness to reread Baumgarten’s underdeveloped account of
happiness provides new understanding of the work happiness does for Baumgarten, even if it still
fails to define the concept of happiness in his work. Following Ahmed through her critique of
happiness and taste, however, also severely undermines the value of Baumgarten’s aesthetic
project if his assertion that the aesthetician is happy only serves to align his aesthetics with the
good. To perhaps reclaim some of the value for Baumgarten’s aesthetic system, this chapter will
conclude by reconsidering his happy aesthetician alongside Ahmed’s feminist killjoy to better
understand the status of “happiness” and “joy” for these two figures.
The character of the feminist killjoy is introduced in the second chapter of Ahmed’s The
Promise of Happiness to explore the consequences of refusing happiness in a society founded on
the inevitability of the universality of desiring it. Feminist consciousness, Ahmed argues, is not
only consciousness of gendered experience but also “consciousness of the violence and power
that are concealed under the languages of civility and love” (PH 86). Throughout her critique of
happiness, Ahmed strives to show how it “provides as it were a cover, a way of covering over
what resists or is resistant to a view of the world, or a worldview as harmonious” (PH 83-4). The
feminist, in her awareness of this covering-over, must then always be uncovering the violence
and power at stake in things in which people find pleasure or stability. She must be upsetting
their happiness in order to show what lies beneath or within—always introducing dissonance to
harmony. This certainly kills many peoples’ joy. And, as Ahmed says, “feminists do kill joy in a
certain sense: they disturb the very fantasy that happiness can be found in certain places” (PH
66). Ahmed underscores just how widespread and pervasive these fantasies can be in the world
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in her more recent text Living a Feminist Life. There she highlights how “you can cause
unhappiness by noticing something. And if you can cause unhappiness by noticing something,
you realize that the world you are in is not the world you thought you were in” (LFL 62). The
feminist killjoy, in this sense, changes the world by noticing and uncovering something
disturbing and painful, and insofar as she produces unhappiness in doing so, she becomes “bad.”
For her, the earlier-articulated process of how something pleasurable is transformed into
something good occurs inversely or in the negative.
This may be precisely what Baumgarten is trying to avoid when he affixes the label of
“happy” to the aesthetician. From the moment Baumgarten establishes “aesthetics” as a science
alongside logic, he initiates a certain kind of break within a tradition that has emphasized the
pervasiveness of logic. In articulating why and how aesthetics is a “sister science” to logic, he
attempts to elevate what has forever been a “lower” faculty. He marks thinking beautifully as just
as important as thinking logically, and in doing so he reorganizes and introduces dissonance into
a system that has always emphasized harmony and completion.
This said, it must be noted that Baumgarten himself works to uphold the values of
harmony and completion in his aesthetic science. He keeps the emphasis on perfection, and he
considers beauty a matter of not only one but three agreements (“the unified agreement of
thoughts among themselves” is the beauty of things and thoughts or the beauty of appearance;
“the agreement of the order in which we think about beautiful things” is the beauty of order; and
“the internal agreement of signs” is the beauty of signification [A §18-20]). Baumgarten’s idea
of “the beauty of sensuous cognition and the tastefulness of things” emphasizes “the maximal
possible agreement of the appearances” (A §24), and his description of beautiful thinking
demands the agreement of six aesthetic qualities.
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But even in consistently affirming the importance of harmony and agreement,
Baumgarten always seems to belie this harmony within his system. If we understand happiness
(for Baumgarten) to be a matter of increased perfection of cognition as was explored in previous
sections, in the case of aesthetics it is still a different kind of perfection for a different kind of
cognition than in the logical traditions. While Baumgarten affirms the value of harmony, his
valorization of the lower faculty still belies its difference as he works to explain the aesthetic
perfections of the qualities of richness, greatness, truth, clarity, certainty, and life that he
introduces. In the case of certainty, this difference even slips into his organization of the system,
where he renames the category persuasion to highlight aesthetic certainty, which is different than
logical certainty which he calls conviction. These six qualities that comprise the perfection of
cognition themselves also seem to introduce difference into Baumgarten’s system, as it never
becomes clear how to value them in relation to each other and which one or another may be more
important. Baumgarten emphasizes that they must all be “in agreement with each other in a
representation” but what does that actually look like? He certainly has a drive to perfection, order
and agreement in his system, but he himself cannot seem to realize this ideal and the workingsout of his system betray his emphasis on perfection always defined as agreement. Therefore,
while Baumgarten is certainly not a thinker of radical difference on his own terms (as he
attempts to uphold values of harmony and agreement in his philosophy), it is notable that his
system introduces difference and dissonance in many places where there had previously only
been sameness by consistently articulating and elevating the sensuous and sensible nature of
aesthetics in a philosophical framework that traditionally valued logic over sensation.
Thus, perhaps describing the aesthetician as happy is precisely a way to mask the
disagreement Baumgarten introduces in his thought and to cover up the ways that his aesthetics
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and the aesthetician are resistant to a more exclusively logical view of the world. Were the
aesthetician to truly fulfill Baumgarten’s articulations and introduce new modes of perfection,
new standards for cognition, and new emphases on the lower faculties, she would likely not be
happy or would at least not find her happiness in the world because she would be resisting
dominant constructions of happiness as agreement and perfection. In fact, following Ahmed’s
killjoy, she would likely be causing unhappiness as she noticed something lacking in an
emphasis on logic in life or a system that valorized the higher faculties.
By performing this killjoy reading that uncovers the work of happiness to cover
unhappiness and disturbs the happy fantasy of Baumgarten’s happy aesthetician, we have now
aligned her with the feminist killjoy. Insofar as the aesthetician would end up disturbing longheld truths about the world, she would kill a certain kind of joy in a world that conceives of itself
through those terms. Unlike the rationalist and aesthetic thinkers that create various
constellations of beauty, goodness, and happiness based on harmony and agreement, she would
revel in modes of dissonance that elevate the sensuous as equal to the logical. She would expose
the limitations of logic to explain all modes of experience, and she would propose her own
sensible understandings beyond those limitations. If we think, even briefly, of one way in which
this could work: the fact that, as Ahmed says, happiness in the traditional sense is oriented
toward the future means that it also requires a sort of linear temporality that supports the
concept—a linear concept of time in which the future is always ahead of us and we are always
directed toward and in relationship to it as the time in which we’ll be happy. This linearity could
also be related to a framework that is needed by the notion of logic and its intensity. As we’ve
seen here (particularly in Leibniz, but also in how Baumgarten takes up Leibniz), that intensity is
defined by progress toward the perfection of cognition. If we deconstruct this linear temporality
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vis-à-vis killing the joy of the happy aesthetician, then we can begin to see how the breadth that
describes the criteria for aesthetic knowledge as extensive clarity might have introduced already
a completely different temporal framework: not progress but simultaneity. If aesthetics requires a
completely different temporal framework than logic, that further shows (as I’ve claimed here) to
what extent it is radically different than logic. It’s only after reading Ahmed and her critique of
happiness that it makes sense to go back and ask these questions.
So while the “happy” aesthetician might create unhappiness for some, this has to do with
how she disrupts logic and does not necessarily mean that she would be unhappy. Rather as
Ahmed admits, the “happy” aesthetician would find that “there can even be joy in killing joy”
(PH 87). For Ahmed, killing joy is a matter of uncovering false truths and living outside their
harmonies; it is a matter of standing in opposition to a culture that covers up unhappiness with
happiness. The feminist killjoy finds joy in reclaiming her experience outside the agreement of
oppressive narratives. Analogously, the “happy” aesthetician can take joy in uncovering the
value of sensuous cognition and challenging the dominance of logic. She would not be happy in
the way that Baumgarten seems to posit as a self-evident result of beautiful thinking, but she
would be “happy” in her own subversive (rather than harmonious) way.

1.7 Conclusion
As has been explored in this chapter, Baumgarten establishes a new realm—the aesthetic
realm—alongside the long-established logical realm in philosophy. He identifies extensive
clarity as the cognitive mode of that realm, and he populates it with a new system of values that
can serve as an ethos for the happy aesthetician. While Baumgarten’s work is often understated
or dismissed as simply a coining of the term “aesthetics” by contemporary scholars, I argue here
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that Baumgarten’s break with his rationalist predecessors and development of the aesthetic realm
as uniquely analogous to logic is an incredibly important contribution to philosophy that makes
possible the German idealist work in aesthetics that follows him.
In addition to claiming this prominence of Baumgarten’s work, I also argue that we must
take seriously his claim that the aesthetician would be happy and equally seriously his failure to
explain how or why. This failure calls us to read his text as killjoys and to critique his use of the
concept of happiness in order consider what other work his “happy” aesthetician does. As
Ahmed argues, “if we [feminist killjoys] do not assume that happiness is what we must defend, if
we start questioning that happiness we are defending, then we can ask other questions about life,
about what we want for life, or what we want life to become” (PH 218).
Reconsidering how Baumgarten’s aesthetic thought conceives of happiness allows us to
better consider the differences he introduces by elevating the lower faculties of cognition, by
articulating how sensuous experience may have its own perfections, and by considering a world
in which thinking beautifully is as important as or even more important than thinking logically.
Once we consider these differences, we are better able to understand what work happiness does
for Baumgarten. While he seems to designate the aesthetician as happy in order mask her
subversive potential, perhaps she is “happy” precisely because she has reorganized the hierarchy
of philosophical sciences and her own experience of the world. If we reread Baumgarten through
our own lenses as killjoys, we uncover dissonance where there was once only harmony and
agreement and rediscover the aesthetician’s “happiness” alongside the subversive potential in
Baumgarten’s aesthetics.
In considering this chapter in the scope of the larger project, I think that it points to
certain successes and challenges of the work already. As I wrote in the introduction, in this
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dissertation I set out to trace two inverse through lines in the thought of three German idealist
aesthetic thinkers and three contemporary feminist thinkers. I wanted to explore how the German
idealist aesthetic tradition begins with an attempt to understand the incomprehensibility of
certain (beautiful) objects and works its way to respect for them and their freedom, and (2) how
the feminist tradition cited here begins with the necessity of respect for the position of others and
then cultivates new modes of encountering and embracing incomprehensibility between
individuals.
At the end of this chapter, I don’t think either of those through lines are clear yet, but we
are beginning to see their beginnings. I see the first most evidently in Baumgarten’s explanation
of extensive clarity. There we can find moments of an attempt to understand an object in a way
that doesn’t plumb its depths, a way that respects its incomprehensibility, perhaps how the object
can only be felt rather than understood. I don’t think Baumgarten is yet asking (or answering)
questions about the (in)comprehensibility of (beautiful) objects or whether or not they must be
respected or considered free. But I do see Baumgarten’s work as necessary for Kant to even ask
the questions about pleasure, taste, and aesthetic experience that he raises in the third Critique.
Without Baumgarten, there isn’t a distinct realm of aesthetics for Kant to assign the power of
judgment (as will be explored in chapter two). Without Kant and Baumgarten, there isn’t an
aesthetic dimension/disposition in which Schiller can find objects that demand we emulate their
freedom (as will be explained in chapter three). The trajectory of that through line remains to be
traced, but I think that we can now see how it begins here with Baumgarten.
I think it’s perhaps less apparent how Ahmed serves as the beginning of the inverse
through line in which the feminist thinkers cited in this project begin with the necessity of
respect for the positions of others and then cultivate new modes of encountering and embracing
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incomprehensibility between individuals. In fact, I don’t think that’s how I would characterize
Ahmed’s overall project at all, and I haven’t done any work here to present her entire body of
work with claims for its aims and accomplishments.
What I have done is present her critique of happiness and her characterization of the
feminist killjoy. The feminist killjoy is a character whose politics I think certainly begin with a
call for the recognition of the positions of others, specifically a recognition of the systems of
power those positions exist in and the relative privilege and disadvantage ourselves and others
acquire as a result. As Ahmed writes in Living a Feminist Life, “a killjoy manifesto thus begins
by recognizing inequalities as existing. This recognition is enacted by the figure of the killjoy
herself: she kills joy because of what she claims exists” (LFL 252).
The work Ahmed assigns the killjoy then certainly is the work of respecting difference
between individuals, but because that difference is always being recognized in the negative for
her, I’d say that it is less about cultivating new modes of embracing that difference and more
about constantly unveiling and revealing it, no matter the negative consequence. Ahmed argues
that the feminist killjoy “is assembled around violence; how she comes to matter, to mean, is
how she exposes violence” (LFL 252), and she proffers two early mottos for her: “it is a downer;
we are downers” and “we must stay unhappy with this world” (LFL 252).
This portion of Ahmed’s work, I’d therefore argue, does mark the beginning of the
through line I’m trying to trace here. Her work on happiness and the feminist killjoy is an effort
to identify difference—the difference between societal myths and material reality, the difference
between one person and another, the difference between us and them, the difference between the
story of a happy life and the reality of pain and exploitation it relies on. Ahmed’s work marks the
opening up of the emotional and political space between ourselves and others so that it can be
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laid bare, made visible, and felt raw, and she doesn’t shy away from the displeasure that can
cause. She marks the beginning of this through line because the killjoy does the vital and, on her
argument, violent work of articulating difference from the position of the oppressed that is
necessary if we ever are going to cultivate new modes of encountering and meaningfully
cultivating incomprehensibility between us.
While the through line that I’m tracing between Baumgarten, Kant, and Schiller is in
some ways a progressive one, evolving from one thinker to the other to eventually reach a
culmination, I want to make clear now that I don’t see the trajectory between Ahmed, Lugones,
and Lorde functioning that way. It’s not that there is no Lugones without Ahmed or no Lorde
without them both (although you might argue that there is no Ahmed without Lorde, as Ahmed
cites Lorde’s work often as a personal touchstone). Rather, I think that each of them speaks to
different moments of this through line. If we are tracing a path from a respect for otherness to
modes and methods of cultivating relation among difference (as I intend to do), Ahmed
represents the constant discomfort, disease, and disavowal of norms that that work always
requires. It’s not that one can accomplish that work and move on to the next step of the process
that Lugones or Lorde might have to offer (as one could perhaps “accomplish” Baumgarten’s
project and move on to Kant’s then Schiller’s). The work Ahmed assigns to the killjoy must
always be going on. If the work is going to be feminist, it will always require the act of killing
joy. As Ahmed puts it in a sentence I love: “grumps are a feminist lump” (LFL 264).
As a conclusion to this chapter, I’d like to return to my museum encounter with
Marshall’s painting Untitled (Mirror Girl) that I opened this dissertation with. In considering
what Baumgarten and Ahmed might have to offer me in that moment, I’m struck by two things.
First, Baumgarten’s expansive notion of extensive clarity that invites me to experience the
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painting not only for the world contextualized within it but also perhaps for the context of my
encounter with it, a gentle encouragement to open the experience circumscriptively and
ecologically through a receptive approach rather than to plumb its depths for meaning in an
academic or technical way. And second, I’m also struck by something Ahmed writes in her
feminist killjoy manifesto in Living a Feminist Life. One of the principles of that manifesto is to
“put the hap back into happiness” (265) and in describing it she frames hap and happiness in
terms of care. As I quoted in the epigraph to this chapter, she says:
What would it mean to care for something, whether or not it breaks? Maybe we can
reorient caring from caring for someone’s happiness to caring what happens to someone
or something: caring about what happens, caring whatever happens. We might call this a
hap care rather than a happiness care. A hap care would not be about letting an object go,
but holding on to an object by letting oneself go, giving oneself over to something that is
not one’s own. A hap care would not seek to eliminate anxiety from care; it could even be
described as care for the hap. Caring is anxious—to be full of care, to be careful, is to
take care of things by becoming anxious about their future, where the future is embodied
in the fragility of an object whose persistence matters. Our care would pick up the pieces
of a shattered pot. Our care would not turn the things into a memorial, but value each
piece; shattering as the beginning of another story. (LFL 266)
In this quote, I hear the mixed feelings I felt in the face of the painting recast as a moment of
care, a moment in which I felt the pull to give myself over to something that was not my own, in
which I was anxious, fragile, and embedded in the hap. In that moment, I felt my own selfperception could shatter, but that would also be all right, because that shattering would simply
mark a new beginning.
I don’t offer these brief reflections as a definitive reading of my experience, but I do
consider them a clue, a piece of the puzzle perhaps that will develop across the remaining
chapters here. In a fortuitous case of hap, the next chapter will also open with an anecdote about
shattering—this one shared by Lugones about her mother’s approach to objects in her childhood
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home. Beginning with that anecdote, I’ll continue tracing the through lines of this project in the
work of Lugones and Kant.
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CHAPTER TWO
Double Vision as Double Tongue:
Reading Kant and Lugones “Together” at the Limen
Just because it fell on the floor and broke in half and you glued it
and you have to fill it half way, so stuff doesn’t drip from the side,
it doesn’t stop being a tureen (or a flower pot for “centros de mesa,”
or maybe it’ll be good as one of those thingamajigs to put things in).
It’s still good. And it hasn’t changed its “nature” either. She
has always had multiple functions for it, many possibilities.
Its multiplicity has always been obvious to her.
María Lugones (PP 124)

In the previous chapter, I considered how Baumgarten’s elevation of confused cognition
established aesthetics as an equal, perhaps superior, science to logic, and I performed a feminist
killjoy reading á la Ahmed to question how his assertion that the aesthetician must be happy
undermined the subversive potential of his project.
I was first drawn to writing about Baumgarten’s aesthetics because of the potential I saw
in his understanding of confused cognition to challenge the superiority of logic. I wanted to
understand what kind of knowledge might emerge if extensive clarity were seen as its own realm
of relation, and I wanted to explore the theoretical implications of the “sister science” of
aesthetics from Baumgarten’s perspective and from a critical feminist perspective. So in that
chapter, I performed a systematic philosophical explication of Baumgarten’s work and countered
it with the biting logic of the feminist killjoy.
While I won’t be returning to Baumgarten in this chapter, it too started from being drawn
to a moment I identified as confused cognition—this time not as a theoretical position but as seen
through a philosopher’s explication of her (mother’s) experience. In the epigraph above, Lugones
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shares her experience of her mother’s relationship to objects in their home. While she in other
places recounts finding her mother’s way of thinking damaging, here Lugones attempts to
perceive her mother in a loving way. As a result, she is able to see how each object has multiple
functions for her mother. Nothing is ever broken; it only has a new use. Nothing is ever
determined; its “nature” is always unfolding.
In reading this anecdote, I was drawn to how Lugones’ mother approaches the world, and
I could sense how her seeing every object collecting many functions, senses, and ideas together
could somehow be aligned with Baumgarten’s not-so-happy aesthetician’s circling toward the
perfection of poetic cognition through extensive clarity.
In this chapter, I want to attend to that intuition connecting Lugones’ mother and the
“happy” aesthetician by exploring a number of key concepts in Lugones’ work—play, health,
love, and common sense—in terms of their aesthetic registers. Lugones herself gestures toward
the aesthetic underpinnings of her thinking in the introduction to Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes
where she cites Arthur Danto’s The Wake of Art as a primary text for her conception of “worlds”
(PP 21-26). But rather than turning to Danto (or even back to Baumgarten) to make this aesthetic
connection, I want to consider Lugones’ aesthetic registers specifically through the system
elaborated by Kant in the Critique of the Power of Judgment.
As I previewed in the introduction to this project, I know that Lugones and Kant are an
unorthodox pairing. What I hope to show here is that (1) they’re both thinkers of play, health,
love and common sense and (2) by attending to their different constructions of and concerns with
those concepts, we can actually learn a lot about both thinkers’ projects as a whole and raise
important questions about the transcendental and material conditions of each. For example, in
attending to play, we can see how Kant’s emphasis on disinterestedness makes aesthetic
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experience largely inaccessible to marginalized and oppressed people. In attending to health, we
can understand how Lugones’ mention of health requires external resources to unpack what she
means there. In attending to common sense, we can question whether it is best considered
universally or singularly and how one’s relationship to power and the common shapes one’s
sense of what’s “common” about common sense. In looking at all of these, we’ll see how reading
Kant’s aesthetic system through Lugones’ decolonial project helps us see material concerns even
in a transcendental structure, and in turn how reading Lugones’ decolonial project through
Kant’s aesthetic system helps us raise questions about the structural conditions of oppression not
always obvious in the material concerns.
There is also a performative level to this effort. In this chapter, I aim to take up Lugones’
methodology of double vision as a preparation for “world”-travelling and loving perception.
When Lugones writes of the “world”-traveler, she says, “sometimes, the ‘world’-traveler has a
double image of herself and each self includes as important ingredients of itself one or more
attributes that are incompatible with one or more attributes of the other self” (PP 92). In reading
as a “world”-traveler, I must maintain this double image and hold these incompatible parts of
myself, my readings, these thinkers, and their texts together without collapsing them—much like
Lugones’ mother did the pieces of the broken vase. I’ll read Kant and Lugones together. I’ll read
German aesthetics and decolonial feminism together. And I’ll read as a woman and as a
philosopher, together.
Attempting this can be dizzying. Likely because maintaining double vision is an unsteady
process and the status of “togetherness” it yields is unstable. As I read these thinkers side-byside, I aim to create a liminal space, a between, a limen. And this limen itself is doubled. It’s not
a space where these two thinkers occupy common ground. Rather, it’s a space opened within the
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work of each thinker where the other can be read or into which I can bring the other and myself.
In that space, I can see and share (1) the aesthetic underpinnings and applications of Lugones’
feminist political thought and (2) the precarious politics (from a feminist perspective) within
Kant’s aesthetic philosophy. This requires translating that double vision into a double tongue, as
Lugones puts it. As we’ll learn by the end of this chapter, I have to be able to speak to the
Critique and to la callejera simultaneously. At times I succeed, and at other moments, I stumble,
but what proceeds here feels fruitful and fertile to me all the same.
This chapter is organized through the series of aforementioned concepts (play, health,
love, and common sense) that I read in both Lugones’ and Kant’s work in turn. First, I consider
the possibilities and meanings of play in Lugones’ discussion of playfulness and Kant’s
articulation of free play in order to understand why they take very different stances on ease and
interest. Then, I raise questions about the role that health plays in Lugones’ conception of the
self, and I try to decipher it through Kant’s conception of health in relation to aesthetics. After
that, I consider how loving playfulness might be akin to a (Kantian) sublime disposition as a
bridge to my discussion of the role that sensus communis plays in universalizing Kant’s sense of
aesthetic judgment and my reflection on how Lugones’ critique of common sense undermines his
efforts.
On this final point, I make a gesture similar to the one I made in the last chapter,
attempting to explore how Lugones’ critique of common sense can help us focus on the radical,
disruptive potential of aesthetic judgment that Kant points toward but fails to emphasize, perhaps
even undermines, in his writings. I tease this out through the character of Lugones’ reading of la
callejera, and I conclude by turning to Lugones’ discussion of complex communication, ending
with my reflections on the idea of a double tongue as it appears in Lugones’ work and in my
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methods in this chapter. There is a lot of theoretical and methodological work between here and
there, so first, play.

2.1 Playfulness and Free Play in Lugones and Kant
2.1.1 Dismissing Being-at-Ease: Understanding Playfulness in Lugones’ “Worlds”
In this section, I aim to unravel the connections between play, ease, and “world”travelling in Lugones’ work through a close reading of the chapter “Playfulness, ‘World’Travelling, and Loving Perception” from Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes. My goal is to explain how
Lugones ultimately understands play through her conception of “world”-travelling and dismisses
being-at-ease as a necessary condition for playfulness. The purpose of Lugones’ analysis is
manifold: she wants to explore her experience as an outsider to white/Anglo U.S. culture; she
wants to speak to the pluralistic construction of selves for anyone who inhabits a similar
marginalized or “outsider” position; she wants to explore whether or how feminism (in a
theoretical and in an activist sense) can hold the very different positions and perspectives of
diverse women; and she wants to resolve why she can’t be playful in certain places. So, she
opens up all of these concerns by reflecting on her experience of being playful in one “world”
and not in another because that latter “world” excludes certain (playful) possibilities for her
through its construction of her as an “outsider.”
Thus, Lugones comes to the question of play politically and personally. In the
introduction of Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes, she argues that “playfulness in me, for me, is not a
frivolous, disposable quality in me or in my loving. It is at the crux of liberation” (PP 33). She
then expands on playfulness very personally, grounding it materially and historically in her own
life. She opens the chapter “Playfulness, ‘World’-Travelling, and Loving Perception” with
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precisely this personal orientation, saying: “This chapter weaves two aspects of my life together.
My coming to consciousness as a daughter and my coming to consciousness as a woman of color
have made this weaving possible” (PP 77). Part of these dual coming-to-consciousnesses is a
reckoning with whether or not she is playful. Lugones speaks of her experience of playfulness as
a painful realization. She says:
Some time ago, I came to be in a state of profound confusion as I experienced myself as
both having and not having a particular attribute. I was sure I had the attribute in question
and, on the other hand, I was sure that I did not have it. I remain convinced that I both
have and do not have this attribute. The attribute of playfulness. I am sure that I am a
playful person. On the other hand, I can say, painfully, that I am not a playful person.
(PP 86)
As illustrated here, the question of playfulness brings up pleasure and displeasure for Lugones
immediately when she says “painfully” that she is not a playful person. Not being playful is
painful for her, whereas being playful yields a certain sort of pleasure. Considering this pleasure
and displeasure, Lugones then conjectures that she must only be playful when she is at ease. She
says:
So I said to myself “Okay, maybe what’s happening here is that there is an attribute that I
do have but there are certain “worlds” in which I am not at ease and it is because I’m not
at ease in those “worlds” that I don’t have that attribute in those “worlds.” But what does
that mean?” (PP 87)
Lugones’ argument here hinges on her conception of “worlds.” Rather than playfulness being a
matter of ease, Lugones argues that being playful (or not) is a matter of the construction of the
“world.” As she states previously, “I am not a playful person in certain ‘worlds’” (PP 86).
For Lugones, a “world” (and she insists on the quotation marks to refuse the fixity of any
traditional conception of the word or idea world), “has to be inhabited at present by some flesh
and blood people” (PP 87). A “world” is not the world of the mind nor is it a hypothetical or
theoretical world. A “world” is material and concrete. A “world,” she also argues, “may be an
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actual society, given its dominant culture’s description and construction of life, including a
construction of the relationship of production, of gender, race, etc.” (PP 87) but it is problematic
to argue that any society holds only one “world.” One society likely holds many “worlds”
through which its members move as either aligned with or resistant to dominant culture. She
argues that a “world” “can also be such a society given a nondominant, a resistant construction”
and it “need not be a construction of a whole society” (PP 87). Thus, “world” and society cannot
simply be collapsed. Some “worlds” may hold only a few people and some “worlds” may hold
millions. All or none of those people could be in the same society.
Analogously for Lugones, just as no society is encompassed by one world, no person
only inhabits one world. For Lugones, each individual inhabits many “worlds.” This inhabiting,
however, is not a matter of an active agent choosing which “worlds” she inhabits. Rather, being a
member of a “world” is often the matter of being perceived to be a member of a “world” and
being perceived as what that “world” constructs one to be. Lugones provides the example that
“one can be at the same time in a ‘world’ that constructs one as stereotypically Latina, for
example, and in a ‘world’ that constructs one as simply Latina” (PP 89). The status of being
“stereotypically” or “simply” Latina is not a matter of the self-identification of a person, rather it
is a matter of the perception and societal-construction of that person by a particular “world.” It
does not require that that person understand that construction (e.g. what it means to be
“stereotypically” or “simply” Latina), rather, Lugones notes that a person may animate
constructions that exist in a “world” without understanding or accepting those accounts of
oneself (PP 86). In this way, each person may find themselves seemingly containing
contradictory attributes—as Lugones found herself both playful and not-playful. Those
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attributes, however, are not simply qualities the person does or does not have; they are complex
relationships between oneself and the perceptions of the “world” one is inhabiting.
To resolve this seeming contradiction, Lugones argues that any one person is a different
person in each of her worlds. She may find herself a member of dominant cultures in certain
“worlds” and nondominant cultures in other “worlds”; she may be stereotypically something in
one “world” and simply so in another “world”; she may be playful in one “world” and notplayful in another “world.” As she moves between these “worlds,” Lugones argues, she is a
different person in each. Thus, it is not a matter of one person containing contradictory attributes
but of one person moving between contradictory worlds.
The movement between “worlds”—and therefore the movement between persons—is
what Lugones calls traveling: “the shift from being one person to being a different person is what
I call traveling” (PP 89). And Lugones is clear to articulate that there is no “underlying ‘I’” that
remains constant between these worlds. While one may in some sense remember oneself across
worlds and even refer to a unified self across worlds, Lugones argues that when one recognizes a
“me” or “I” in another world, that is not in fact a moment of recognition, because “one does not
experience any underlying I” (PP 90). This is why Lugones defines “world”-travelling not in
terms of worlds but in terms of people. There is no one person traveling between worlds, rather
world-traveling is the shift from being one person to being another.
But what does this mean exactly? It’s certainly challenging to understand how one can
perceive of oneself in many worlds if there is no oneself in which to ground those perceptions.
Ortega critiques precisely to this aspect of Lugones’ work in her influential text In-Between:
Latina Feminist Phenomenology, Multiplicity, and the Self. There she argues that
In my view … there is no necessity to appeal to a plurality of selves. … Depending on
the specific circumstances of world-traveling, the multiplicitous self might also actively
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animate different aspects of itself. The experience of finding that I am playful in this
world and I am unplayful in another world need not be resolved by an appeal to a
plurality of selves, as Lugones suggests.43
On Ortega’s account, “while traveling, the self highlights different aspects of itself, or different
aspects of the self are highlighted or covered over depending on dominant norms as well as
structures and relations of power at work in different worlds,”44 but Lugones is committed to the
a multiplicitous self, and she explores the possibility of how multiple selves can travel between
worlds through the idea of memory and the imagination.45 Returning to her personal account of
being not-playful, she says,
I thought about what it is to be playful and what it is to play and I did this thinking in a
“world” in which I only remember myself as playful and in which all of those who know
me as playful are imaginary beings. It is a “world” in which I am scared of losing my
memories of myself as playful or have them erased from me. (PP 93-4)
Here, Lugones introduces the idea of imaginary beings as those memories that travel between
worlds, as memories that are still attached to the different person one is in a new world and
remind her of a different world. The people who knew Lugones to be playful in one world are
only imaginary in this different world. And since they are only imaginary in that new world, they
don’t maintain the flesh and blood standard that Lugones upholds for being in a world. They’re
not real in that material sense, and therefore they can’t ground any underlying “I” of a subject
across or between worlds. But they do remind her of another way of being—of being playful.
Thus, Lugones argues:
I suggest, then, that my problematic case, the being and not being playful, cannot be
solved through lack of ease. I suggest that I can understand my confusion about whether I
43
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am or am not playful by saying that I am both and that I am different persons in different
“worlds” and can remember myself in both as I am in the other. I am a plurality of selves.
(PP 93)
Lugones’ “profound confusion” at being playful and not-playful is resolved by coming to
see herself as a plurality of selves among worlds. But if Lugones can’t rely on ease, memory, or
an underlying sense of self to become playful in a world, is it possible for her to be playful there
at all? In a certain sense, no. Lugones argues that “that ‘world,’ would have to be changed if she
is to be playful in it” (PP 92). Something about that world requires her being constructed and
perceived as unplayful, for her to be playful in that world would be “to become a contradictory
being” (PP 93).
To conclude this section, in her conception of playfulness, Lugones evokes the concept of
play but rejects grounding it in ease. She sees being not-playful and being not-at-ease as
compatible in a world in which she is constructed as “an outsider” and in which she is one of
many “nondominant people in the ‘worlds’ of their dominators” (PP 93). Therefore, she argues
that, “though I may not be at ease in the ‘worlds’ in which I am not constructed playful, it is not
that I am not playful because I am not at ease. The two are compatible” (PP 93). Thus, for
Lugones, we have now seen that playfulness is a core concern for her, but that play and ease are
not causally connected.
And while I’ve traced the progression of her theoretical arguments around these concepts,
in concluding I also want to emphasize that Lugones’ being perceived as unplayful is as much (if
not moreso) about her material, social and political positions/conditions in different “worlds” as
it is about her conceptions of play and ease in any given “world.” There is a certain exclusion
happening in the “world” that constructs Lugones as not-playful, because people in that world
cannot access that side of her or perceive it, blinded perhaps by stereotypes, prejudice, violence
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and/or the fact that of ignoring or misunderstanding her. There is nothing that Lugones could do
to become playful in those “worlds,” no amount of ease she could cultivate to recover that
attribute there.
As I turn to Kant’s conception of play in the next section, we’ll return to a more
conceptual understanding of play, but I want to hold on to this final point from Lugones through
that reading of Kant in order to ask: are there social positions in which play is impossible no
matter what any given person may do or be there? What does that say about play? And what does
that say about the “world”?

2.1.2 Turning to Kant: Play as an Aesthetic Concept, and Free Play and Disinterestedness
in the Critique of Judgment
Play is also an important concept for Kant and one that is at the heart of his aesthetic
system, because the free play of the faculties is at the core of the functioning of aesthetic
judgment as it is the free play of the cognitive faculties that the subject feels when feeling herself
affected by an aesthetic representation (CJ §9, 5:217-5:219, 102-104). While Lugones’
conception of playfulness cannot easily be collapsed with Kant’s conception of free play, I think
that her consideration of play that identifies it with pleasure and displeasure is at the very least
building a similar constellation of conceptions to Kant’s aesthetic conceptions of play.
Furthermore, Lugones’ connection between being playful and being at ease hearkens to the
Kantian assertion that the faculties of cognition can only play freely when one is disinterested,
meaning when one has no interest in the object evoking the play of the faculties or, in other
terms, when one is enough at ease that the faculties can linger. On this point, I argue that both
Kant and Lugones consider how only when one is at ease can one be disinterested (for Kant) or
playful (Lugones). The core difference, however, is that Kant grounds his aesthetic system in the
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necessary relationship between free play and disinterest, and Lugones rejects the idea that
playfulness must be accompanied by ease. This, I argue, greatly impacts who can “play” and
who cannot, illustrating the material and social conditions that underlie Kant’s transcendental
system and finding a certain kind of inequity there. To understand how Kant’s and Lugones’
conceptions of play converge and diverge on this point, I will elaborate Kant’s conception of free
play in his aesthetic system and then return to Lugones’ reading of playfulness (elaborated in the
previous section) to reread (and critique) Kant.
For Kant, play is a particular mode of functioning of the powers of cognition. To best
understand the role of play in Kant’s system, we must understand (1) how play functions in
aesthetic experience, (2) how pleasure results from free play, and (3) why Kant argues that this
play must be free play. In the next three sections, I’ll elaborate on each of these points as they’re
discussed in the first and second introduction and the “Critique of the Aesthetic Power of
Judgment” sections of the Critique of the Power of Judgment.
First, how play functions. In the first moment of the first section of the analytic of the
Critique of Power of Judgment, Kant opens by considering how the judgment of taste is
aesthetic. He argues that in aesthetic judgment when one encounters a beautiful object they relate
the representation of the object to the imagination of the subject and their feeling of pleasure or
displeasure. (This is opposed to a logical judgment in which the representation of the object is
related to the understanding of the object and the faculty of cognition.) He summarizes this in a
tidy table at the very end of the second introduction (CJ 5:198, 83), but the text of the first
moment includes an interesting parenthetical that Kant develops as the Critique continues:
In order to decide whether or not something is beautiful, we do not relate the
representation by means of understanding to the object for cognition, but rather relate it
by means of the imagination (perhaps combined with the understanding) to the subject
and its feeling of pleasure or displeasure. (CJ §1, 5:204, 89, emphasis my own)

94

This parenthetical, “perhaps combined with the understanding,” is the opening for play in Kant’s
aesthetic system, because as it turns out, aesthetic judgment isn’t simply a matter of the
imagination, rather it is a matter of understanding and imagination lingering in a relationship of
free play.
Clarifying how this comes to be the case for Kant (either in terms of his system across the
three Critiques or exclusively in the context of aesthetic judgment in the third Critique) is a
rather complicated matter that’s been the subject of extensive scrutiny in Kant scholarship. To
briefly consider play in the context of Kant’s larger critical system—Friedlander reminds us that
The notion of play has already been invoked by Kant in his ‘First Critique.’ It serves him
there to distinguish that movement of the imagination which is a mere subjective play of
representations and to contrast it, unfavorably, with the function of the imagination in
objective knowledge, as it is bringing together intuitive representation guided by a
concept.46
In the case of empirical judgments, the role of the imagination is to schematize the manifold of
perceptions and organize them as intuitions to be subsumed under concepts by understanding.
While imagination plays a critical role here, it is the understanding that actually enables to
determine any given object—without it we would not be able to comprehend the world or our
place in it because we could not conceptualize any “thing.”
In the “Critique of the Power of Aesthetic Judgment,” Kant elaborates this idea of play as
the movement of the imagination gathering together representations without eventually
subsuming those representations under a concept vis-à-vis understanding. In aesthetic judgment,
as imagination composes the manifold and understanding generates concepts for the
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representation, no concept is applied. The object is not subsumed under a concept, and thus
imagination keeps composing and understanding keeps generating.47
Kant calls this relationship in which cognition remains open play, and he calls that play
free insofar as no concept is applied to the representation. Instead of ending the process of play
by applying a concept, Kant says “we linger over the consideration of the beautiful” (§12, 5:222,
107) as our cognitive faculties play freely.
Now to turn to the second point: how pleasure results from free play. Among Kant
scholars, the role and function of free play is widely accepted, but there is much controversy over
how pleasure results from free play, which Kant explains in the oft-discussed §9. There (on my
reading), Kant argues that the sensation of free play is what produces the pleasure of judgments
of taste. He says, “it is the universal capacity for the communication of the state of mind in the
given representation which, as the subjective condition of the judgment of taste, must serve as its
ground and have the pleasure in the object as a consequence” (§9, 5:217, 102). And he continues,
The animation of both faculties (the imagination and the understanding) to an activity
that is indeterminate but yet, through the stimulus of the given representation, in unison,
namely that which belongs to a cognition in general, is the sensation whose universal
communicability is postulated by the judgment of taste. (§9, 5:219, 104)
Together, I take these quotes to say that what pleases us in aesthetic judgment is the subjective
feeling of both faculties enlivened in unison. This feeling, however, is not simply subjective. If
the judgment of taste were simply the recognition of a subjective pleasure, then it would be a
matter of the merely agreeable and not the beautiful. Therefore, the judgment cannot simply
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appeal to a subjective condition but must have a universal one if the beautiful is to be
distinguished from the merely agreeable. According to Kant, this universal ground for the
judgment of taste is, as previously cited, the “universal capacity for the communication of the
state of mind in the given representation” (§9, 5:217, 102) or, in other words, the universal
communicability of cognition in general.
In §9, what makes cognition in general universal and how that universality results in the
pleasure of aesthetic judgment is largely unclear. Much later in §57, Kant argues that the
determining ground of the judgment of taste “may lie in the concept of that which can be
regarded as the supersensible substratum of humanity” (CJ 5:340, 216). Scholars dispute and
interpret this in different ways. Schaper argues (and I agree) that
Kant seems at times, when he connects the resultant pleasure with the claim to general
assent, to be arguing that the pleasure arises because we become aware of something that
all people possess, namely cognitive capacities, and that we feel pleasure in the mere
ability to share our own mental states with others.48
But, as she also admits, this seems counter to Kant’s own goals as it diminishes the pleasure of
aesthetic judgment to a simple fact of human sociality rather than establishing the necessity of a
pleasure that is uniquely aesthetic. Were the feeling of pleasure to result from the judgment of
taste simply because all humans share the capacity to judge by means of understanding and
imagination in combination, then it would follow that any cognition involving imagination and
understanding (aka all cognition) would produce this pleasure and thus be aesthetic.
In his highly influential Kant and the Claims of Taste, Guyer works to resolve this
problem by breaking the judgment of taste into two acts of judging. In the first, an object evokes
the free play of the faculties which in turn produces the feeling of pleasure. And in the second,
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the subject reflects on that pleasure and judges that it is universally valid and thus the object is
beautiful. By breaking the judgment of taste into two moments, Guyer is able to maintain both
that the judgment precedes the pleasure and that that judgment is universal.
In contrast to this interpretation, Ginsborg works to resolve the problem of free play and
the universality of the judgment of taste by construing the act of judging and the feeling of
pleasure as identical. She says that
For a subject to judge an object to be beautiful is for the object to cause a state of mind in
the subject which incorporates a claim to its own universal validity with respect to the
object. The resulting view…identifies the free play with the judgement of universal
communicability, collapsing pleasure, judgement, and free play into a single state of
mind which is both a feeling caused by, and a judgement about, the beautiful object.49
Whether we take the judgment of taste to be a two-step process of reflective judgment (as Guyer
does) or a combined state of mind involving both judging and feeling (like Ginsborg) is not of
consequence to the overall argument here, but it does highlight that precisely how pleasure
results from the free play of the faculties (and whether or not that can be universally valid) is still
contested. Therefore, while we can understand that for Kant, aesthetic judgment both (1)
involves the free play of imagination and understanding and (2) somehow produces pleasure, the
relationship between those two facts remains unresolved because of Kant’s reliance on claims of
universal communicability. For now, we will put that aside to discuss one more important point
about the status of free play, but we will return to this later in our discussion of “common sense”
and the sensus communis.
And finally, the third part of this section: what’s free about free play. While the previous
pages explain how play functions in the judgment of taste (through the mutual enlivening of
imagination and understanding) and what makes it free (that no concept is applied), they don’t

49

Hannah Ginsborg, The Normativity of Nature (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2015), 6-7.

98

yet explore why that play is free, or, in other words, why imagination and understanding do not
apply a concept to the representation as they do in logical judgments.
Kant is very clear that the reason the faculties linger is not a result of a quality or property
of the object itself, but (what I would call) a particular mode of cognition of the object. To
explain, in the first moment of the judgment of taste (CJ §1-5, 5:203-5:211, 89-96), he lists the
relationship of various types of judgment and sensation to interest, which he defines as “the
satisfaction we combine with the representation of the existence of the object” (CJ §2, 5:204-5,
90). He argues that the agreeable, the beautiful, and the good are all feelings of pleasure that
result from judgments. The agreeable “is that which pleases the senses in sensation” (CJ §3,
5:206, 91)—the objects that gratify our senses. The good is that which pleases us through reason
in finding an object to be what it is supposed to be (CJ §4, 5:207-8, 93)—the objects that garner
our moral esteem. Both of these require an interest in the object itself to yield pleasure, either an
interest in the object’s existence in order to provide pleasure to the senses (the agreeable) or an
interest in the assignation of a concept by reason (the good).
What makes the judgment of taste unique is that in a judgment of taste there is no interest
in the object and thus the subject is disinterested in it, meaning they are
indifferent with regard to the existence of an object, [and] merely connects its
constitution together with the feeling of pleasure and displeasure…for the judgment of
taste is not a cognitive judgment (neither a theoretical nor a practical one), and hence it is
neither grounded on concepts nor aimed at them. (CJ §5, 5:209, 95)
Being disinterested in an object suggests a certain indifference toward it, but it doesn’t
necessarily mean that one finds it uninteresting. Kant describes the disinterested relationship
with an object as one of “satisfaction” or “delight” because “the person making the judgment
feels himself completely free” (CJ §6, 5:211, 96). Thus, the free quality of free play, for Kant, is
key to the judgment itself. Every judgment of taste must be entirely disinterested in the existence
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of the object itself in order that the faculties can play freely when representing it. One must not
“want to know whether there is anything that is or that could be at stake, for us or for someone
else, in the existence of the thing” rather it is only “what I make of this representation in myself,
not how I depend on the existence of the object” that matters (CJ §2, 5:205, 90-1).
All of this said, it is still not entirely clear what it means to “depend on the existence of
the object.” As Guyer notes, “The definition of interest as any delight connected with the
existence of an object, then, involves an obscure distinction between existence and representation
and a vague conception of the connection between pleasure and existence.”50 What does it mean
to yield pleasure from the contemplation of an object while maintaining no interest in its
existence? This becomes even more unclear later in the text when Kant argues that the pleasure
we experience in the judgment of beautiful objects actually does lead us to want to maintain that
state of mind. He says,
But yet it has a causality in itself, namely that of maintaining the state of the
representation of the mind and the occupation of the cognitive powers without a further
aim. We linger over the consideration of the beautiful because this consideration
strengthens and reproduces itself. (CJ §12, 5:222, 107)
According to Kant, the reason the faculties linger in free play is that the consideration of the
beautiful reproduces itself and maintains the lingering. This answers the question we posed
earlier of why a concept is not applied to the object, but it does seem to complicate Kant’s claim
that the judgment of taste is disinterested. I follow Guyer here when he suggests that
a desire for the continued existence of an object we have found beautiful is certainly one
thing we could mean by an interest in the beautiful; thus, the fact that our response to
beauty is pleasure must itself lead to an interest in the continued existence of its object.51
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For Kant while it is the relationship between imagination and understanding that signals what is
playful about free play, it is disinterestedness that determines whether free play is free or not,
because the free play of the faculties is dependent on a judgment being disinterested. Kant says
that it is only when the subject has no interest in the object’s existence that their faculties can
play freely and not assign a concept to the representation of the object, but as we have just seen
here, he also suggests that the way the faculties linger in free play produces a kind of interest in
maintaining that state of mind, therefore bringing his claims of disinterestedness into question or
at least demanding that he further explain in what sense judgment must be disinterested and in
what other senses it does not have to be.
Now that we have considered the role of free play and disinterestedness and raised
questions about these concepts in Kant, in the next section, I will further problematize the
relationship Kant posits between free play and disinterestedness by considering it alongside
Lugones’ conceptions of playfulness and ease.
2.1.3 Lugones and Kant in Dialogue:
Critiquing the Privilege of Disinterestedness
To bring Kant and Lugones into conversation here, I want to draw parallels between a
few of their concepts, notably Kant’s conception of free play with Lugones’ idea of playfulness
and Kant’s assessment of disinterestedness with Lugones’ discussion of ease. While these
concepts can’t simply be reduced to one another, I do think they are worthy of attending to
together, particularly because of how Kant argues that free play is contingent on
disinterestedness, while Lugones argues that playfulness is not at all reliant on being-at-ease.
Why this difference? What is it that Kant finds necessary in disinterestedness and that Lugones
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finds problematic in ease? How can this help us better understand and/or problematize both
thinkers? These questions are what the final part of this section will work to answer.
As we just saw for Kant, the free play of the faculties is dependent on the judgment of
taste being disinterested. If there is any interest in the judgment, then understanding will stop the
movement of the imagination by applying a concept to the object, thus halting the free play of
the faculties. In describing what it means to be disinterested, Kant argues that one must be
indifferent to the existence of the object. This suggests a certain relationship between the subject
and the object in which existence is not at stake. This also implies a certain positioning of the
subject in which objects are not necessarily related to in terms of their ability to exist or to aid in
the subject’s continued existence. Here we can start to see how subsumed in Kant’s definition of
disinterestedness is a certain privileged position of ease.
He himself alludes to this in the text. There he argues that “hunger is the best cook, and
people with a healthy appetite relish everything that is edible at all; thus such a satisfaction
demonstrates no choice in accordance with taste” (CJ §5, 5:210, 95-6). In doing so, he
necessarily excludes the hungry from pure aesthetic experience. He suggests that certain types of
interest (here, hunger) necessarily disallow free play, or in other terms, that certain material
conditions exclude one from aesthetic experience.
The fact that Kant does not explain in this section exactly how or why an embodied
hunger would mean that one’s cognitive faculties cannot play freely or without constraint
underscores how his claim that disinterestedness is a matter of indifference to the existence of
the object also relies on a certain sort of privilege that someone who is hungry cannot access.
One must, in some sense, be at ease in order to make judgments of taste. Kant argues that “only
when the need is satisfied can one distinguish who among the many has taste or does not” (CJ

102

§5, 5:210, 96)—suggesting that need—perhaps here we can say the dis-ease that hunger
brings—is a barrier to taste, that the material reality of one’s hunger somehow excludes them
from the transcendental experience of the aesthetic, somehow bars their faculties from lingering
in free play.52 Thus, for Kant, a certain kind of physical ease is necessary for aesthetic
experience, as it’s necessary for disinterestedness and free play, therefore inextricably linking
play and ease in his thought.
This is precisely the kind of argument that Lugones rejects when she disconnects
playfulness and ease. For Lugones, whether or not she is playful is not a matter of whether or not
she is at ease, precisely because, she argues “if it was just a matter of lack of ease, I could work
on it” (PP 87). If Lugones conceives of her playfulness as a matter of ease, then when she is
upset at not being playful, her only recourse is to demand of herself to be at ease. As she sees it
(and society impresses upon her), understanding playfulness as a matter of ease makes it her
responsibility to make things easy so that she can be playful.
This is notably different than Kant. On his own account, he doesn’t conceive of interest
as something one necessarily has agency over or could “work on.”53 But reading Kant in
conjunction with Lugones highlights the tension between material conditions and his
transcendental analysis. If, for Kant, material conditions like hunger can make aesthetic
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experience inaccessible, then there is a certain way of understanding how one could or must
work on one’s material conditions for one’s faculties to be able to play freely.
Lugones’ work leads us to challenge the division that Kant sets up between material and
transcendental levels of experience. Centering the material conditions necessary for the free play
of the faculties opens the transcendental analysis of aesthetic experience to material realities and
the structural and systemic conditions that impact them. In Kant’s terms, this means
understanding that there are structural and systemic conditions that prohibit certain individuals
and communities from being able to suspend their interest in the world around them so that their
faculties could play freely. In Lugones’ terms, this means understanding that there are structural
and systemic conditions that prohibit certain individuals and communities from ever being at
ease in certain “worlds” – that refuse to let life be easy for them.
When Lugones disconnects play and ease on the grounds of her experience as part of a
nondominant group, she challenges the idea of any inherent connection between disinterest, ease,
and play such as the one Kant relies on and argues for. For Lugones, in some “worlds,” one may
be free to play and in others one may not, but that is not attributable to whether or not they are at
ease. Instead, playfulness is about the complex relationship between one and how that “world”
constructs them. While Kant’s transcendental conception of play relies on a certain mode of
cognition of the beautiful object but excludes the material conditions of the subject (or only
includes them in denying that cognitive mode if there are adverse material conditions), Lugones
suggests that there is no level on which our cognitive faculties are not already in some way
restricted to the realities of the “world” we inhabit. For Lugones, there is no transcendental realm

104

outside of that “world” to which we can appeal. Structures and conditions are always already
embedded in the material “world.”54
In addition to Lugones’ work helping us open this critique of the material conditions at
stake in Kant’s transcendental analysis, I think that reading Kant with Lugones also helps us
respond to a critique of Lugones presented by Ortega. In In-Between, Ortega questions whether
play is essential to world-travelling. She says
I wonder, however, whether the experience of world-traveling capable of opening
possibilities of resistance needs to involve playfulness, as Lugones suggests. The value of
playfulness in her account stems from the fact that it allows us not to take ourselves so
seriously that we cannot construct and reconstruct ourselves, others, and societal norms.
In other words, nothing is sacred, and it is okay for me to be a fool. … Would serious
world-traveling make us lose that openness to being surprised, to being a fool, and thus to
thwart possibilities for change?55
Understanding Lugones’ idea of playfulness in the context of aesthetic notions of free play, helps
us see that the opposite of playful world-travelling would not be serious world-travelling as
Ortega suggests here. In contrast to playful world-travelling, Ortega proposes that critical world
travelling is what’s necessary for liberation. But, again, if we can think of playfulness as
analogous to an aesthetic sense of play as discussed in this section, then we can see how worldtravelling being playful is precisely what makes it critical, because for Lugones play is what
allows for the flexibility and fluidity necessary to move between “worlds” without breaking—or
if we remember her anecdote of her mother from this opening, to move between “worlds” and
see the moments of breaking as creative and productive rather than earth-shattering (or to see
that earth-shattering as creative, productive, etc).
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Playfulness is what opens space for critique for Lugones because it is what animates the
movement between worlds, opening up that “world”-travelling space (what she will later call the
limen which I will address at the end of the chapter) in which critique can be produced.
Analogously, free play is what animates the judgment of taste in Kant’s critical philosophy
because it is the state of animation of the cognitive faculties in response to the experience of
beauty that holds open the space of non-determination by thwarting the production of a concept
for the object. Play, for both thinkers, holds open space where a different kind of
thinking/living/being—different than conceptual thinking, different than oppressive
thinking/living under oppression—can take place.
Having now used Lugones’ insistence on the material to question the relationship
between the material and the transcendental in Kant’s account of disinterestedness and free play,
in the next section we will briefly dwell on Kant’s discuss of health to better understand
Lugones’ account of the relationship between ease and playfulness in certain “worlds.” This
detour will help us further nuance the understanding of how material conditions impact Kant’s
transcendental analysis and the ways in which he can, perhaps, respond to the line of Lugonian
questioning we just raised before we turn to the discussion of loving playfulness in Lugones and
aesthetic disposition in Kant that will better ground our discussion of the relationship between
the material and the transcendental in both thinkers. 56
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2.2 Health in Lugones and Kant
2.2.1 The Connection Between Ease and Health in Lugones
In the previous section, we explored parallels between Kant’s conception of
disinterestedness and Lugones’ discussion of ease. While we looked closely at Kant’s definition
of disinterestedness as indifferent to the existence of the object, we didn’t interrogate what
Lugones means by ease. As one might expect, Lugones’ definition of ease is grounded in
material conditions of a particular “world.” She argues that there are many ways of being at ease
in a particular “world,” including, but not limited to, being a fluent speaker, being humanly
bonded, or sharing history with others in that world (90). Being at ease in a particular “world” is
marked by feelings of confidence, of mutual love and respect, or of commonality and being
understood.
That said, as we know, Lugones rejects the idea that she is not-playful because she is notat-ease. She argues instead that “lack of playfulness is not symptomatic of lack of ease but of
lack of health. I am not a healthy being in the ‘worlds’ that construct me unplayful” (PP 93). On
reading this, one might think that Lugones goes on to develop what it would mean to be healthy
and how we might construct healthy “worlds” for healthy beings. However, this is not the case,
and Lugones does not thematize health in her work at all, leaving it to the reader to determine
what it might mean to be a healthy being.57
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In the spirit of this analysis, then, in this section, we’ll turn to Kant’s conception of health
to see if it can be helpful in understanding what Lugones might mean when she says that a lack
of health is the root-cause of a lack of playfulness. Furthermore, we’ll see if understanding health
in Kant might also alleviate some of the concerns raised in the previous section about how
Kant’s definition of disinterestedness eliminates the possibility of aesthetic experience for those
in adverse material conditions.

2.2.2 Health and the Feeling of Life in Kant
In an extended remark in the third Critique, Kant explains health as a matter of sensation,
connecting it to bodily well-being and one’s feeling of life: “Gratification (even if its cause may
lie in ideas) always seems to consist in a feeling of the promotion of the total life of the human
being, consequently also of bodily well-being, i.e., of health” (CJ 5:331, 207). He continues to
explain that “all changing free play of sensations (which is not grounded in any intention)
gratifies, because it promotes the feeling of health” (CJ 5:331, 208). Here we can see that Kant
conceives of health as a matter of free play. While the free play of the faculties requires one to be
disinterested on both cognitive and embodied realms, he argues in this section that the feeling of
health is not an intellectual or practical matter. Health is a matter of one’s sensations moving
freely, one’s embodied state changing, one’s feelings stirring.
Rather than grounding the free play of sensation in reason (as he, to some extent, does the
free play of the faculties or at least the pleasure resulting from their free play through connection
to a regulative principle), Kant argues that “gratification and pain, however, can rest only on the

and as she often rejects canonical historical concepts, she quite possibly has none of them in mind. Hans-Georg
Gadamer, The Enigma of Health, translated by Jason Gaiger and Nicholas Walker, (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford
University Press, 1996), 113.

108

feeling or the prospect (whatever its basis might be) of the possible state of well- or ill-being”
(CJ 5:331, 208). Where Kant articulated disinterestedness as a necessary condition for the free
play of the faculties, here he says that a state of well- or ill-being is only a contingent condition
of the free play of sensation. One must not actually feel well or ill, rather there must be the
prospect of well- or ill-being. This sort of contingency opens the feeling of sensation to all
(unlike aesthetic experience), perhaps simply to respect that all people do feel sensation
regardless of material conditions.58
In order to fully understand Kant’s conception of health, we must also look at what Kant
calls the feeling of life, which he identifies early in the third Critique as an important element of
aesthetic experience. There he argues that
Here [in the judgment of taste] the representation is related entirely to the subject, indeed
to its feeling of life, under the name of the feeling of pleasure or displeasure, which
grounds an entirely special faculty for discriminating and judging that contributes nothing
to cognition but only holds the given representation, of which the mind becomes
conscious in the feeling of its state. (§1, 5:204, 90)
The feeling of life, for Kant, is the feeling of feeling oneself in one’s activity. In the early
descriptions of aesthetic experience, Kant makes it sound like this feeling is perhaps exclusively
cognitive—the feeling of the free play of one’s faculties. In his discussion of health, however,
Kant emphasizes that this feeling is also sensory—the feeling of the free play of one’s
sensations. He says:
…the feeling of health resulting from a movement of the viscera corresponding to that
play constitute the whole gratification in a lively party, which is extolled as so refined
and spirited. It is not the judging of the harmonies in the tones or sallies of wit, which
with their beauty serve only as the necessary vehicle, but the promotion of the business of
58
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life in the body, the affect which moves the viscera and the diaphragm, in a world the
feeling of health (which otherwise cannot be felt without such a stimulus), which
constitutes the gratification in which one discovers that one can get at the body even
through the soul and use the latter as the doctor for the former. (CJ 5:332, 209)
Here, the feeling of health is evoked in how an affect moves the body. One feels oneself in one’s
sensation of oneself and the free play of that sensation, in how the diaphragm expands and
collapses when one laughs or cries or hyperventilates or meditates.
The feeling of life, therefore, is a locus in which one can see Kant align transcendental
and material conditions. But in this instance, rather than disinterestedness being a necessary
condition for aesthetic experience (the feeling of pleasure or displeasure resulting from how
beauty promotes the feeling of life), it is only the possibility of a state of (ill- or) well-being that
is necessary for the feeling of health that results from how the movement of our sensations
promotes the feeling of life. Through the free play of sensation, the feeling of life becomes
accessible to all when in the judgment of taste Kant deemed it exclusive only to those who could
cast off their material conditions.

2.2.3 Reconsidering Health in Lugones and Kant
Where we previously critiqued Kant for grounding free play in disinterestedness, thus
entirely excluding communities in certain material conditions from certain modes of
transcendental experience (e.g. aesthetic experience), here, when Kant undoes that necessary
condition and displaces that conception of free play from the cognitive realm (free play of the
faculties) to the embodied realm (free play of sensations), his argument aligns much more
closely with Lugones’ argument. Her lack of playfulness is not a matter of lack of ease, because
her lack of playfulness is a result of being constructed as not-playful in the “world” she inhabits.
Her lack of health, however, can be a root-cause of her lack of playfulness, because if we
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consider this Kantian idea of health as a matter of the free play of sensation, her lack of health is
a matter of her lack of freedom in sensation. She appears as not-playful because she does not
have—or perhaps, more carefully, is not allowed—the sensory freedom required to be playful.
Being not-playful is likely only one symptom of the larger lack of freedom in sensation that she
names a lack of health. And that lack of health is the result of inhabiting a particular “world” that
constructs her as unhealthy, or rather that constructs an unhealthy sensory relationship between
her and that “world.”
While it is still conjecture whether Lugones would conceive of health in this way, the
attention that Lugones pays to playfulness and health, then, better allows us to attend to the way
that the feeling of life connects the sensory and the aesthetic for Kant and to see why we may not
want to maintain the distinction between the material and the transcendental that Kant attempts
to uphold when he ascribes necessary, exclusionary conditions to aesthetic experience (in order
to distinguish the agreeable from the beautiful). Bringing Lugones and Kant into conversation
also allows us to question why and how the material impacts the aesthetic and to consider the
ways in which the “worlds” we inhabit always shape the transcendental conditions of our
experience as well as the material ones.
While we cannot simply collapse Lugones’ mention of health and Kant’s discussion of
health, we can see how they both connect play to a matter of health and life and how free play
and playfulness become markers of health, and thus life, for both thinkers. For Kant, paying
attention to health means paying attention to how the body surfaces in aesthetic judgment. While
Kant’s account of aesthetics is largely cognitive and his mention of the feeling of life is still only
in terms of pleasure and displeasure, when he speaks of health, suddenly the viscera and the
diaphragm emerge—aesthetics is embodied, it’s breathing, it’s material.
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What I yield from rereading Kant after reading Lugones is a heightened attention to how
the body bursts through the seams of his aesthetic project. Kant doesn’t deny that the body is
involved in the judgment of taste, but he certainly doesn’t provide a clear or thorough account of
it there, either. Traveling between the “worlds” of Lugones and Kant has led me to seek out the
body in Kant’s aesthetics, to find it in those moments of hunger and of health, and to mark its
materiality there. I don’t think this disputes or refutes Kant’s analysis. Rather, it allows me to
open up those moments and better see how material inequity can enter Kant’s transcendental
account through how he broadly excludes those who are hungry or in ill-health from aesthetic
experience. It helps me see that when the body enters aesthetics, material conditions and thus the
inequities that follow them in certain “worlds” do too.
Having taken this detour through health, now perhaps, we can return to the questions that
I raised after exploring Lugones’ conception of play. There I asked: are there social positions in
which play is impossible no matter what any given person may do or be there? What does that
say about play? And what does that say about the “world”?
For Kant, I think the body often stymies aesthetic experience and makes play impossible.
While the “free” in the free play that characterizes aesthetic experience seems to refer to the lack
of concept to stop the lingering of the faculties (the quality of disinterestedness as previously
developed), in Kant’s mentions of hunger and ill-health, we can see how there are more complex
notions of material, social, and/or political freedom that set conditions for whether or not the free
play of the faculties is even possible. Of course, this is exactly what Kant says: we don’t make
judgments of taste when our judgment is clouded by hunger, hunger is a material condition that
forbids aesthetic judgment. But in this admission, Kant only treats hunger and health as universal
conditions of the body. He fails to reckon with the social and political conditions that produce
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hunger and health. He fails to consider how the transcendental also has material conditions that
aren’t simply universal realities of having a body.59
It’s not simply the case that everyone experiences these material conditions of the body in
the same way or that if we can overcome them (by eating, healing, etc.) then we all gain access
to the same transcendental experience. This is what we learn from Lugones in her discussion of
how she is painfully constructed as not-playful in certain worlds. The material conditions of her
life are shaped by the structural conditions of her “world,” and the structural conditions of her
“world” are shaped by the material conditions of her life. They go hand-in-hand. There is no
amount of work she could do to improve her material conditions in certain “worlds” that would
ever allow her (or her faculties) to play there. This isn’t a fact of her body. It isn’t a universal,
human condition. It’s a structural condition of that “world” that constructs her in such a way. It
reshapes the conditions of her experience and of her ability to experience play, health, and life.
In the introduction to this chapter, I talked about the performative level of this analysis:
how I would be attempting a “world”-travelling reading that would have to maintain double
vision. In this moment of bringing Kant and Lugones “together,” I think we can now see how
that double vision develops. In travelling between their “worlds,” I was able to some extent to
blur the boundaries within and between them, particularly the boundary between the material and
the transcendental or structural in their analyses. As I did so, I could begin to see both Kant and
Lugones at once, “together” but never in clear outline. Their readings never became compatible
but they did point to different compatibilities and incompatibilities within each. Much like what
one experiences when they actually have double vision, there remain two distinct, yet indistinct
images that separate, come closer, overlap, stretch and shrink in size, brighten and dull in color,
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but never merge. It’s a liminal space that’s between but also within. In the next section, I’ll
continue this approach to discuss loving dispositions in Lugones and Kant through their
respective discussions of loving perception and the sublime disposition. I’ll also (finally) return
to the inverse through lines that I’ve positioned as the overarching structure of this project,
connecting dots between the previous chapter and this one.

2.3 Loving Dispositions in Lugones and Kant
So far in this chapter, I have reread Kant’s conception of disinterestedness through
Lugones’ emphasis on the materiality of “worlds” and reconsidered Lugones’ discussion of ease
and health through Kant’s understanding of how the free play of our faculties and sensations
evokes a feeling of health and thus a feeling of life. Were one to stop reading at this point in the
analysis, one might take away that for Kant, aesthetic experience is thus forever foreclosed to the
disadvantaged and for Lugones the disadvantaged are forever doomed to be unplayful and not-atease in the “worlds” that construct them as such. I do not, however, think that that is the case.
In this section of the chapter, I will consider (1) how Lugones develops the concept of
loving playfulness as a disposition for “world”-travelling that allows people from nondominant
groups to cultivate their health across worlds, and (2) how Kant also makes an appeal to love in
his aesthetic system and how his discussion of the disposition of the sublime further holds open
space for the accessibility of aesthetic experience.
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2.3.1 Loving Perception and “World”-Travelling in Lugones
In considering a world in which Lugones could be healthy, I conjectured that that world
would have to be one in which she can experience free sensation or, in simpler terms, can feel
freely. That said, Lugones is very clear on this point that she does not locate the possibility of her
health in a naïve or utopian dream of a “world” in which she would suddenly be free. Rather than
arguing that a new “world” must be constructed, she argues for a new mode of traveling between
“worlds” in which one maintains a particular disposition or mode of traveling that holds
“worlds” and oneself open to free sensation. She calls this “loving playfulness,” and she
introduces loving playfulness with the following anecdote:
What, then, is the loving playfulness that I have in mind? Let me begin with one
example: We are by the riverbank. The river is very low. Almost dry. Bits of water here
and there. Little pools with a few trout hiding under the rocks. But it is mostly wet stones,
gray on the outside. We walk on the stones for awhile. You pick up a stone and crash it
onto the others. As it breaks, it is quite wet inside and it is very colorful, very pretty. I
pick up a stone and break it and run toward the pieces to see the colors. They are
beautiful. I laugh and bring the pieces back to you and you are doing the same with your
pieces. We keep on crashing stones for hours, anxious to see the beautiful new colors. We
are playing. The playfulness of our activity does not presuppose that there is something
like “crashing stones” that is a particular form of play with its own rules. Instead, the
attitude that carries us through the activity, a playful attitude, turns the activity into play.
(PP 95)
Here, we see Lugones call for play to be defined by a certain attitude, an attitude that can turn
any activity into play. That attitude here is marked by a lack of presuppositions. Crashing the
stones is not contained, guided, or regulated by a preconceived concept of “crashing stones.”
Lugones further characterizes this playful attitude as follows: “The playfulness that gives
meaning to our activity includes uncertainty, but in this case the uncertainty is an openness to
surprise. This is a particular metaphysical attitude that does not expect the ‘world’ to be neatly
packaged, ruly” (PP 95).
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While the preceding discussion of the way one is constructed by one’s “world” sounded
almost deterministic in the ways one could only be what one’s world perceived of or constructed
one to be, when Lugones emphasizes a playful attitude rather than a quality of being playful or
not-playful, she returns agency to the individual who inhabits a “world.” Lugones argues that in
a playful attitude “we are not wedded to a particular way of doing things. While playful, we have
not abandoned ourselves to, nor are we stuck in, any particular ‘world.’ We are there creatively.
We are not passive” (PP 96). Taking up a playful attitude is a way to resist the oppressive nature
of certain material conditions. And one can take up a playful attitude even in worlds that
construct one as not-playful. As Lugones says, maintaining an
openness to surprise, openness to being a fool, openness to self-construction or
reconstruction and to construction or reconstruction of the “worlds” we inhabit playfully,
and thus openness to risk the ground that constructs us as oppressors or as oppressed or as
collaborating or colluding with oppression (PP 96)
does not necessarily change our material conditions, but it maintains the possibility of their
changing.
And how is this playfulness loving, exactly? While Lugones upholds that playfulness is
an important attitude to hold in order to resist domination, she is also careful to note that “there
are ‘worlds’ that we enter out of necessity and that would be foolish to enter playfully” (PP 96).
Aside from these worlds, however, she argues that “there are ‘worlds’ that we can travel to
lovingly, and traveling to them is part of loving at least some of their inhabitants.” (PP 97)
Lugones sees that effort as a matter of beginning to love someone by allowing oneself to be a
fool about them, to let them surprise you, to let them reconstruct your self-construction and the
construction of the “world” you/they inhabit. Lugones says that
The reason I think that traveling to someone’s “world” is a way of identifying with them
is that by traveling to their ‘world’ we can understand what it is to be them and what it is
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to be ourselves in their eyes … Knowing other women’s “worlds” is part of knowing
them and knowing them is part of loving them. (PP 97)
Lugones reflects on this experience in terms of her relationship with her own mother (her
“coming to consciousness as a daughter” that she references on the first page of the chapter). She
recounts having one perception of her mother from her (Lugones’) own “world” where she could
only see her mother as a victim of patriarchy, and then an entirely different perception of her
mother when she (Lugones) finally traveled to her mother’s “world.” There her mother was an
entirely different person (as Lugones says we all are when we travel to different worlds). She
writes,
I came to realize through traveling to her “world” that she is not foldable and pliable, that
she is not exhausted by the mainstream Argentinian patriarchal construction of her. I
came to realize that there are ‘worlds’ in which she shines as a creative being. Seeing
myself in her through traveling to her ‘world’ has meant seeing how different from her I
am in her “world.” (PP 98)
Loving playfulness in one’s “world”-travelling, as Lugones sees it, is a commitment to traveling
to other women’s worlds without presuppositions of who those women will be in those worlds.
And travelling with loving playfulness also puts one’s self-perception/construction at risk. “To
enter playfully into each other’s ‘worlds’ of subjective affirmation,” she argues “also risks those
aspects of resistance that have kept us riveted on constructions of ourselves that have kept us
from seeing multiply, from understanding the interconnections in our historico-spatialities” (PP
98). “World”-traveling in this way involves “risking one’s ground” in profoundly unsettling but
deeply loving, playful ways (PP 98).

2.3.2 Love, Esteem, and the Sublime Disposition in Kant
While Kant doesn’t develop this sort of “world”-travelling analysis in his work, he does
make a very brief reference to love in the third Critique that can serve as the starting point for
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our analysis here. In the general remark at the end of the Analytic of the Beautiful, Kant says,
“the beautiful prepares us to love something, even nature, without interest; the sublime, to
esteem it, even contrary to our (sensible) interest” (CJ 5:267, 151). Kant does not thematize love
or esteem in his discussion of aesthetic judgment, nor does he give any explanation of why the
beautiful would provide preparation to love without interest here. So in this section of the
chapter, I hope to unpack this offhand comment of Kant’s, imagining what he could mean by it,
and eventually understanding how it may make larger suggestions about the role of aesthetic
judgment in our lives that we can reconnect to Lugones’ “world”-travelling. In order to do that,
we must first understand a bit more about his distinction between the beautiful and the sublime,
so I’ll briefly outline that here.
While the preceding analysis of aesthetic judgment in this chapter has focused almost
exclusively on the Analytic of the Beautiful, in the third Critique, Kant also develops an Analytic
of the Sublime. At the opening of that Analytic, Kant outlines the similarities and differences
between the beautiful and the sublime (CJ §23, 5:244-246, 128-130). In considering similarities,
he argues that both are judgments of reflection in that the satisfaction they produce is connected
to indeterminate concepts, and that both are singular judgments that claim universal validity on
the grounds of the feeling of pleasure (rather than cognition of the object). In considering
differences, he argues that the beautiful is a matter of the limitation of form and the sublime is a
matter of limitlessness; the beautiful presents an indeterminate concept of understanding and the
sublime an indeterminate concept of reason; the beautiful a matter of quality and the sublime a
matter of quantity; pleasure in the beautiful a matter of the promotion of the feeling of life and
pleasure in the sublime a matter of a momentary inhibition and then an outpouring of vital
powers.
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It seems most important for Kant that what is at stake in the sublime is not at all about
the object but entirely about the feeling of the subject. While he had previously argued that the
experience of beauty is entirely about the subject and not the object, here he makes claims such
as “we express ourselves on the whole incorrectly if we call some object of nature sublime,
although we can quite correctly call very many of them beautiful” (CJ §23, 5:245, 129, emphasis
added), suggesting that it actually only the sublime that is an exclusively subjective experience.
Concerning the sublime, he argues that
we can say no more than that the object serves for the presentation of a sublimity that can
be found in the mind; for what is properly sublime cannot be contained in any sensible
form, but concerns only ideas of reason, which, though no presentation adequate to them
is possible, are provoked and called to mind precisely by this inadequacy, which does
allow of sensible presentation. (CJ §23, 5:245, 129)
To explain this, Kant gives the example of the ocean during a storm that’s raging with waves.
It’s not the ocean that’s sublime in that moment, he argues, but the way that the mind stretches to
represent the image of that all-encompassing ocean that is beyond its representation. The feeling
of the sublime is a matter of the “movement of the mind” toward the infinite (CJ §24, 5:247,
131); it is the recognition of a “supersensible faculty in us” (CJ §25, 5:250, 134), our ability to
feel, and in a very particular way, to think the unthinkable. As a result of these reflections, Kant
argues that, “Hence it is the disposition of the mind resulting from a certain representation
occupying the reflective judgment, but not the object, which is to be called sublime” (CJ §25,
5:250, 134).
While Kant has made clear at this point that the sublime is a matter of the movement of
the mind, this analysis leaves lingering questions, particularly: what is the difference between the
movement of the mind in the experience of the sublime and the lingering of the faculties in free
play during the experience of the beautiful? Furthermore, what exactly does Kant mean by
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calling the movement of the mind in the sublime a disposition60? It seems for Kant that
something about the experience of the sublime being a disposition makes it different than the
experience of the beautiful. To better understand, we’ll briefly outline three characteristics of the
disposition of the sublime that Kant develops: elevation of the mind, displeasure mixed with
pleasure, and resistance. The first important quality of this disposition is the elevation of the
mind. Kant says,
True sublimity must be sought only in the mind of the one who judges, not in the object
in nature, the judging of which occasions this disposition in it. And who would want to
call sublime shapeless mountain masses towering above one another in wild disorder with
their pyramids of ice, or the dark and raging sea, etc.? But the mind feels itself elevated in
its own judging if, in the consideration of such things, without regard to their form,
abandoning itself to the imagination and to a reason which, although it is associated with
it entirely without any determinate end, merely extends it, it nevertheless finds the entire
power of the imagination inadequate to its ideas. (CJ §26, 5:256, 139-40)
Whereas in the case of the beautiful, Kant argued that understanding and imagination linger in
free play (he even calls this “calm contemplation” [CJ §24, 5:247, 131]), here he says that the
mind abandons itself to the imagination. The mind must elevate itself through the power of the
imagination to attempt to represent this unrepresentable thing. In the process, the imagination is
found to be inadequate. This inadequacy produces a second important quality of this disposition:
displeasure. Kant argues that
The feeling of the sublime is thus a feeling of displeasure from the inadequacy of the
imagination in the aesthetic estimation of magnitude for the estimation by means of
reason, and a pleasure that is thereby aroused at the same time from the correspondence
of this very judgment of the inadequacy of the greatest sensible faculty in comparison
with the ideas of reason, insofar as striving for them is nevertheless a law for us. (CJ §27,
5:257, 141)
While the experience of beauty is pleasurable, the experience of the sublime is one of displeasure
mingled with or followed by pleasure. The subject feels displeasure from the inadequacy of the
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imagination to represent the sublime and then feels pleasure from the movement of the mind
striving toward representation regardless. Kant says this movement can be “compared to a
vibration, i.e., to a rapidly alternating repulsion from and attraction to one and the same object”
(CJ §27, 5:257, 141), making this some sort of vibratory disposition, pleasurable and
displeasurable simultaneously.
This vibratory tension marks a third notable quality of this disposition: that it produces
resistance. Kant describes this rather poetically through more examples:
Bold, overhanging, as it were threatening cliffs, thunder clouds towering up into the
heavens, bringing with them flashes of lightning and crashes of thunder, volcanoes with
their all-destroying violence, hurricanes with the devastation they leave behind, the
boundless ocean set into a rage, a lofty waterfall on a mighty river, etc., make our
capacity to resist into an insignificant trifle in comparison with their power. But the sight
of them only becomes all the more attractive the more fearful it is, as long as we find
ourselves in safety, and we gladly call these objects sublime because they elevate the
strength of our soul above its usual level, and allow us to discover within ourselves a
capacity for resistance of quite another kind, which gives us the courage to measure
ourselves against the apparent all-powerfulness of nature. (CJ §28, 5:261,144-5)
Here Kant describes how nature can overwhelm and overpower us but in the sublime we can
recognize the power of our minds to elevate themselves above nature and resist its all-powerful
domain. While Kant’s discussion of beauty emphasizes harmony, lingering, and calm, the
sublime emphasizes resistance, elevation, and power. Kant says
In our aesthetic judgment nature is judged as sublime not insofar as it arouses fear, but
rather because it calls forth our power (which is not part of nature) to regard those things
about which we are concerned (goods, health and life) as trivial, and hence to regard its
power (to which we are, to be sure, subjected in regard to these things) as not the sort of
dominion over ourselves and our authority to which we would have to bow if it came
down to our highest principles and their affirmation or abandonment. (CJ §28, 5:262,
145)
This latter part is important for Kant: the sublime calls us to cast off our concerns for goods,
health and life in the face of this power. This is what Kant means when he says that it prepares us
to esteem something even against our sensible interest. It is perhaps not wise to marvel at the
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sublimity of a hurricane when one should be making a hasty retreat from its storm surge, but the
power of sublimity is that it calls one to esteem the hurricane even, perhaps, as it threatens one’s
life. (Although Kant notes of course that there must be some sense of safety felt in the moment to
maintain the sublime. One does not pause in awe at the hurricane while being swept away into
the ocean and drowning.61)
This complicates Kant’s discussion of disinterestedness as necessary for aesthetic
judgment, because rather than ascribing disinterestedness as a precondition of the sublime, it
becomes something one achieves vis-à-vis the sublime. In the case of the sublime, one’s material
conditions are very much present in the threat that the sublime can pose, but they are cast off
through the movement of the mind elevating itself and resisting the threat and its own
diminishment. This leads us back to the quote we opened with: “the beautiful prepares us to love
something, even nature, without interest; the sublime, to esteem it, even contrary to our
(sensible) interest” (CJ 5:267, 151). Beauty, it seems, is a matter of simple disinterestedness—
being without interest as required for a selfless love—but sublimity is a matter of resisting
interest—being disinterested only through effort that produces a respect for the object that
summons that effort, or perhaps more correctly, a respect for reason’s capacity to elevate itself
above the object that summons that effort.
This latter point is the subject of much debate in Kant scholarship that considers whether
Kant’s articulation of the sublime makes the sublime object obsolete. Zammito argues that if we
follow Kant carefully, then the “particular objects of nature – indeed even nature itself as an
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object – are really not intrinsically relevant” to the experience of the sublime.62 In disagreement,
Allison argues that the experience of sublimity must always be triggered by a sensual encounter
with some object:
the experience of the mathematically sublime must rest ultimately on a sense of an object,
as it were, imposing itself upon us for its estimation in virtue of its sheer magnitude. And
from this it follows that even though it is our supersensible nature and vocation, rather
than the objects themselves, that is truly sublime, only certain objects are capable of
occasioning such a feeling.63
And in reply, Grier argues that “even acknowledging this, however, there seems to be a deep
sense in which the natural phenomena, or indeed nature itself, seem to operate rather
coincidentally as catalysts to the experience.”64
One (of many) things at stake in these disagreements is whether or not the experience of
the sublime becomes merely an intellectual one if the object is irrelevant. Kant, of course, denies
the idea of intellectualizing aesthetic judgment, but his discussion of intellectual interest in the
beautiful does belie that the intellectual poses certain challenges to his system—and it also,
finally, brings us back to love. In §42, Kant argues that
Someone who alone (and without any intention of wanting to communicate his
observations to others) considers the beautiful shape of a wildflower, a bird, an insect,
etc. in order to marvel at it, to love it, and to be unwilling for it to be entirely absent from
nature, even though some harm might come to him from it rather than there being any
prospect of advantage to him from it, takes an immediate and certainly intellectual
interest in the beauty of nature. I.e., not only the form of its product but also its existence
pleases him. (CJ 5:299, 178-9, emphasis added)

62

John Zammito, The Genesis of Kant’s Critique of Judgment, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 282.

63

Henry Allison, Kant’s Theory of Taste, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 325.

64

Michelle Grier, “Kant and the Feeling of Sublimity,” in Kant on Emotion and Value, (New York, NY: Palgrave
McMillan, 2014), 260.

123

Here, we see Kant articulate a case of the beautiful that sounds in some ways like the sublime—
“even though some harm might come to him from it” he wishes that the beautiful object exist.
And this desire for its continued existence marks some interest in the object that makes the
subject not simply disinterested. Yet, it is still beautiful, and he still loves it.
This winding analysis has not provided a systematic understanding of love in the third
Critique, but it has paid closer attention to the role of disinterestedness in Kant’s system, the
places in which it becomes entangled with love, and how that further complicates Kant’s claims
about interest in both the cases of the beautiful and the sublime by raising the question of
whether disinterestedness must be a precondition of aesthetic experience or if it can be achieved
vis-à-vis aesthetic experience. This section also raises the question of the role of the object in
aesthetic experience and how beholden aesthetic experience is to a sublime or beautiful object.
I’d like to propose that this can be resolved through attention to the question of the sublime
disposition: what does Kant mean when he uses the term “disposition”?
This question isn’t simple to answer (as Kant provides few clues), but we can take some
interpretation from secondary literature. Gasché argues that “pleasure is not merely an effect—an
aesthetic manifestation of awareness—it is intimately tied up with taste as a state of mind in
which powers freely become attuned to one another in pleasure, or rather as pleasure itself.”65 On
his reading, insofar as pleasure “serves to perpetuate the accord and hence keep the pleasure of
the mutually self-animating faculties alive,” it is more than an effect of aesthetic judgment but
also the disposition of it. Guyer presents a similar reading with his “Dispositional Model of
Aesthetic Pleasure and Pain.” In explaining this theory, Guyer argues that the pleasure or pain

65

Rodolphe Gasché, The Idea of Form: Rethinking Kant’s Aesthetics, (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press,
2003), 51.

124

felt in aesthetic experience is the feeling and then the desire to linger over that feeling (in the
case of the beautiful) or continue to experience the power of reason (in the case of the sublime) is
a disposition. He argues that in Kant, “there is a distinctive way all pleasure feels and that such a
feeling is always accompanied with the disposition to continue feeling it.”66 Thus, what marks a
disposition, on Guyer’s reading at least, is precisely what we previously marked as an interest in
spite of disinterestedness. Here the use of disposition names that moment in which the subject
finds interest in aesthetic judgment—notably, judgments of both the beautiful and the sublime as
she lingers and resists.
When we consider how the idea of a disposition complicates disinterestedness alongside
the questions raised about whether or not the aesthetic object must be present in order for the
disposition to remain, we open a host of other questions about aesthetic experience: If the
experience of the sublime is a disposition, can that disposition be carried beyond the moment of
being in the face of the object? Can it be cultivated, developed, and/or summoned at will? Can it
become a way of being in the world that is not reliant on evocation by an object? Can it also be
applicable in experiences of the beautiful? How might that disposition be similar or different?
These are the questions we will speculatively consider as we return to Lugones and bring
together Kant’s sublime disposition with her loving playfulness.

2.3.3 Lugones and Kant in Dialogue: Sublime Disposition and Loving Playfulness
The premise of this section on love stems from an intuition connecting Lugones’
development of loving playfulness with Kant’s fleeting mention of love in the third Critique.
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Following that intuition, however, proved neither linear nor direct. That said, I still think there’s
something fruitful about bringing Lugones and Kant together around the concept of love.
The loving playfulness Lugones argues for demands an “openness to surprise” and a
rejection of the “ruly.” This insistence on surprise is aligned with what Kant argues when he says
that aesthetic judgments are judgments marked by a lack of presupposed concept. And the
rejection of the ruly seems analogous to what Kant argues when he says that the sublime is that
which cannot be contained by sensible form, thus naming a disposition of the mind that elevates
itself in the face of the unrepresentable. The lack of a given concept is why the faculties linger in
free play in the face of the beautiful and the sublime capacity of the imagination is why they can
resist all-powerful nature in the face of threat. These, perhaps, are also how the two people in
Lugones’ anecdote about crashing stones play freely; their ability to reject conceptualization and
power are how they are free to be playful.
Rereading Kant after reading Lugones helps us attend to the ways that an aesthetic
disposition might be akin to a loving playfulness, not so much through any hard conclusions but
by raising a series of questions: Might Kant calling the experience of the sublime a disposition
open the possibility for the experience of beauty to be a disposition as well? Might the capacity
of the mind to hold itself open to resisting conceptualization be a beautiful disposition that one
could maintain beyond the experience of a beautiful object? Might the sublime disposition that
allows one’s mind to supersede the sensible allow one to imagine other people’s lives that one
could certainly never sense? Might these together—resisting conceptualization and abandoning
oneself to the infinite power of the imagination—be different ways of articulating loving
playfulness and “world”-travelling?
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These questions are certainly speculative and there are many objections to be raised both
within the terms of Kant’s system and in the conversation between Kant and Lugones.
Considering some of the Kantian objections first: Kant certainly wouldn’t move so easily
between the beautiful and the sublime; Kant seems to limit the experience of the sublime to our
interactions with nature67; Kant himself seems to insist that the sensible experience of the object
is crucial for aesthetic experience, so the aesthetic couldn’t become a transferable disposition in
the way suggested here. These are certainly some challenges posed by remaining strictly in
Kant’s system.
There are also plenty of objections from a Lugonian perspective, particularly that Kant’s
articulation of the sublime disposition does not have the material emphasis and ethical
implications of Lugones’ loving playfulness; it does not contain “world”-traveling and loving
flesh-and-blood people in those “worlds.” But I would argue that Lugones’ analysis isn’t simply
about identity or materiality, either. When she describes the attitudes of the people crashing
stones as open to surprise, she calls it metaphysical to emphasize its understanding of the
structure and being of the “world.” Kant is concerned with this, too.
Again, this is a matter of double vision. Staging this conversation between these two
thinkers doesn’t bring them “together” per se, but it does help us consider how our attitudes or
dispositions shape our perceptions of the world and how those perceptions have material,
interpersonal, societal, and political consequences. Here, we finally see where Kant and Lugones
meet on the inverse through lines I’ve proposed as the overarching structure of this dissertation.
As I wrote in the introduction, in this project I set out to trace how the German idealist aesthetic
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tradition begins with an attempt to understand the incomprehensibility of certain objects and
works its way to respect for them and their freedom, and how the feminist tradition cited here
begins with the necessity of respect for the position of others and then cultivates new modes of
encountering and embracing incomprehensibility between individuals. In the experience of the
sublime, I believe we see how Kant presents a moment in which the incomprehensibility of the
sublime object/event compels us to esteem it, and in doing so we develop a disposition that can
perhaps be carried into other moments of and interactions in our lives. In the cultivation of
loving playfulness, I believe we see a recognition of the different positions of each individual in
an oppressive system and then the cultivation of an openness to surprise in our encounters with
others (particularly other marginalized and oppressed folks) in different “worlds” that helps us
love them there.
This is where I see Kant and Lugones meeting on that through line even as they come
from very different contexts and develop very different arguments. They’re both concerned with
those moments of opening ourselves to something or someone we don’t understand, letting
ourselves be surprised by it, abandoning ourselves to that experience, and learning to develop a
new disposition from it. I see these sweeping gestures as a moment of intersection in their work,
a crossing or even just brushing against each other, of those inverse through lines I’m tracing. It
is also perhaps a moment where those doubled visions overlap, a brief second of a single image,
a fleeting “together,” before they double again.
And I do think they double again pretty immediately, or, if there is a metaphorical
intersection or merging of these through lines, the paths diverge quickly. In the next section, I
will consider how Kant and Lugones depart from this moment of commonality I’ve just argued
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for, as I show how they both develop and critique a notion of common sense that further
illustrates their different commitments to universality and singularity in their projects.

2.4 Common Sense in Kant and Lugones
So far in this chapter, we’ve considered the individual (and perhaps interpersonal) aspects
of Kant’s and Lugones’ theories, but have failed to explore how they both ground their
philosophies in social and political concepts. For Kant, aesthetic judgment is subjective but
appeals to a universal validity and communicability. For Lugones, loving playfulness and
“world”-travelling are perhaps individual attitudes/activities, but they are also deeply coalitional
and shared among oppressed groups. This section of the chapter will further explore these
political dimensions of Kant’s and Lugones’ work by addressing how they both appeal to
concepts of common sense to consider the larger impact or ramifications of their dispositional
claims, first by explaining the role and function of sensus communis in Kant’s work and then by
elaborating on la callejera and common sense in Lugones’ work.

2.4.1 Sensus Communis and “Vulgar” Common Sense in Kant
In the “Deduction of Aesthetic Judgment” in the third Critique, Kant develops his
understanding of taste as a kind of sensus communis. He argues that
The common human understanding, which, as merely healthy (not yet cultivated)
understanding, which, is regarded as the least that can be expected from anyone who lays
claim to the name of a human being, thus has the unfortunate honor of being endowed
with the name of common sense (sensus communis). (CJ §40, 5:293, 173)
Here, healthy understanding is contraposed to cultivated understanding. This serves the contrast
Kant hopes to draw between a “vulgar” idea of common sense as the lowest possible level of
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knowledge we expect to share with others and a more nuanced idea of a communal sense that
considers what faculty for judgment we all share. He says
By “sensus communis,” however, must be understood the idea of a communal sense,
i.e., a faculty for judging that in its reflection takes account (a priori) of everyone else’s
way of representing in thought, in order as it were to hold its judgment up to human
reason as a whole and thereby avoid the illusion which, from subjective private
conditions that could easily be held to be objective, would have a detrimental influence
on the judgment. (CJ §40, 5:293, 173)
Sensus communis as a communal sense is a matter of holding one’s own faculty for judgment up
to the measure of everyone else’s faculty for judgment and to human reason as a whole; it’s a
matter of taking account of oneself in the context of everyone else, less so in their actuality than
in their possibility. Kant identifies three maxims for how this works:
1. To think for oneself; 2. To think in the position of everyone else; 3. Always to think in
accord with oneself. The first is the maxim of the unprejudiced way of thinking, the
second of the broad-minded way, the third that of the consistent way. (CJ §40, 5:294,
174)
Kant maps these maxims onto understanding, judgment, and reason, saying: “One can say that
the first of these maxims is that maxim of the understanding, the second that of the power of
judgment, the third that of reason” (CJ §40, 5:295, 175). Thinking for oneself is a matter of
cultivating the activity of one’s mind to liberate it from superstition. Thinking in the position of
everyone else is a matter of developing a broad-minded way of thinking that helps one reflect on
one’s own thoughts by way of a “universal standpoint” (CJ §40, 5:295, 175). And thinking in
accord with oneself is a matter of developing consistency in one’s thought and thus consistency
with oneself.
It’s much contested in Kant scholarship whether sensus communis is regulative or
constitutive68—likely because Kant himself defers this question, saying
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Whether there is in fact such a common sense, as a constitutive principle of the
possibility of experience, or whether a yet higher principle of reason only makes it into a
regulative principle for us first to produce a common sense in ourselves for higher ends
… this we would not and cannot yet investigate here (CJ §21, 5:240, 124)
But whether common sense is what defines human thought or common sense simply represents
one of human thought’s most powerful capacities, for the purposes of this argument it is most
important that for Kant that capacity is best cultivated in the aesthetic power of judgment—or, as
he calls it, sensus communis aestheticus. It is through aesthetic experience that one “makes our
feeling in a given representation universally communicable without the mediation of a concept”
(CJ §40, 5:295, 175). It is through aesthetic experience that we are prompted to consider a
community of commonality; are promised a certain something shared with those around us; are
able to bridge the singularity of our sense and the universality of shared feelings. Friedlander
describes this capacity elegantly when he says that common sense
demands placing oneself in the midst of things by taking everything into account. This
balance of common sense is not an averaging but a sense of the world that take beauty to
be the meeting point of its dimensions. In beauty one feels at home or oriented in the
world.69
There’s more to be said about the status and validity of Kant’s claims about sensus communis
here, but having considered the promise of sensus communis in Kant, we will now turn to
Lugones to understand her conception of common sense before returning to Kant with critical
questions.
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2.4.2 Common Sense and La Callejera
Lugones also writes about common sense in Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes, using that name
to seemingly move between the two senses of it that Kant develops: “common” sense and sensus
communis. While we can find ideas of a common sense throughout the text, she thematizes it
directly in her discussion of la callejera—the streetwalker—as a character who refuses sense,
plays with sense, and doesn’t “make sense.” Of streetwalkers, Lugones says
Streetwalkers include women who are at odds with “home.” The home-shelter-streetpolice station/jail/insane asylum-cemetery circle, in ever so many permutations, is their
larger understanding of home. … I count myself among the women who have found
myself more skillful at dodging violence in the street. … Conversations in the street are
not subject to the same rules of sense, nor the same expectations. (PP 209)
Streetwalkers are many people70, but here Lugones specifically calls out the women who live and
work on the street, who experience “home” as a multiplicitous state/space of violence and find
themselves making and dodging alliances on the streets where they move and live. She argues
that the street does not have the “same rules of sense” as other spaces because when women live
on the street they disrupt the public/private dichotomy by bridging “private” homes with
“public” streets. Those public/private designations mean nothing when nowhere and everywhere
is “home,” when nothing is “private” and everything is “public.” The disruption of the
public/private dichotomy, therefore, breaks with the common nature of “common sense” and
Lugones argues that it allows for / requires new sense to be made by the people who find
themselves walking the streets—streetwalkers.
Considering “common sense” more directly, Lugones argues that
The walking/theorizing [of streetwalkers] defamiliarizes “common sense,” and the
“common” backing it up loses its unseen, or taken for granted, part of the furniture of the
universe, quality. The common is all around and in her as both upheld and defied. The
70
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politics and fictitious quality of the common are clarified as the callejera, who is
prepared for the unmaking and remaking of sense and thus for participation in a delicate
production, is assumed by and as everyone else around her, to be fluent in sturdy
common sense. (PP 221)
Here Lugones explores how the streetwalker defamiliarizes the “common” of “common sense”
through her embodiment of what she doesn’t share with the common, through the ways she does
not commune with the community, even as she lives on the streets in their midst. When she
walks the streets, she stymies public/private distinctions and exposes the violence at the core of
the commons.
But that violence is not simply visible to the community she shares these streets with—to
the community for whom the streets are the public space juxtaposed with their private lives. The
power of “common sense” is that when it claims the streetwalker to be part of its community, it
makes invisible the visibility of her difference. It covers up how she doesn’t “make sense” with
more “common sense.” Her life on the street becomes part of the “furniture of the universe” as
opposed to a radical rupture of its logic. Lugones says
She [la callejera] is assumed to be part of the common that backs up common sense,
pressed into being complicit with the ease and carelessness of interlocution, all meaning
presented as ready-made for the compliant consumption and as heavy with its own
propriety. The words and gestures seem not to break or dissolve easily, their solid
meanings carried by an enormous collectivity constituting and legitimating their
institutionalization. Meanings and institutions thus appear reified, objectified, taken out
of the danger of interlocution. (PP 222)
Lugones is obviously suspicious of what makes common sense “common” in any way. Rather
than the sort of mutually-considered, collectively-produced sensemaking practice “common
sense” claims to be when it is presented as a universally accessible faculty (as Kant seems to do),
common sense here is a ready-made logic provided by an authoritarian power for the “compliant
consumption” of the masses. But la callejera, Lugones argues,
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Can both sense the reality and fiction of the common in daily interaction as well as the
multiple contestations of the common and of its sense. She is ready for multiple meaning
being elaborated interactively. The daily negotiations of streetwalkers, pedestrians, draw
trajectories that concretize, differentiate space, that defy its abstract production and
administration. They also reveal the presuppositions of abstraction and its being
constituted by an interchangeability of all terms, and thus a homogenization of sense and
an absence of dialogical sense making. (PP 222)
The streetwalker sees how “common sense” is constructed—not given—and she moves in,
between, and among its real and fictitious layers. She sees how she constructs meaning
dialogically, how she makes sense between her and others, rather than simply drawing upon a
“common sense” they share without consideration. Her daily acts defy abstraction. She is not
simply interchangeable with any other individual. She is an individual amid homogenized
society. And she exposes how “common sense” homogenizes sense by asserting it is universal
rather than leaning into is dialogical—perhaps multilogical—possibilities.

2.4.3 Sensus Communis or Common Sense: Critiquing Kant vis-à-vis Lugones
Returning to Kant, Lugones helps us see that when Kant argues that “common sense” is
just a vulgar idea of shared knowledge and sensus communis is an intricate sensemaking process
tapped into by aesthetic experience, he may not be careful enough to consider the ways in which
the two bleed together or can be / are conflated. That’s why Lugones pays special attention to the
ways in which a reified “common sense” is not different from but a symptom of a disciplinary
communal sense or sensus communis. She wants to carefully attend to how claims of
universalization produce homogenization.
Similarly, there are many Kant scholars who have raised questions about the normativity
of sensus communis. To consider two important critiques from Makkreel and Eagleton here:
Makkreel notes that, “a pure judgment of taste is not an empirical report about a subject’s
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emotional state, but a normative reflective judgment that projects a felt agreement with other
subjects.”71 The source of this normativity, he notes, is transcendental for Kant, however “on the
assumption that all human beings share the same faculties, Kant concludes that a disinterested
judgment of taste is universally valid. Without this Enlightenment tenet, all we can say is that the
aesthetic judgment makes a normative demand that it be a shared judgment.”72 Here Makkreel
points to an important limitation of Kant’s claim that sensus communis is transcendental (a
limitation I also pointed to in Kant’s discussion of the body): that the transcendental nature of
this claim seems to rely solely on the Enlightenment tenet that all human beings share the same
faculties. Thus, Makkreel continues by pointing out that: “Whereas Kant assumes that the sensus
communis postulated by taste represents a universal community, we merely expect a general
sharing that may in fact be less inclusive. There is no need to equate the common, the general,
and the universal.”73
In aesthetic judgments, Kant wants to say, we appeal to a common humanity as the basis
for the universal validity of our subjectively felt judgment. But in the centuries of philosophical
thought since Kant, many thinkers—including Lugones—have written substantive critiques of
such claims of commonality and universality. This is one of the things Eagleton critiques when
he argues that there is an ideological threat within Kant’s aesthetics:
To judge aesthetically is implicitly to declare that a wholly subjective response is of the
kind that every individual must necessarily experience, one that must elicit spontaneous
agreement from them all. The aesthetic, one might argue, is in this sense the very
paradigm of the ideological … Like aesthetic judgments for Kant, ideological utterances
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conceal an essentially emotive content within a referential form, characterizing the lived
relation of a speaker to the world in the act of appearing to characterize the world.74
What Eagleton points to here is the danger of conflating a subjective feeling and a universal
claim. Kant, of course, has gone to painstaking claims to justify why aesthetic judgments are
subjectively universal, but as we’ve seen through Makkreel’s critique, that move from the
subjective to the universal still relies on a perhaps unjustified claim of universality that conflates
the common, the general, and the universal. Eagleton directly critiques how this happens in the
Kant’s articulation of sensus communis as follows:
Such solidarity is a kind of sensus communis, which Kant opposes in his work to that
fragmentary, unreflective collection of prejudices and opinions which is doxa or common
sense. Such doxa is what Kant himself, had he used the word, might have termed
‘ideology’; but sensus communis is ideology purified universalized and rendered
reflective, ideology raised to the second power, idealized beyond all mere sectarian
prejudice or customary reflex to customary reflex to resemble the very ghostly shape of
rationality itself.75
The failures or dangers of sensus communis that Makkreel and Eagleton point out are almost
precisely the value that Kant finds in the concept. Sensus communis names how we elevate our
thoughts and feelings to the level of the universal. This can both be a powerful moment of
commonality (as Kant argues) or a violent moment of forced agreement (as Eagleton understands
it). I like how Zinkin describes aesthetic judgment as a way to underscore this; she says, “my
feeling of pleasure in a judgment of taste only has any worth, or only counts as an appropriate
feeling of pleasure, if I can assume as a standard a unity, or coalition, of judging subjects.”76
Making the assumption that that coalition of judging subjects agrees with or affirms your
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judgment can be a powerful moment of shared humanity. It can also be a totally biased and
unfounded assumption.77
Reading Lugones alongside Kant doesn’t necessarily resolve these contradictory readings
of sensus communis, but I think it does suggest both/and an approach that holds both readings
together and demands we carefully attend to how sensus communis can be powerfully affirming
for some and ideologically oppressive for others simultaneously.
I think Lugones’ figure of the streetwalker is helpful for moving forward here. What
would Kant think of the streetwalker? Would he, like Lugones, recognize that her sense-making
may be the only one that rises above the ready-made vulgarity of “common sense”? Could we
perhaps see the streetwalker as a figure that can appeal to sensus communis without the risk of
the ideological or rather as a risk to the ideological?
I would argue that if we understand in Kant’s articulation of sensus communis its deep
connection to an aesthetic experience that is disruptive and demands new modes of thinking,
then it has to be the streetwalker who actually fulfills the three maxims of sensus communis: (1)
“to think for oneself,” as unprejudiced, (2) “to think in the position of everyone else,” as broadminded, and (3) to “always think in accord with oneself,” as consistent. She must (1) think for
herself because her life defies common sense. Yet she must (2) always think in the position of
everyone else, because everyone assumes she is part of common sense. And regardless she still
(3) always thinks in accord with herself in that she both upholds and defies common sense—not
with the kind of harmonious consistency Kant perhaps has in mind here, but by being
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consistently multiple, multiplicitous, and multilogical in the face of common sense, the
commoners and their commons.
This streetwalker sensemaking/theorizing rejects the transcendental nature of Kant’s
sensus communis, because it is deeply material, always concrete, and occurring in the midst of
duress—not disinterest. Lugones says,
Streetwalker theorizing, then, is sustained in the midst of the concrete … Tactical
strategies of making sense against/in spite of/in the midst of domination pedestrian style
make room for and sustain a long and wide social sense of resistant intentionality, a sense
with a history. Tactical strategies of making sense against/in spite of/in the midst of
domination also sustain an open, in-the-making sociality at the street level, no sense of
‘the whole’ except as an imposing, intruding, deceitful, and powerful fiction.
Streetwalker theorizing countenances no possibility of making resistant sense except
among people, since sense cannot be presupposed—as it is with dominant sense. (PP
224-5)
Streetwalker theorizing, for Lugones, establishes a “resistant intentionality” that makes “sense
with a history.” Because streetwalkers are always grounded in their concrete material existence
by the fact of the challenges they face just trying to survive, their sensemaking cannot be
abstracted to any sense of a universal experience. And because they are marginalized, ignored,
and covered-up by dominant society, their sensemaking will always resist any “common” sense
of “the whole.”
But if, going against streetwalker theorizing, we do abstract a sort of “resistant
intentionality,” we can see many analogies to aesthetic experience in the Kantian sense. Our
experiences of the beautiful and the sublime, for Kant, are precisely those which resist
conceptualization. They do not fit into “common sense” and they require a different kind of
sensemaking. To use Lugones’ streetwalking metaphor, they do not make pedestrian use of
public streets to expediently get from one place to another, they linger and play.
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For Kant, this lingering and play can only happen when one is disinterested. And in his
emphasis on how the disinterested cannot be hungry or have concerns for existence, Kant
suggests that being disinterested requires a certain kind of comfort/stability/wholeness only
available to those who live within the dominant class. Kant relies on the sudden appearance of a
beautiful or sublime sight to “shock” someone out of their normal modes of making sense and
into new aesthetic ones that resist the conceptualization and emphasize the singularity of the
object that surprised, delighted, or even terrified them in the first place.
But Lugones sees more clearly that many people exist—and are always forced to exist—
at the margins of dominant sensemaking. Streetwalkers are not “shocked” by the uncommon,
because their lives are uncommon. They presuppose no “common” sense and thus must make
sense in every moment. In some way, then, they are always living in the lingering of a resistance
to conceptualization as they have no ready-made conceptual resources of their own with which to
make sense of things. This lingering isn’t opened in singular moments in the face of beautiful or
sublime sights, rather streetwalkers are supremely creative and tactical, living/lingering their
resistance in the face of the “imposing, intruding, deceitful, and powerful fiction[s]” of “common
sense” (PP 225).
The last point that Lugones makes in the extended quote above is that, “streetwalker
theorizing countenances no possibility of making resistant sense except among people, since
sense cannot be presupposed—as it is with dominant sense” (PP 225). She emphasizes that each
moment of making sense is made singularly and cannot be presupposed or universalized. But
that doesn’t mean that those moments cannot be shared, just that communal sense only becomes
communal in the way that it is made together in each instance of coming together. The figure of
the streetwalker inverts Kant’s understanding of sensus communis. Rather than sensus communis
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being presupposed to ground the universal value of a subjective judgment (thus risking the
conflation of universal and common that Makkreel points out and the smuggling in of ideology
that Eagleton critiques), in streetwalker theorizing sensus communis is only constructed through
the communication of a judgment in the material world.
We can (and should) reflect this consideration back into Lugones’ discussion of “world”travelling. In doing so, we can see now that “world”-travelling also sounds similar to Kant’s
three maxims for sensus communis. It requires a sense of oneself in one’s own “world,” an
ability to put oneself in the position of others by travelling to their “worlds,” and an ability to see
oneself there and bring new understandings of other back to one’s own “world.” Lugones says,
Knowing other women’s ‘worlds’ is part of knowing them and knowing them is part of
loving them. Notice that the knowing can be done in greater or lesser depth. … Without
knowing the other’s “world,” one does not know the other, and without knowing the
other one is really alone in the other’s presence because the other is only dimly present to
one. (PP 97)
“World”-travelling requires the kind of unprejudiced, broad-minded, and consistent thinking that
Kant articulates as a matter of communal sense-making. But Lugones reminds us that that can
never happen in an abstract sense. One must travel to the specific, concrete worlds of other
women, not to an abstract, imagined, or presupposed idea of them. Travelling in the former way
allows knowing and loving; travelling in the latter way only founds a “common” sense on one’s
own sense and produces an unloving mode of arrogant perception in which the other person is
reduced to your own perception of them.
To conclude, through “world”-travelling and streetwalker theorizing, Lugones draws on
ideas of resistant sense-making and open-ended conceptualization that we can see as analogous
with aesthetic cognition. That said, she is not concerned with developing a transcendental
justification for the universality of aesthetic judgments—or any judgments for that matter.
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Through her discussion of streetwalker theorizing, she articulates the pervasive and harmful
nature of any attempt to universalize sense-making, particularly as it appears in a reified
“common sense.” In the face of this, she shows how those who live at the margins of dominant
society uphold and defy dominant “common sense” to develop new modes of sense-making that
are always grounded in concrete, material existence. That sense-making, she argues, only
becomes common when it is constructed communally—meaning there can never be an appeal to
a presupposed “common sense” upon which our sense-making together is grounded. Rather, we
must travel between and among each other’s “worlds” and make sense there together.

2.5 Conclusion
2.5.1 Double Vision, Complex Communication, and the Coalition Limen in Lugones
Throughout her work, Lugones is always concerned with how women can work together
for their liberation from systems of oppression. She sees this as a complicated task that requires
deep understandings of ourselves, the systems in which we live, and each other. Her work, in
many ways, can be read as a catalog of resources and tools for approaching these challenging
tasks. So far we’ve explored how “world”-travelling, loving playfulness, and streetwalker
theorizing function in this way, and as we work toward the conclusion of this chapter, we can
finally see how she introduces double vision and the limen as well.
Concluding in this way, requires going back to the very beginning of Lugones’ work. In
the introduction to Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes, Lugones writes of her chapter on “world”travelling that she:
wanted to express the actuality and possibilities of relations among women as nonlinear:
women standing on the oppression of other women, women colluding with the reduction
of other women, women colluding with the blocking of other women’s possibilities,
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women standing in resistance against those reductions in oneself, women standing with
other women making their possibilities. (PP 32)
And she concludes that chapter with a call to her readers to try to “‘world’-travel in the direction
of deep coalition” (PP 98). Thus for Lugones, “world”-travelling—and I think we could argue
streetwalker theorizing as well—is not simply a matter of one’s own orientation toward the
world. Rather, it also encourages a certain mode of creating relationships that offer the possible
emergences of new “worlds” in which the very same “world”-travelers find themselves more
playful and thus freer.
Lugones describes this in her essay “On Complex Communication,” where she discusses
the necessity of developing in-between (liminal) spaces in which coalition can develop and
argues that complex communication is the only form of communication that can be successful
there. To accomplish such a coalitional limen, she argues that:
We must develop a double vision arrived at through “world”-travel or else we will be
zombified by the oppressor’s imaginative construction of us. Multiple consciousness
(Matsuda 1996) or “world”-travel (Lugones 2003) are methodologies that enable us to
shift to the liminal by reading reality as multiple. (CC 78-9)
Here, Lugones puts “world”-travelling to use, arguing that it is a methodology that allows us to
access the liminal through the way in which it illuminates the multiplicity of reality. It is
important for Lugones, however, that this liminal space where coalition becomes possible not be
conceived of as simply “outside” dominated space. She rejects the idea that one can necessarily
be “outside” domination or that being there would make communication between oppressed
groups easier.
Instead she argues that oppressed individuals and groups must first develop a sort of
“double vision” that allows them to see oppression and resistance at the same time. She says,
“against the oppressive descriptions of reality, all these opposition constructions by the
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oppressed create a clear sense of standing in a dual reality, one in which we use double
perception and double praxis. One eye sees the oppressed reality, the other sees the resistant one”
(CC 78). This double vision seems to be opened up or made possible by “world”-travelling but is
not the same thing as “world”-travelling. Where “world”-travelling is a matter of moving
between “worlds” and selves in those “worlds,” double vision is a matter of seeing multiple
realities within one “world.” One can see those realities, because one knows that multiple
“worlds” exist, but one is not necessarily travelling when one uses double vision. To think again
of Lugones’ example of playfulness, Lugones experiences herself as playful in some “worlds”
and not-playful in others as she travels from one “world” to another. But within a “world” where
she is constructed as not-playful, she can use double vision to see the reality of herself as notplayful and the possibilities of her resisting that reality in that “world.”78
Double vision, then, is not quite “world”-travelling, but it does create and position one at
the limen as one sees both the oppressive reality and the resistant possibilities. Lugones argues
that, “the creation of liminal spaces involves this going back and forth from domination,
negotiating that movement so as to maximize our freedom in an unfree situation” (CC 79). This
movement that allows one to cultivate double vision—though made possible by “world”travelling—does not create a new “world,” and thus is not revolution itself. But it is a “creative
preparation” for revolution as it creates space for coalition to be possible.
But how is coalition possible at the limen? Lugones argues that the failing of many
writers of liminality is that they seem to think that if multiple communities can come together at
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the limen, then they will immediately be able to communicate, organize, and liberate themselves
from there. Lugones, however, sees this as too strong a claim and proposes the following weaker
one:
So, though it is not true that if we stand together in the limen we will understand each
other, we can make the weaker claim that if we recognize each other as occupying liminal
sites, then we will have a disposition to read each other away from structural, dominant
meaning, or have good reason to do so as oppressed people. (CC 79)
Rather than assuming multiple oppressed communities would meet in the same liminal space,
Lugones proposes recognizing multiple limens and learning to see across liminal sites. And
rather than assuming recognition would be possible purely because of occupying liminal sites,
she proposes that simply recognizing each other as both being at liminal sites is the preparation
necessary for working toward liberation.
The communication that can then happen as a result of this recognition of mutualliminality also takes its own mode which Lugones calls “complex communication.” She argues,
Liberal conversation thrives on transparency and because of that it is monologized.
Complex communication thrives on recognition of opacity and on reading opacity, not
through assimilating the text of others to our own. Rather, it is enacted through a change
in one’s own vocabulary, one’s sense of self, one’s way of living, in the extension of
one’s collective memory, through developing forms of communication that signal
disruption of the reduction attempted by the oppressor. Complex communication is
creative. In complex communication we create and cement relation identities, meanings
that did not precede the encounter, ways of life that transcend nationalisms, root
identities, and other simplifications of our imagination. (CC 84)
Complex communication recognizes the challenges of communicating across difference—even
for oppressed groups existing under the same oppressor—and values the opacity warranted by
difference rather than demanding the transparency that liberal, egalitarian frameworks admire.
Lugones argues that a demand for conversational transparency is a demand to produce one
account from multiple experiences. It produces a monologue from dialogue. In contrast, complex
communication preserves the dialogical nature of dialogue by maintaining the opacity of
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experience in language. It communicates by creating disruptive signals within the oppressive
structures of monological language. It turns double vision into a double tongue. Lugones says,
There are then at least two conversations here occurring at once, through one speech act.
In one, the intended form of the speech is that of an oppositional address to the colonizer.
In the other, the intersubjective conversation, the form of the speech marks liminality,
marks a portal to life lived differently, nonmonologically, interculturally. (CC 82)
In this way, speakers at the limen can communicate about oppression while intersubjectively
communicating against the oppressor. This can happen in many ways—through polyglossia,
through gestures, through slang. Lugones, herself, points to how complex communication is also
a playful practice for her:
I speak them [many tongues] because I want to point to the possibility of becoming
playful in the use of different voices and because I want to point to the possibility of
coming to appreciate this playfulness. Here I exercise this playful practice. The
appreciation of my playfulness and its meaning may be realized when the possibility of
becoming playful in this way has been collectively realized, when it has become realized
by us. It is here to be appreciated or missed and both the appreciation and the missing are
significant. The more fully this playfulness is appreciated, the less broken I am to you,
the more dimensional I am to you. But I want to exercise my multidimensionality even if
you do not appreciate it. To do otherwise would be to engage in self-mutilation, to come
to be just the person that you see. To play in this way is then an act of resistance as well
as an act of self-affirmation. (PP 41)
Speaking multiple languages is a form of resistance for Lugones. It asserts her existence in
multiple “worlds.” And while those in power may not appreciate it, those who are also in liminal
spaces can recognize it as complex communication and become co-conspirators in her resistance.
They can make sense of what she means and form coalitions. As she says at the end of “On
Complex Communication,”
We know that liminal lives are led and created against the grain of dominating power. If
we know that about each other, we have good reason not to assimilate what we hear and
see to the oppressor’s meaning or to our own. If we recognize liminality in others and in
ourselves and if we recognize a need for company and for coalition then we can decide to
enter a conversation with the other liminals that is not a liberal conversation. (CC 84)
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Lugones’ imperative for complex communication that allows for coalition-building is both about
learning to speak playfully in ways that signal resistance in liminal existence and about learning
to hear those signals in the communication of others. It is both about cultivating certain modes of
expressing one’s thoughts and feelings and certain dispositions of sensing and processing one’s
experiences. Doing so, Lugones seems to believe, will allow us to create the kinds of coalitional
communities necessary to liberate ourselves from oppression.

2.5.2 Double Visioning, “World”-Travelling, and Crashing Stones
Across this chapter, I’ve followed the intuition that the multiplicity of possibilities
Lugones’ mother saw in every object was a uniquely aesthetic experience and considered how
Lugones’ articulation of loving playfulness and “world”-travelling do and don’t align with
Kant’s articulation of the aesthetic experiences of the beautiful and the sublime.
In doing so, I aimed to create a liminal space where I could understand what drew me to
Kant’s articulation of aesthetics while also questioning and critiquing him through the lens of the
feminist perspective developed by Lugones. I wanted to use double vision to see moments that
might be oppressive (as in the cases of disinterestedness and sensus communis) and the
possibilities of resistance (as in the feeling of life and the sublime). I wanted to travel between
the “worlds” of Lugones and Kant. I wanted to crash stones in their “worlds.” I wanted to crash
them together like stones. I wanted to see the beautiful colors inside when they broke.
If we consider each concept I attended to a pair of stones, one for each thinker, then I
crashed together play, health, love, and common sense in this chapter. In the case of play that
crashing yielded a better understanding of how and why Kant connects play and ease
(disinterestedness) while Lugones insists on disconnecting them and developing a conception of
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different “worlds” to treat the presence of different attributes of oneself (oneselves). That
crashing also attuned us to how play opens a space of critique for each thinker (a space of
lingering, a space of fluidity or flexibility) in which a different kind of thinking/living/being can
take place (something we’d see developed in loving playfulness and the sublime disposition).
In the case of health that crashing yielded new questions about why Lugones appeals to
health as a condition of play and how health surfaces the body in Kant’s aesthetic system. It
allowed us to begin to articulate how Kant elevates general conditions of many (privileged)
bodies to universal facts of all bodies, neglecting how structural and systemic privilege and
oppression impacts those conditions and thus embedding social and political inequities in his
aesthetic system through its claim to transcendental status (something we’d see repeated in the
case of sensus communis).
In the case of love that crashing yielded an attention to how loving playfulness and the
sublime disposition both serve as the new modes of being in the world and relating to others that
play made space for, how they both represent modes of being open to surprise and abandoning
oneself to an experience without preconceived ideas or concepts of what it should be. This was
the moment in which Kant and Lugones came closest “together” here, in which the inverse
through lines became visible, and even with doubled-vision we saw more clearly the intuition
that drew me into this “world”-travelling conversation to begin with: that German idealist
aesthetics and certain feminist theorists might be describing a similar way of being in the world
and relating to others.
And finally, in the case of common sense that crashing yielded a critique of Kant’s claims
for a transcendental common sense and an elevation of la callejera as the figure who perhaps
best makes visible the sensus communis amidst vulgar “common sense.” This final point required
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reading Kant in a way that I see as similar to the previous chapter’s feminist killjoy reading of
Baumgarten. By that I mean it required reading Kant against Kant to some extent, seeking out
the radical, disruptive possibility in his aesthetics and refusing to allow for a harmonious
covering-up of that potential. It required imagining what it would really look like if each moment
of aesthetic judgment created its own criteria for judgment. It required refusing to let those
moments or judgments be harmoniously resolved in a general standard of taste or a universal
common sense. It required seeing how la callejera embodied the culmination of, resistance to,
and failure of “common sense at once.
Like crashing stones, this process was messy at times—rocks crumbled, pebbles scattered
away and were lost. Simultaneously, the beautiful insides of other rocks emerged, their edges
were smoothed and polished. As a form of double vision, this chapter has resisted singularity and
a unified approach. As a mode of complex communication, it’s been a practice of meeting
opacity with opacity and still finding a method for dialogue. As a double tongue, it’s meant
speaking the Critique and la callejera “together,” mixing and mingling their “worlds” in
resistance to voices who might argue they’re too different to ever speak to each other.
More than the other two chapters here, as this one closes, I feel like perhaps it has just
begun, like these last pages on Lugones and Kant are the opening of a conversation rather than
the conclusion of one. In the early stages of my writing, this felt like a failure. But upon
reflection, I think it’s a sign that I may have managed to actually maintain the liminality of the
space I worked to create and resisted collapsing its in-between into one or the other, or
concretizing it as a third place. At the very least, I think it marks that I’ve begun to practice the
coalitional work Lugones prescribes, at least as/if it can be practiced on a theoretical and
philosophical level.
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I want to end again back at my museum encounter with Marshall’s painting Untitled
(Mirror Girl). In considering what Lugones and Kant might have to offer me in that moment,
I’m most struck by what I’ve learned in practicing creating a liminal space. I’ve learned from
Kant how an experience of a work of art can leave my faculties lingering in free play, how I can
remain open to the object that compelled me into that state, and how to cultivate a disposition
that might keep me there. I’ve learned from Lugones that if I want to remain committed to my
anti-racist, anti-sexist, social justice principles, then my conversation with the painting and the
woman in the painting must remain dialogical; it must be, in a deep sense of the word, a
dialogue—a complex communication, a double vision, and a double tongue. This means that I
have to resist my desire to have a definitive understanding of that painting, that woman, or my
encounter there by recognizing the liberal tendency of that desire, and instead constructing a
liminal space that allows for us (me and the painting, me and the woman, me and the artist, etc.)
to remain opaque to each other while still resisting oppressive gazes/systems/structures/“worlds.”
At the exhibition, there was a corner of one room where images from Marshall’s
inspiration archives were scattered all over the floor. Visitors were invited to step and stand
among them, to sit down and sift through them. As I did in front of the Mirror Girl painting, I
spent a long time there, sitting and sifting. And looking back, what I was doing didn’t feel
dissimilar from crashing stones, or perhaps from the work that comes after the stone-crashing. If
the painting and I were two stones crashed together, these images were pebbles left from other
nearby stones crashing. In being invited to see them, I was being invited to pick up the pieces
and make sense of the multiple stories, the multiple “worlds,” the multiple potentials there.
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Figure 4: Photograph of the Images Shared at Mastry, 9/25/16
In the next chapter, I’ll present another unorthodox pairing—Schiller and Lorde—and I’ll
continue to trace the inverse through lines of this project. Like this chapter, the next will treat
two thinkers’ work comprehensively, teasing out concepts that they develop throughout their
oeuvres to understand a number of parallels and divergences between their contexts and
concepts. Unlike this chapter, that analysis won’t contain such a strongly performative method,
and rather than opening with a shatter, it will open with a scream.
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CHAPTER THREE
Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Woman:
From Lorde’s Erotics to Schiller’s Aesthetics
If I open my mouth and scream, that is an expression of feeling,
but it’s not a poem and it’s not really useful to you.
I have to take the scream and put words to it in such
a way that it will make you feel why I am screaming.
Audre Lorde (CWAL 169)
How can we be just, kindly, and human toward others, if we
lack the power of receiving into ourselves, faithfully and truly,
natures unlike ours, of feeling our way into the situation
of others, of making other people’s feelings our own?
Friedrich Schiller (L 124)

While Audre Lorde has been revered as a poet and a Black Feminist thinker enshrined in
the canons of English and Gender Studies curricula for decades, her inclusion among twentiethcentury philosophy is far from established. Her work is at times taught in philosophy classes
(including many of my own) and occasionally seen in papers at philosophical conferences, but
it’s rarely anthologized or thematized, and, as such, it still seems to remain outside of the
philosophy canon. In fact, Sharon Patricia Holland even notes that “while feminists have utilized
Lorde’s work somewhat, little attention has been paid to it in feminist theory as a whole.”79
There are likely many reasons for this, one of which being that Lorde never claimed to be
a philosopher or even to be writing philosophically. Lorde self-identified as a poet, and as Nancy
Bereano writes in the introduction to Sister Outsider, “Lorde’s stature as a poet is undeniable”
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(SO 8). Lorde’s limited prose writing worked to establish the singular role of poetry in
connecting our deepest feelings to our lives lived in a shared world. Her writing is deeply felt,
and it purposefully eludes the sorts of analytic and systematic claims in which philosophy
barters.
That said, her work also has much to offer to philosophy, particularly in the ways she
conceptualizes knowledge and discusses the differences between individuals. Thus, Bereano also
says in that same introduction: “Audre Lorde’s voice is central to the development of
contemporary feminist theory. She is at the cutting edge of consciousness” (SO 8).
In the first part of this chapter, I will attend to Lorde’s work philosophically, by which I
mean, I aim to present a reading of Lorde’s thought that thematizes her discussion of knowledge
and her concept of the erotic. In doing so, I intend to explore Lorde’s work as a whole, to treat
her corpus seriously, and to reorganize it in ways that will show its pertinence along the way. I
also hope to show that Lorde’s work has considerable philosophical depth and nuance in her
conceptions of feeling, thinking, poetry, and the erotic—while reckoning with how
philosophizing Lorde’s work in such a way does lose something about the power and force of her
poetic writing.80
After attending carefully to Lorde’s work, I will then introduce a, perhaps curious,
interlocutor for her thought: Schiller. Like Lorde’s, Schiller’s work is also relegated to the
margins of philosophy. He is most famous as a playwright and highly regarded for his position in
the European and German literary canons, but when he is considered by philosophers it is often
only to mention that he was a reader of Kant. And this is true: Schiller was a reader of Kant, but I
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believe he has much more than a gloss on Kant to offer to the history—and present—of
aesthetics.
As such, in the second part of the chapter, I will present a reading of Schiller’s thought
that articulates how he reorients aesthetic experience around the object/other through the
development of what I call an aesthetic disposition/dimension implicit in Kallias and the play
drive he explicitly conceives of in Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man. In doing so, I
intend to emphasize the relational nature of Schiller’s thought and how it serves not only as a
commentary on but also as a certain kind of corrective to Kant’s aesthetic theory. I will also
consider Schiller’s conception of the aesthetic state and what I and many critics see as a number
of failures in his attempt to bridge aesthetics and politics in that way. Having reviewed those
ideas and literature, I will return to the idea of an aesthetic disposition/dimension in Schiller to
show how I think it reorients aesthetics as a whole around new modes of relating to objects and
others.
These extended readings will then allow me in the final part of the chapter to bring
Schiller and Lorde into conversation together, to see how they intersect on the inverse through
lines I’ve been tracing throughout this project. While there are certainly so many differences
between these thinkers, I see real alignment in how they: (1) articulate the division between
reason/thinking and sense/feeling, (2) reclaim and attend to the status of sense/feeling in that
division, (3) propose unique fusions of reason and sense in their concepts of the play drive and
the erotic, and (4) posit poetry and art as ways we can reshape ourselves and our societies for the
better development of our humanity. In the end, I argue that finding parallels between the erotic
and the play drive helps us better understand the possibility of the emergence of an aesthetic state
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that might actually resist the oppressive powers of our logic-driven, colonial, patriarchal, white
supremacist society through the force of poetry, pleasure, and play.
In the previous two chapters, I took inspiration from the feminist thinker I was reading to
develop a performative level of the chapter (e.g. the killjoy reading of the “happy” aesthetician,
the effort in double vision and cultivating a liminal space). While I did spend some time while
writing this chapter trying to imagine what employing Lorde’s concept of the erotic in a
performative reading might look like, in the end I couldn’t quite wrap my head around it and
abandoned the effort.
If there is any performative aspect to this chapter, I actually think I would say it’s
pedagogical. I read Lorde and Schiller with more of my students than any of the other thinkers in
this project. I return to them time and time again in syllabi for a variety of courses. I’m always
finding opportunities to share them with my students and to make sense of their work together.
My reading of Schiller here was developed in the classroom I opened this dissertation with, and
my reading of Lorde came from a project I worked on with a philosophy undergraduate student.
Both of those readings were tested out and taught at the front of classrooms.
As a result, the approach I take to present the ideas of these thinkers here is one that I
very often take in presenting any thinker to my students: identity a few main concepts, figure out
if there’s a thesis for each of those themes, and try to make connections within that thinker’s
work and with the work of others. At times, I think proceeding this way makes this chapter feel a
bit plodding; it moves slower than the others and doesn’t make as many conceptual leaps. But I
also think this method is important for two reasons: (1) because there is a lack of philosophical
treatment of each of these thinkers (particularly Lorde), it is necessary to go back to the
fundamentals of their work and closely and clearly track the core concepts and steps of their
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arguments; and (2) because Lorde and Schiller are both conceptually invested in education—be
it a poetic education or an aesthetic one—it makes sense to treat their writings like a curriculum
of sorts and to see what teaching tools doing so can yield.
As Lorde says, “a poet is by definition a teacher also” (IAYS 184). I consider that
statement license to take a pedagogical approach to this chapter and write as both a philosopher
and a teacher with my peers, my mentors, and my students in mind. I’ll begin that process by
turning to Lorde and tracing the role of poetry and the poet in her rich body of work.

3.1 Every Poem is an Erotic Bridge: Fusing Feeling and Thinking through Poetry in Lorde
Feeling/Knowing and Thinking/Understanding: The Role of Poetry and the Poet in Lorde
In this section, I’ll weave together a number of Lorde’s poems, essays, speeches, and
interviews to explore how she articulates a nuanced understanding of the relationship between
oneself and the world. I’ll explore her work on feeling, thinking, and poetry through four theses
that I think are woven through her thought: (1) feeling is a mode of knowing best communicated
through poetry, (2) thinking is a mode of understanding emphasizing rationality and prized by
contemporary society, (3) speaking is a necessary act of resistance, and, finally, (4) poetry is not
simply a matter of poems, but also a way of being.
Each of these theses presents a different aspect of one’s relationship to oneself and the
world that Lorde develops across her oeuvre, and they intertwine and enmesh throughout her
writing. My primary task here is to make each of these threads more visible so that we can see
the nuance and depth of her work. In doing so, I intend to reject the assessment of a critic like
Jan Clausen who argues that Lorde’s work exhibits a “blunt refusal to distinguish between poetry
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and life.”81 Rather than seeing Lorde’s entanglement of poetry and life as a blunt refusal to
distinguish them, I hope to show how that entanglement is instead a rich tapestry. I also hope to
provide a resource for philosophers reading Lorde’s work who want to better understand what
she might offer to a variety of aesthetic, epistemological, and ethical projects. I’ll begin by
discussing the relationship between feeling and poetry.

3.1.1 Transposing Feeling into Poetry
The first step of this analysis is to explore how Lorde understands feelings and then the
relationship between feeling and poetry. In short, for Lorde, feelings are innate, deep forms of
knowledge and they can only be communicated in words through poetry. In an interview with
Adrienne Rich, she describes her experiences of feeling and finding words for her feelings as she
was growing up. Speaking about her early childhood, she says:
I kept myself through feeling. I lived through it. And at such a subterranean level that I
didn’t know how to talk. I was busy feeling out other ways of getting and giving
information and whatever else I could because talking wasn’t where it was at. (SO 81)
Here we see her articulate how feeling is deeply interior and within oneself, seemingly preverbal
and not yet linguistic. But she’s careful to note that that doesn’t mean it can’t be a mode of
communication. Feeling can be a way of getting and giving information. Even that subterranean
knowing can be shared—just not easily in words. Lorde continues telling the story of her
childhood and explains further:
Poetry functioned specifically for me from the time I was very young. When someone
said to me, ‘How do you feel?’ or ‘what do you think?’ or asked another direct question, I
would recite a poem, and somewhere in that poem would be the feeling, the vital piece of
information. It might be a line. It might be an image. The poem was my response. (SO
82)
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As Lorde recounts here, poetry became her first link between a nonverbal feeling and a
verbal speaking. She recited poems to express her feelings and used them as her own words. But
she soon found that she had many feelings for which poems did not exist to explain: “[And] this
was the first reason for my own writing, my need to say things I couldn’t say otherwise when I
couldn’t find other poems to serve. … There were so many complex emotions for which poems
did not exist.” (SO 82) Thus, poetry is how Lorde began to communicate her feelings in words.
And, at least for her, only poetry could make words hold the subterranean nature of the feelings
she wished to express.
Lorde expands on this autobiographical account more theoretically in her essay, “Poetry
Is Not A Luxury.” There she argues that “it is through poetry that we give name to those ideas
which are—until the poem—nameless and formless, about to be birthed but already felt.” (SO
36) Here, once again, we see Lorde articulate that poetry allows for nameless, formless feelings
to be named. She refers to those feelings here as ideas, suggesting, as she did previously, that
feelings are a form of knowledge, even if not yet a conceptual one. And she refers to the process
of naming those feelings in poetry—of bringing them from their subterranean depth into the
light—as being birthed.
Lorde uses this metaphorical language of dark and light again later in the essay: “Feeling
is a knowing that happens outside language; poetry bringing feeling to light, understanding and
articulating” (SO 43, emphasis added). Here Lorde explicitly argues that feeling is a form of
knowing that’s pre- or extra-linguistic. The work of poetry then is to understand and articulate
feeling by transposing it to language. As such, Lorde argues, poetry is a very important and
special mode of knowing:
We can train ourselves to respect our feelings and to transpose them into a language so
they can be shared. And where that language does not yet exist, it is our poetry which
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helps to fashion it. Poetry is not only dream and vision; it is the skeleton architecture of
our lives. (SO 38)
While poetry may bring to life something that does not yet exist, that thing isn’t invented out of
thin air. It doesn’t come into being at the moment of being articulated in language. Rather, it
emerges from the subterranean depths of feeling. Poetry brings into the world that which already
exists within us. This is why it’s the “skeleton architecture of our lives.”
But what is this world within us, this subterranean depth that Lorde describes? Where
does it come from and what resides there? In “Poetry Is Not A Luxury,” she argues that “for each
of us as women, there is a dark place within, where hidden and growing our true spirit rises” (SO
36). She continues:
These places of possibility within ourselves are dark because they are ancient and hidden;
they have survived and grown strong through that darkness. Within these deep places,
each one of us holds an incredible reserve of creativity and power, of unexamined and
unrecorded emotion and feeling. (SO 37)
The dark place is one that has always been there. It is an “incredible reserve,” our “true spirit,”
the lifeforce that makes each of us uniquely alive. It is also hidden. It is ours alone to a certain
extent. It is who we are before the forces of the external world shape us.
Lorde specifically identifies this place as feminine and Black. She refers to it as “the
Black mother within each of us” (SO 38). But upon being asked if this description or her thought
as a whole is uniquely to/for Black women, she clarifies that everyone has the Black mother
inside: "the Black mother being the source of nourishment, the source of power for us all—black,
white, male, and female” (CWAL 147). That said, in her conversation with Rich, she says: “I
personally believe that the Black mother exists more in women; yet she is that name for a
humanity that men are not without. But that have taken a position against that piece of
themselves” (SO 101).
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Lorde sees the Black Mother as within all humans, but also recognizes that men and
women have different relationships to the Black Mother, as dictated by external forces of societal
expectations and strictures. As she says in an interview with Claudia Tate:
Men have been taught to deal only with what they understand. This is what they respect.
They know that somewhere feeling and knowledge are important, so they keep women
around to do their feeling for them, like ants do aphids. I don’t think these differences
between men and women are rigidly defined with respect to gender, though the Western
input has been to divide these differences into male and female characteristics. We all
have the ability to feel deeply and to move upon our feelings and see where they lead us.
(CWAL 91)
This comment signals the ways in which Lorde’s writings are not just a poetic description of her
own life or location in the world, but a much larger assessment and assertion of what it means to
be human and how each of us accesses and enacts our humanity. In explaining the relationship
between feeling and poetry in her own life and the lives of women, she is making a larger claim
about the shape and structure of knowledge. She is arguing that feelings are our first and most
true form of knowing, but that our relationship to our feelings is gendered through societal
forces.
This is why poetry is not a luxury for women in her essay, even if poetry itself is a
gender-neutral mode of articulating our feelings in language. Those who have been most
impacted by the oppressive structures of contemporary society are most in need of the curative
measures that accessing the modes of knowing that prefigured the language of that society can
yield. Poetry is necessary for (Black) women, because they’ve spent their lives translating their
experiences into words given to them by a patriarchal and racist society—a society that genders
the neutral human as a white male, that sees “he” as the common pronoun to use when speaking
of a person in general. This brings Lorde into conversation with contemporary philosophical
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literature on epistemic injustice and epistemic ignorance.82 It is precisely in the context of
hermeneutical injustice that poetry serves as an emancipatory tool. For Lorde, it is poetry that
produces words and concepts for what society explicitly wants to erase, quiet down, and silence
all together: the voices/beings/bodies of Black women (and other marginalized people).
In the next section, I’ll pause to consider how Lorde’s elevation of feeling through poetry
also includes a critique of thinking while simultaneously rejecting the dichotomy between the
two.

3.1.2 Differentiating Between Thinking and Feeling
Having explored Lorde’s early articulations of the relationship between feeling and
poetry, it is important to pause and clarify how her discussion of feeling also includes an
important critique of thinking (as can be seen in the last quote on how men are taught to deal
with what they understand). Doing so will also allow us to better understand what Lorde means
by “feeling” itself and why poetry may be the best way of communicating feelings, as well as to
understand the relationship between feeling and thinking that Lorde presents in her work.
In “Poetry Is Not a Luxury,” Lorde argues that “the white fathers have told us; I think,
therefore I am. But the Black mother within each of us, the poet within each of us, whispers in
our dreams: I feel, therefore I can be free” (SO 38). Here, Lorde juxtaposes Descartes’ cogito
ergo sum with her own mantra. She contrasts thinking and being with feeling and freedom. She
expands on this almost a decade later in an interview with Marion Kraft:
Yes, the white fathers are the ones who have said “I think, therefore I am,” having the
concept that it is only through our thoughts, through our intellectual, rational processes
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that we gain freedom. This is not true. I speak of the Black mother as that part of us
which is chaotic, messy, deep, dark, ancient, old, and freeing. (CWAL 147)
Here she adds the critique that the preeminence of the statement “I think, therefore I am,” has led
to a society permeated with the idea that only thinking can lead one to freedom. Getting free has
become an intellectual process guided by Reason. Lorde, however, disagrees. She argues that the
rational path is not the way toward freedom. Rather, freedom must be found in our feelings, in
that deep, dark, subterranean space of ourselves.
If we connect this contrast between the white fathers and the Black mother to Lorde’s
discussion of feeling in poetry, then we can see that a core difference between thinking and
feeling is the relationship to language. She locates feeling in a deep, dark, ancient space of
oneself. Feeling is extra-linguistic or outside language—at least any sense of language shared
commonly in the world in which we live. In contrast, thinking is a linguistic process—even if it’s
only “inside one’s head,” so to speak, and not verbalized out loud or written on the page. She
expands on this in the interview just cited:
We think with tools that have been given to us. If we are to create a new order, we must
go back, back, back, to what is primary, and those are our feelings; and take those
feelings and bring them forward enough, so we can cobble a new way out of them. In
other words, a screeaam is just a feeling—but it is not a poem, it’s not a piece of art. We
must take the emotion behind that scream and make something out of it that is articulate
and powerful and communicative. (CWAL 147)
As Lorde says, thinking happens in the language that one takes in from the external world.
Feeling, by contrast, comes from within. Lorde locates the nature of this within as “back, back,
back,” suggesting that the within is also a before. Feelings come before thinking, because the
source of feelings is innate to each of us. It is within us before we learn the language through
which we are taught to construct thoughts and in which we think.
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Thus, the screeaam is a feeling. It is an utterance of what’s most primary. And it’s not
that the scream should be intellectualized through thought in order to explain the feeling of the
scream to another; rather, Lorde argues that the scream should be poeticized into language, thus
maintaining a more direct relationship between the feeling and its communication to the world.
In an interview with Ilona Pache and Regina-Maria Dackweiler, she speaks to the scream again:
If I open my mouth and scream, that is an expression of feeling, but it’s not a poem and
it’s not really useful to you. I have to take the scream and put words to it in such a way
that it will make you feel why I am screaming. When I am writing prose, I am trying to
make you understand why I am screaming. (CWAL 169)
The difference between poetry and prose, here, can be mapped onto the difference between
feeling and thinking. The scream itself is an expression of feeling. The poem is the articulation in
language of the feeling so that another person can feel the feeling. The prose description of the
feeling is an attempt to communicate the understanding of what has motivated the feeling, or the
thought behind it.
The work of poetry, for Lorde, is to help others feel our feelings (and to feel others’
feelings through their poetry, in return).83 As will be explored later in her concept of the erotic,
she sees freedom as cultivated between people who are able to feel each other’s deepest feelings
across difference. This is something that she believes thinking can never accomplish—no matter
how skillfully a thought may be put into words for others to understand.
It’s important to note here, that as Lorde’s work is always rooted in her identity and
position in society, so too is her distrust of thinking. In the interview with Tate, she states that
Our real power comes from the personal; our real insights about living come from the
deep knowledge within us that arises from our feelings. Our thoughts are shaped by our
tutoring. As black people, we have not been tutored for our own benefit, but more often
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than not, for our detriment. We were tutored to function in a structure that already existed
but does not function for our good. (CWAL 91)
Here Lorde aligns thinking with “tutoring.” Again, thoughts are shaped by external forces, and
thus thinking, in some way, is always in conversation with the outside world, at the very least
through its language. In this case, that outside world is a racist, sexist, homophobic world. It’s a
world that is invested in furthering the detriment of black people, especially black lesbian
women like Lorde. In order to survive, she must reject the tutoring of the world that works
against her, and thus reject thinking, because it’s the mode of knowing and communicating that
world prizes.84
This isn’t to suggest that Lorde’s work is reactionary or simply a result of her identity,
but it is to acknowledge the ways that it arises in the context of her lived experience and offers a
direct critique of oppressive systems and structures in the world. Lorde critiques thinking,
because all the “thinking” she knows operates to her detriment. She elevates feeling, because to
survive she must elevate the truths she can find within herself that help her stay alive.
All of this said, it is also important to recognize that Lorde does not reject thinking
outright. Rather, she suggests that thinking and feeling must be combined and recombined in our
lives and the world. In the aforementioned interview with Rich, she argues that
Rationality is not unnecessary. It serves the chaos of knowledge. It serves feeling. It
serves to get from this place to that place. But if you don’t honor those places, then the
road is meaningless. Too often, that’s what happens with the worship of rationality and
that circular, academic, analytic thinking. But ultimately, I don’t see feel/think as a
dichotomy. I see them as a choice of ways and combinations. (SO 100-101)
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The shape of this argument should sound relatively familiar from the previous chapter on Lugones and Kant
where I attended to how material conditions shape transcendental structures. In this instance, Lorde is making clear
how that also happens through language, a side that did not come out so much in the previous chapter, or at least
only came out implicitly as assumed in the discussion of double tongue.
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Ultimately, Lorde is not interested in maintaining the feeling/thinking dichotomy that has been
imposed on us, but rather in strategically redistributing thinking so that thinking and feeling are
not so strictly different or separate in our experiences and lives. In other places, Lorde describes
this as a “fusion” of the two modes. In an undated manuscript, she argues that:
When we view our living in the european mode, only as a problem to be solved, we rely
solely upon our ideas to make us free, for the white fathers told us it was our ideas alone
which were precious. But as we become more and more in touch with our own ancient
and original non-european view of living as a situation to be experienced and interacted
with, we learn to cherish our feelings, and to respect those hidden and deep sources of our
power from whence true knowledge and therefore, lasting action come. It is the fusion of
these two approaches which is the keystone to our survival as a race, and we come closest
to this combination in our poetry. (IAYS 185-6)
This is quite similar to (perhaps an early draft of) a passage from “Poetry Is Not a Luxury,”
where Lorde says:
When we view our living in the european mode, only as a problem to be solved, we rely
solely upon our ideas to make us free, for these were what the white fathers told us were
precious. But as we come more into touch with our own ancient, non-european
consciousness of living as a situation to be experienced and interacted with, we learn
more and more to cherish our feelings, and to respect those hidden sources of our power
from where true knowledge and, therefore, lasting action come from. At this point in
time, I believe that women carry within ourselves the possibility for fusion of these two
approaches so necessary for survival, and we come closest to this in our poetry. (SO 37)
I highlight both of these passages even though they are almost the same to (1) show how Lorde
introduces the notion of a fusion, and (2) note the slight shift in emphasis in her discussion of the
“fusion” of thinking and feeling between them.
In the first passage, Lorde argues that “it is the fusion of these two approaches which is
the keystone to our survival as a race” and in the second she says that “women carry within
ourselves the possibility for fusion of these two approaches so necessary for survival.” In both
places, Lorde argues that the fusion of thinking and feeling is necessary for survival. In the first
passage it is a keystone, suggesting that it is the most necessary thing. In the second passage, it is
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so necessary, but is also relocated specifically to women. While the first passage does not gender
the possibility of this fusion, the second does.
I don’t think it’s simply rhetorical that Lorde says “At this point in time…” in the second
passage. Throughout her writings, Lorde moves back and forth between the idea that there is
something uniquely feminine and specific to women about feeling, and the idea that feeling is
common to all and only gendered by the work of society. As I mentioned previously, I think this
tension results from her attempt to speak to human experience at large while never losing the
specific positioning of her identity as a Black lesbian woman.
In speaking to the overlapping tensions between thinking/feeling, men/women,
white/black in her work and the world, she says:
I’m not saying that women don’t think or analyze. Or that white does not feel. I’m saying
that we must never close our eyes to the terror, to the chaos which is Black which is
creative which is female which is dark which is rejected which is messy. . . sinister,
smelly, erotic, confused, upsetting . . . (SO 101)
Lorde is always clear that the tensions I previously named are not necessarily in tension with one
another, but rather are dynamic aspects of our existence. It’s just that one (white/men/thinking) is
societally valued so much higher than the other (black/women/feeling), such that we must
recover and foreground that which has been forgotten in order to ever accomplish the
redistribution of both, to fuse them, to experience new—or perhaps ancient—combinations of
their possibilities.
Lorde also speaks to this in her poetry. In “Sister Outsider” from The Black Unicorn, she
speaks to an unnamed but known other and says:
We were born in a poor time
never touching
each other’s hunger
never
sharing our crusts
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in fear
the bread became the enemy.
Now we raise our children
to respect themselves
as well as each other.
Now you have made loneliness
holy and useful
and no longer needed
now
your light shines very brightly
but I want you
to know
your darkness also
rich and beyond fear. (BU 106)
And in the title poem from her collection Coal, she says, “I am Black because I come from the
earth’s inside / now take my word for jewel in the open light” (C 6). 85
In these poems, she doesn’t contrapose light and dark. Rather, she demands both by
demanding that the light recognize and value the dark. This is the path toward the fusion of
feeling and thinking that Lorde sees as necessary for our survival. It’s embedded in a recognition
and reclamation of what has been forgotten (feeling, the darkness) but also in a bringing that to
light or at least in a reciprocal care for the light.
While Lorde is a harsh critic of the Western thinkers who represent that “european mode”
of “I think, therefore I am,” she is also not interested in simply inverting their dichotomy of
thinking/feeling to be feeling/thinking. She is strategic about the need to rescue the aspects of our
experience that, not yet given in language, have not yet been pre-determined to fit the language
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In citing Lorde’s poetry throughout this chapter, I am placing it in relationship to her prose writings, her identity
and history, and the reader in their own multifaceted experience. My overlapping of these considerations was
informed by reading Zofia Burr’s Of Women, Poetry, and Power, particularly her chapter “Audre Lorde and the
Responsibility of the Reader.” Zofia Burr, Of Women, Poetry, and Power: Strategies of Address in Dickinson, Miles,
Brooks, Lorde, and Angelou (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2002).
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of the oppressors, but she does not conflate the act of thinking with the oppressors themselves, or
rather she does not assume that only the oppressors can or should think.
When I think of what this redistribution or creative combination of feeling and thinking
might look like for Lorde, I’m reminded of another poem she wrote called “From the House of
Yemanjá,” where in the final stanza she says:
I am
the sun and moon and forever hungry
the sharpened edge
where day and night shall meet
and not be
one. (BU 7)
In this poem, I see Lorde offer a place where two meet without becoming one or remaining
strictly two. That sharpened edge is a space of both and neither. Perhaps, if we think back to the
previous chapter on Lugones we’d call it a liminal space. That’s the space I see Lorde opening in
her discussion of feeling and thinking, while always maintaining that we will first have to go
deep within to the subterranean depths of our feelings in order to ever get there.

3.1.3 From Feeling to Speaking
As we’ve seen the past two sections, language is very important in Lorde’s distinction
between feeling and thinking as well as in the function of poetry. But something that has not
been mentioned far is the role of speaking. This section will explore how Lorde argues that
speaking poetry (at least for those who are marginalized or oppressed) is a necessary act of
resistance.
In the process of transposing feeling to language, Lorde often emphasizes the power of
the voice. In the anecdote from her childhood that she shares with Rich, Lorde says: “When I
wrote something that finally had it, I would say it aloud and it would come alive, become real”
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(SO 88). We can imagine a young Lorde reciting poems to tell other people about her feelings
and writing poems because there were no words to explain her feelings. And the poems that
Lorde writes as an adult are now there for young, Black girls to recognize themselves in. For
Lorde, speaking poems brings them into the world and gives them life. If poetry is the “skeleton
architecture of our lives” as previously cited, speaking is what brings those structures to others so
that they can share them.
In addition to this personal story, Lorde also addresses the power of speaking poetry for
women in her more theoretical work. The thesis of “Poetry Is Not A Luxury,” illustrates this:
“for women, then, poetry is not a luxury. It is a vital necessity of our existence. It forms the
quality of the light within which we predicate our hopes and dreams toward survival and change,
first made into language, then into idea, then into more tangible action” (SO 37). If poetry is the
mode of communicating feeling in shared language and women have societally been relegated to
the realm of feeling, then poetry is a necessity (not a luxury) for women. When survival is what’s
at stake, feeling cannot simply remain in an internal, deeply personal, extra-linguistic space.
Feeling must be “made into language,” as she puts it, so that it can be shared so as to spark ideas
and action.
In emphasizing the necessity of speaking and sharing feelings through poetry, Lorde
rebukes silence. In “The Transformation of Silence into Language and Action,” she says “my
silences had not protected me. Your silence will not protect you” (SO 41). Silence, Lorde argues,
is mistakenly thought of as safety when it provides no protection at all. In the interview with
Pache and Dackweiler, she expands on this:
I believe that silence is a contract made between the oppressor and my oppression; and
that silence is used to keep me unaware of my power. If I wish to empower myself, as a
black woman, as a mother, as a warrior, as a woman who is committed to change, and to
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difference. If I am going to identify my power, then I must be able to speak out. (CWAL
164)
Speaking out, here, is necessary for identifying and empowering oneself. But this isn’t just any
kind of speaking—this is speaking poetry, speaking the poetic words that can communicate
feelings. Lorde asks readers of “The Transformation of Silence into Language and Action”:
“What are the words you do not have yet? What do you need to say? What are the tyrannies you
swallow day by day and attempt to make your own, until you will sicken and die of them, still in
silence?” (SO 41). It requires an inner knowing of the feelings, the desires, the impulses one has
to be able to speak them. And speak them, one must, according to Lorde, in order to create
change.
Lorde addresses this challenge in the final lines of the poem “But What Can You Teach
My Daughter” from The Black Unicorn. There she says:
what you know
can hurt
but what
you do
not know
can kill. (BU 98)
Lorde makes no promise that knowing one’s feelings will not be painful, but—like the feminist
killjoy—she sees facing that pain at necessary for survival—survival that isn’t just singular (your
own survival) but always, hopefully shared. She says: “But primarily for us all, it is necessary to
teach by living and speaking those truths which we believe and know beyond understanding.
Because in this way alone we can survive, by taking part in a process of life that is creative and
continuing, that is growth” (SO 43). Here again Lorde cites the truths “beyond understanding”—
the truths that emerge before or outside of thinking and language—the truth of the screeaam as it
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can, should, and must be communicated in poetry. The truth that has to be spoken aloud in order
to become alive and real in the world we share.
In reading “The Transformation of Silence into Language and Action,” I find it of note
that Lorde makes much of the transformation of silence into language through feeling and poetry
in her work, but says less there about action. What is it one must do with the words you find to
speak? Is speaking itself an act of resistance? It certainly must be in many instances, but it is the
primary or only mode of action Lorde has in mind here?
She says in that essay: “in the transformation of silence into language and action, it is
vitally necessary for each one of us to establish or examine her function in that transformation
and to recognize her role as vital within that transformation” (SO 41). This marks the personal
nature of our contributions, but perhaps still leaves what it is we’re doing in that transformative
work vague, even as Lorde stresses the obligation of doing that work. In the next section, I’ll
explore how poetry and speaking poetry aloud becomes a mode of being for Lorde, which I hope
might help clarify what role speaking and poetry play in our acts of resistance.

3.1.4 Poetry as a Way of Being
In the discussion of poetry so far in this chapter, it’s been presented as a mode—
seemingly the mode—of communicating feeling. I think this is certainly true in Lorde’s work.
Poetry, as we’ve learned, is how we communicate our feelings so that others can feel them. In
one sense then, poetry is a particularly well-suited vehicle for feeling. In reading Lorde’s
discussion of the role of poetry in her life as a writer, however, poetry becomes more than a just
a way to communicate feelings in the world: it is also a way to live in the world. When asked by
Marion Kraft if poetry is the most important aspect of her life, Lorde answers,
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Poetry is not the most important part of my life. Poetry is the strongest expression I have
of certain ways of making, identifying, and using my own power. Because poetry is not a
presentation, is not a product. Poetry—for me—is a way of living. It’s the way I look at
myself, it’s the way I move through myselves, my world, and it’s the way I metabolize
what happens and present it out again. So, it is an inseparable part of who I am. (CWAL
146)
In this passage, Lorde explores how poetry creates a certain relationship between one’s feelings
and the world that doesn’t simply have to result in a poem, but that can be a way of moving
through oneself (or oneselves, as Lorde puts it) and the world with or through one’s feelings.
I also think it’s notable that Lorde says “myselves” here, suggesting multiple selves that
she is moving through. She doesn’t pause to explain this multiplicity, and it doesn’t appear often
in her work, but I think it suggests her deep commitment to her many identities, to her selves as
“black, lesbian, mother, warrior, poet.” Each of these being identities that even in themselves
suggest multiple selves and a pluralistic sense of self (there are so many ways to be black, so
many ways to be a lesbian, so many ways to be a mother, so many ways to be a warrior, so many
ways to be a poet), perhaps akin to how Lugones conceives of the self/selves.
In this case, Lorde is foregrounding her identity as a poet, and exploring how it becomes
a lens to and through her other selves. She elaborates on this in an interview with Karla Jay: “I
will always be a poet. Being a poet is not only a question of what you produce. It’s a question of
a whole way of seeing oneself moving through the world through which we move. That’s why
poets have got to be revolutionaries. Poetry is the most subversive kind of art there is, I think”
(CWAL 111-112). Being a poet, here, is not a matter of producing poems, but a matter of
moving through the world in a certain way—in a revolutionary, subversive way that foregrounds
feeling.
And being a poet, or living through poetry, is challenging, on Lorde’s account. We can
see this in an extended conversation she shares with Rich where they discuss their differences
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and the struggles they have communicating. When discussing the different choices facing white
and Black women, Lorde recounts Rich saying to her: “It’s not enough to say to me that you
intuit it” (SO 103), and Lorde says that statement felt like “a total wipeout of my modus, my way
of perceiving and formulating” (SO 104). Rich responds by saying:
Yes, but it’s not a wipeout of your modus … if I ask for documentation, it’s because I
take seriously the spaces between us that difference has created, that racism has created.
There are times when I simply cannot assume that I know what you know, unless you
show me what you mean. (SO 104)
Here, Rich sees her request for documentation as a way of taking Lorde seriously, so that she can
better understand her experiences. But Lorde sees this attempt to understand as an attempt to
connect via thinking rather than through feeling. Lorde responds:
But documentation does not help one perceive. At best it only analyzes the perception. At
worst, it provides a screen by which to avoid concentrating on the core revelation,
following it down to how it feels. Again, knowledge and understanding. They can
function in concert, but they don’t replace each other. (SO 104)
In requesting documentation, Rich seeks rational evidence for something that Lorde is only
willing (perhaps only able) to express through feeling—because only through feeling can the
core revelation be expressed. As Lorde has juxtaposed feeling and thinking before, here she
maps knowledge and understanding onto that dynamic. Knowledge is cultivated through feeling,
while understanding is cultivated through thinking. Lorde doesn’t simply want Rich to
understand, she also wants her to know.
Early in her conversation with Rich, Lorde recounted how she began writing poetry
because she couldn’t find poems that could express her feelings. She reflects on this in her
journal again at the end of her life. As a poet facing cancer, she says, “in the hospital I kept
thinking, let’s see, there’s got to be someone somewhere, a Black lesbian feminist with cancer,
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how’d she handle it? Then I realized, hey, honey, you are it, for now. … Determination, poetry—
well that’s all in the work” (SO 108).
The work—Lorde’s life’s work—is all a matter of navigating between feeling and
thinking, or knowing and understanding. As their conversation ends, Lorde says to Rich:
Do you realize, we’ve come full circle, because that is where knowing and understanding
mesh. What understanding begins to do is to make knowledge available for use, and
that’s the urgency, that’s the push, that’s the drive. I don’t know how I wrote the long
prose piece I have just finished, but I just knew that I had to do it. (SO 109)
Rich responds, “That you had to understand what you knew and also make it available to others”
and Lorde concludes, “That’s right. Inseparable process now. But for me, I had to know I knew it
first—I had to feel it” (SO 109).
Lorde sees the necessity of this process of meshing knowing and understanding, but she
refuses to give in to any demand that understanding must come first. I would say that this is why
she is a poet and not a philosopher. She always marks feeling as primary and deeply powerful—
not just in her poetry, but also in her life. Thus, for Lorde, poetry is not simply a matter of words
but also a way of being. And while we can thematize her work (as I’ve attempted here), we’ll
always be missing something about it if we fail to feel it in addition to understanding it.
In the first portion of this chapter, we’ve now explored four theses that present my
attempt to thematize Lorde’s work: (1) feeling is a mode of knowing best communicated through
poetry, (2) thinking is a mode of understanding emphasizing rationality and prized by
contemporary society, (3) speaking is a necessary act of revolution, and, finally, (4) poetry is not
simply a matter of poems, but also a way of being.
As I said at the outset, the goal of these theses was to explore Lorde’s work as a whole, to
treat the corpus seriously, to reorganize it in ways that will show its pertinence along the way.
More specifically, I set out to articulate Lorde’s understanding of the relationship between
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oneself and the world. So far, I think I’ve traced the enmeshment (as Lorde put it) of thinking
and feeling in her work through the discussion of poetry and the role of the poet. These are
certainly two modes of perceiving and relating to the world that Lorde wants to elaborate, but I
think that it’s in her concept of the erotic that we see her most innovative philosophical
contributions, particularly to developing a new, interrelational sense of self. This will be
explored and explained in the following sections.

3.2 The Erotic as Source, Connection to Source, and Mode of Connecting to Others
As discussed in the previous section, for Lorde poetry is the way of knowing our feelings
and by sharing poems we communicate our feelings so that others can feel them. But what is the
mechanism by which we actually connect to others? What is it that Lorde and Rich are working
to cultivate in their friendship? I’d like to propose, following Lorde, that it’s the erotic.
Lorde’s primary discussion of the erotic comes from her paper “Uses of the Erotic: The
Erotic as Power,” first delivered as a talk at Mount Holyoke College in 1978 and later published
in Sister Outsider. Lorde opens this talk by insisting that the word “erotic” has been diminished
in contemporary society and we must begin by redefining it. She points to this diminishment as
an intentional strategy perpetrated by patriarchal, white supremacist, Western society. She says:
In order to perpetuate itself, every oppression must corrupt or distort those various
sources of power within the culture of the oppressed that can provide energy for
change. For women, this has meant a suppression of the erotic as a considered source of
power and information within our lives. We have been taught to suspect this resource,
vilified, abused, and devalued within western society. On the one hand, the superficially
erotic has been encouraged as a sign of female inferiority; on the other hand, women have
been made to suffer and to feel both contemptible and suspect by virtue of its existence.
(SO 53)
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Here, Lorde describes the erotic as a “source of power and information” for women that has been
reduced to a superficial, inferior, even shameful concept. Later in the talk, she speaks of the
reduction of the erotic to the pornographic, saying
The erotic has often been misnamed by men and used against women. It has been made
into the confused, the trivial, the psychotic, the plasticized sensation. For this reason, we
have often turned away from the exploration and consideration of the erotic as a source of
power and information, confusing it with its opposite, the pornographic. But pornography
is a direct denial of the power of the erotic, for it represents the suppression of true
feeling. Pornography emphasizes sensation without feeling. (SO 54)
The erotic is not the pornographic and considering these words as synonymous is not only a
grave mistake, Lorde argues, but also a tool of oppression, intentionally wielded against
women.86
But if the erotic is not what we have been led to believe, then what is it, exactly? Lorde
provides an impressive number of definitions in this relatively short talk, and I’d like to list them
here, before systematizing them. So, in “Uses of the Erotic,” Lorde says that the erotic is:
•
•
•
•

“a resource within each of us that lies in a deeply female and spiritual plane, firmly
rooted in the power of our unexpressed or unrecognized feeling” (SO 53)
“a well of replenishing and provocative force to the woman who does not fear its
revelation, nor succumb to the belief that sensation is enough” (SO 54)
“a measure between the beginnings of our sense of self and the chaos of our strongest
feelings… an internal sense of satisfaction to which, once we have experienced it, we
know we can aspire” (SO 54)
“a question of how acutely and fully we can feel in the doing” (SO 54)
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While I think it is outside the scope of this chapter, it’s worth noting that Lorde’s writings on the erotic are
situated in a larger history of feminist debates on pornography that are often reduced to two sides: anti-pornography
feminists and sex-positive feminists. That debate began in the late 1970s with figures like Andrea Dworkin and
Catherine McKinnon spearheading the anti-pornography faction and cultural critics like Ellen Willis developing the
sex-positive framework. When Lorde first reads “Uses of the Erotic” in 1978, she is speaking in the early years of
that debate (which heightened to the “feminist sex wars” of the 1980s and 1990s), and she is positioning herself as
pro-sex (even in developing the idea that the erotic isn’t simply about sex). For an overview of this history, see
Amanda Cawston, “The Feminist Case against Pornography: A Review and Re-Evaluation.” Inquiry 62, no. 6 (July
3, 2019): 624–58. For an article paying closer attention to the role of sex in Lorde’s work on the erotic, see
SaraEllen Strongman, “’Creating Justice Between Us’: Audre Lorde’s Theory of the Erotic.” Feminist Theory 19,
no. 1 (2018), 41-59.
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•
•
•

“an assertion of the lifeforce of women; of that creative energy empowered, the
knowledge and use of which we are now reclaiming in our language, our history, our
dancing, our loving, our work, our lives” (SO 55)
“the nurturer or nursemaid of all our deepest knowledge” (SO 56)
“the power which comes from sharing deeply any pursuit with another person” (SO 56)

I share this list to illustrate how Lorde’s conception of the erotic pushes us to consider its
many forms and functions in our lives. This makes sense in the context of her work as a poet and
how much power she sees the erotic having. From a philosophical standpoint, however, how do
we define the erotic in the face of so many definitions? How do we conceive of the erotic
intellectually, knowing that part of Lorde’s work is to resist intellectualization? Knowing that,
how do we feel the erotic as a way of knowing it?
I’d like to propose understanding the erotic in three ways that gather these many definitions
into a few core attributes and functions of the erotic: (1) the erotic as a source of power, (2) the
erotic as a connection to that source, and (3) the erotic as a mode of connecting to others.87 Each
of these will now be considered in turn and then, in the conclusion of this section, together again.

3.2.1 The Erotic as a Source of Power
In the opening of “Uses of the Erotic,” Lorde begins by recognizing the erotic as a source
of power. In the second sentence, she says: “the erotic is a resource within each of us that lies in
a deeply female and spiritual plane, firmly rooted in the power of our unexpressed or
unrecognized feeling” (SO 53). She later argues that the erotic “offers a well of replenishing and
provocative force to the woman who does not fear its revelation, nor succumb to the belief that
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In articulating these three attributes and functions of the erotic, I took some inspiration from Estella Lauter’s
argument that the erotic is “sexual, communal, and spiritual at once.” While I’ve formulated the three core functions
here quite differently, her approach was helpful for me as I worked to systematize Lorde’s discussion. Estella
Lauter, “Re-visioning Creativity: Audre Lorde’s Refiguration of Eros as the Black Mother Within,” in Writing the
Woman Artist, ed. Suzanne W. Jones (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1991), 404.
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sensation is enough” (SO 54). In these brief quotes, I see two important points about the erotic as
a source of power: (1) the power of the erotic is marked as female or for women, and (2) the
source of the erotic’s power is in unexpressed or unrecognized feeling.
I think it’s important to discuss the gendered nature of the erotic first. In proposing her
concept of the erotic, Lorde is in conversation with women. In one sense, this is literal: “Uses of
the Erotic” was a paper first delivered at the Berkshire Conference on the History of Women at
Mount Holyoke College (a women’s college). She was speaking directly to a group of women
gathered to discuss women. In another sense, her gendering of the erotic follows from Lorde’s
historical, political, and structural analyses: her discussion of the erotic marks it as feminine,
because the suppression of the erotic has been directed at women. As Lorde says:
On the one hand, the superficially erotic has been encouraged as a sign of female
inferiority; on the other hand, women have been made to suffer and to feel both
contemptible and suspect by virtue of its existence. … The erotic has often been
misnamed by men and used against women. (SO 53-4)
The erotic is for women, because it has been used against them, and thus, is their source of
power to reclaim. This, I believe, is why Lorde describes the erotic as lying “in a deeply female
and spiritual plane” (emphasis added). 88 That said, Lorde also argues that men have access to
that same depth of feeling if they can only open themselves to its possibility:
As women, we have come to distrust that power which rises from our deepest and
nonrational knowledge. We have been warned against it all our lives by the male world,
which values this depth of feeling enough to keep women around in order to exercise it in
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In the opening of the essay, Lorde describes the erotic as lying “in a deeply female and spiritual plane” (emphasis
added), but in the remainder of the essay she more often describes it as related to women rather than using the word
“female.” As a contemporary reader, this use of the word “female,” may feel coded as trans-exclusionary, but on my
reading, Lorde is using it moreso to denote the femininity of the concept. Lorde does not develop or appeal to a
framework of sex as distinct from gender such that the words “female” and “femininity” would have conceptually
different meanings. There is no discussion of something like “biological sex” in any of her writings that would
suggest that her use of the word “female” is limited to that. This is why I suggest that “feminine” may be a better
word than “female” in the contemporary context, as it avoids the potentially trans-exclusionary connection to
“biological sex” and remains inclusive of the experiences of all women/womxn in terms of the erotic.
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the service of men, but which fears this same depth too much to examine the possibilities
of it within themselves. (SO 53-4)
Here we can see that Lorde senses the erotic as within everyone (thus avoiding any
essentialization of the erotic as an exclusively feminine trait), but she grounds her analysis in the
historical, political, lived experiences of women because that’s where the erotic has been
sequestered and degraded.89 This doesn’t mean the erotic hasn’t been suppressed in men as well
(it has), but rather that because women have been oppressed precisely through the assignation of
the erotic (and even feeling itself) as feminine, they are in the position to reshape the meaning of
the erotic and reclaim its power. 90
Turning to the second point I’ve highlighted about the erotic as a source of power: Lorde
says the source of the power of the erotic is the unexpressed or unrecognized feeling. Making
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While it’s not necessarily obviously evident in these passages I’ve quoted here, I think Ajuan Maria Mance is
correct when she points out that for Lorde, this is not just women, but perhaps more specifically Black women.
Mance says that for Lorde, “the Black female body serves as a conduit into these sources of vision and
understanding; such forms of knowledge, which resist the orthodoxy of contemporary Western scientific and
philosophical discourse, are more accessible (and most useful) to women, whose empowerment and enlightenment
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sense of this, I think, requires the last section’s analysis of the role of feeling in Lorde’s work
and life.
For Lorde, feeling encompasses our innermost perceptions. She describes feeling as
“creative energy,” “our deepest knowledge,” “complex emotions,” and “what is primary.” In her
multivariate and multifaceted descriptions of feeling, we can see that for Lorde, “feeling” refers
to both our colloquial sense of feelings as discrete emotions and a more philosophical sense of
affect as our “visceral forces beneath, alongside, or generally other than conscious knowing,
vital forces insisting beyond emotion.”91
The erotic is an energy, a force, and, as she says, a resource from which those feelings
emerge. The erotic is the potential that each of us has for feeling, and, as such, it is where
feelings are not yet expressed or recognized. Expressing the feeling requires something like the
screeaam and recognizing it, perhaps, the poem. The erotic is not the feeling itself but where that
feeling comes from—the source.

3.2.2 The Erotic as a Connection to Source
While Lorde clearly argues that the erotic is a source of power from which feelings stem,
she also describes it as a particular mode of connecting to that source. As quoted above, she says
the erotic “offers a well of replenishing and provocative force to the woman who does not fear its
revelation, nor succumb to the belief that sensation is enough” (SO 54). While Lorde’s sense of
feeling is expansive and includes many different philosophical notions of what feeling can be, I
think her rejection of mere sensation here points to a different mode of valuing or evaluating
feelings so as to judge whether or not they come from the erotic. Thus, the erotic is not only the
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source itself but also a way to mark whether feelings are connected to that source or if they’re
mere sensations, divorced from the erotic.
In discussing the difference between the erotic and sensation, Lorde again turns to
differentiating the erotic from the pornographic. She argues that “pornography emphasizes
sensation without feeling” while the erotic never relinquishes feeling (SO 54). Lorde says,
The erotic is a measure between the beginnings of our sense of self and the chaos of our
strongest feelings. It is an internal sense of satisfaction to which, once we have
experienced it, we know we can aspire. For having experienced the fullness of this depth
of feeling and recognizing its power, in honor and self-respect we can require no less of
ourselves. (SO 54)
In this quote, the erotic is both the depth of feeling itself and the demand for all feeling to
connect to that depth and power. This use of “depth” marks both the depth itself and the distance
between a surface and that depth. It is, as Lorde puts it, a measure. Therefore it “is not a question
only of what we do; is a question of how acutely and fully we can feel in the doing” (SO 54). It
is not only a matter of having the depth—of the erotic as a source within us—but also of
connecting with those depths.
While the previous section emphasized that the erotic is a source of power, these
quotations illustrate that the erotic isn’t simply a static source that one draws from. The erotic is
also a measure by which feeling can be assessed, and as such, becomes a standard to which life
can be compared. Lorde says:
Once we begin to feel deeply all the aspects of our lives, we begin to demand from
ourselves and from our life-pursuits that they feel in accordance with that joy which we
know ourselves to be capable of. Our erotic knowledge empowers us, becomes a lens
through which we scrutinize all aspects of our existence, forcing us to evaluate those
aspects honestly in terms of their relative meaning within our lives. And this is a grave
responsibility, projected from within each of us, not to settle for the convenient, the
shoddy, the conventionally expected, nor the merely safe. (SO 57)
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This is connected to the necessity of breaking our silence and fighting back against oppression as
Lorde discussed in her poetry. Similarly, here Lorde says that:
When we begin to live from within outward, in touch with the power of the erotic within
ourselves, and allowing that power to inform and illuminate our actions upon the world
around us, then we begin to be responsible to ourselves in the deepest sense. For as we
begin to recognize our deepest feelings, we begin to give up, of necessity, being satisfied
with suffering and self-negation, and with the numbness which so often seems like their
only alternative in our society. Our acts against oppression become integral with self,
motivation and empowered from within. (SO 58)
Insofar as the erotic connects us to our deepest feelings, it demands that we relinquish our
complacency with suffering and self-negation. Like the poem was both an articulation of a
feeling and a way of feeling in the world, the erotic is both a matter of the depth of any specific
feeling and the depth of feeling itself. It is the source of feeling and the connection to or
expression of that source in each feeling. If we manage to do this, Lorde argues, then it will
direct our lives in a certain way. Once we have connected with our erotic source, we demand that
our lives allow a continued connection. That requires rejecting many societal norms and values.
It becomes, for Lorde, an internal motivation for acting against oppression.

3.2.3 The Erotic as a Mode of Connecting to Others
In this last point, Lorde also adds an important, third valence to her conception of the
erotic: the erotic is interpersonal. It is not only a mode of connecting to one’s own source, but
also a mode of connecting to others. Lorde argues that:
The erotic functions for me in several ways, and the first is in providing the power which
comes from sharing deeply any pursuit with another person. The sharing of joy, whether
physical, emotional, psychic, or intellectual, forms a bridge between the sharers which
can be the basis for understanding much of what is not shared between them, and lessens
the threat of their difference. (SO 56)
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One important function of the erotic, here, is to serve as a “bridge” between oneself and others.
This erotic bridging can occur during sensual or sexual encounters but also during simple,
everyday conversations. The erotic can mark any interaction where feeling is shared, but, Lorde
argues, this must be differentiated from feelings being used. She says:
To share the power of each other’s feelings is different from using another’s feelings as
we would use a kleenex. When we look the other way from our experience, erotic or
otherwise, we use rather than share the feelings of those others who participate in the
experience with us. And use without consent of the used is abuse. (SO 58)
Sharing feelings becomes using feelings when either person looks away from their own feelings
or the feelings of the other(s). The erotic can only form a bridge when both or all people share
deeply. This is why Lorde argues that
Our erotic feelings must be recognized. The need for sharing deep feeling is a human
need. But within the european-american tradition, this need is satisfied by certain
proscribed erotic comings-together. These occasions are almost always characterized by a
simultaneous looking away … When we look away from the importance of the erotic in
the development and sustenance of our power, or when we look away from ourselves as
we satisfy our erotic needs in concert with others, we use each other as objects of
satisfaction rather than share our joy in the satisfying, rather than make connection with
our similarities and our differences. (SO 58-9)
Lorde refers to the erotic as “self-connection shared” (SO 57), because the erotic marks our
ability to look at and live within our own feelings in order to share them. Sharing the feelings of
others is important, but it is grounded in our own self-connection, because, as Lorde argues “the
erotic cannot be felt secondhand” (SO 59).
The erotic, sharing deep feelings, and the nature of this self-connection takes on a
specific and very personal significance for Lorde when she faces cancer toward the end of her
life. In A Burst of Light, she journals: “I am on the cusp of change, and the curve is shifting fast.
In the bleakest days I am kept afloat, maintained, empowered, by the positive energies of so
many women who carry the breath of my loving like firelight in their strong hair” (BOL 96).
Here, Lorde recounts being buoyed by the energy of others. This is certainly an erotic sense of
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self-connection shared; it is the construction of a bridge between healthy bodies and her own
ailing one, reliant on the power transferred between them through their shared depth of feeling.
Lorde’s understanding of how the erotic connects us to others is also reliant on her
conception of difference. In her essay “Age, Race, Class, and Sex: Women Redefining
Difference,” she argues that the success of the feminist movement (or any movement for
liberation) is dependent on the ability of the people in that movement to recognize their
differences and see how those differences have been used to oppress certain members among
them. She opens that essay by recognizing how our society used difference as a divisive tool of
separation and oppression. She says:
Much of Western European history conditions us to see human differences in simplistic
opposition to each other: dominant/subordinate, good/bad, up/down,
superior/inferior...Institutionalized rejection of difference is an absolute necessity in a
profit economy which needs outsiders as surplus people. As members of such an
economy, we have all been programmed to respond to the human differences between us
with fear and loathing. (SO 114-5)
In critiquing this social programming, Lorde isn’t diminishing the fact that difference is very real
and we are each different. She says:
Certainly there are very real differences between us of race, age, and sex. But it is not
those differences between us that are separating us. It is rather our refusal to recognize
those differences, and to examine the distortions that result from our misnaming them and
their effects upon human behavior and expectation…It is a lifetime pursuit for each one
of us to extract these distortions from our living at the same time as we recognize,
reclaim, and define those differences upon which they are imposed. (SO 115)
While Lorde does not mention the erotic in this talk (given two years after “Uses of the Erotic”),
I think that we can begin to understand how the interrelational nature of the erotic provides
opportunities for recognizing, reclaiming, and defining differences among us.
In touch with our own erotic source, we are able to begin extracting the distortions of
difference that Lorde cites here as we demand a world and way of life that allows us to integrate
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our depth of feeling in every moment. And insofar as the erotic serves as a bridge, we are able to
feel each other’s feelings in such a way that bonds us through our difference, rather than ignoring
or destroying them. We can think here of Lugones’ call for a shared opacity. This isn’t a matter
of becoming transparent to each other. It’s perhaps more like sharing in our darknesses, our
differences, our poems together.
As Lorde says: “the future of our earth may depend on the ability of all women to
identify and develop new definitions of power and new patterns of relating across difference”
(SO 123). The erotic is a new definition of power. It is a power that lives deep in us and to which
we must connect. That connection is as much a going within ourselves as an extending out to
others. And erotic self-connections shared are the bridges that make up this new pattern of
relating across difference that Lorde calls for.
As was promised at the beginning of this section, we can now see how the erotic is
source, connection to source, and mode of connecting with others. Like Lorde previously said
poetry was a way of moving through her selves, I think the erotic is a multifaceted mode of
moving through many selves—our own selves and other selves. It’s an energy, a force, and a
resource. It can be cultivated in our lives and, as we’ll see in the next section, in our poetry.

3.2.4 Erotic Poetry and the Erotic as Poetry
Having considered the form and function of the erotic, it remains to be clarified how
Lorde’s conception of the erotic, as developed here, aligns with the previously-developed
discussion of poetry and the articulation of feeling/knowing in poetry. This section will work to
bring those two discussions together while serving as a conclusion for our reading of Lorde (for
now).
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In first considering how the erotic appears in Lorde’s poetry, we can see how Lorde
certainly wrote poetry that could be labeled erotic (both in the societal, superficial sense, and in
her deeper sense of self-connection shared). For example, in “On a Night of the Full Moon” from
Coal, she writes:
Out of my flesh that hungers
and my mouth that knows
comes the shape I am seeking
for reason.
The curve of your waiting body
fits my waiting hand
your breasts warm as sunlight
your lips quick as young birds
between your thighs the sweet
sharp taste of limes. (C 19-20)
This poem expresses an erotic feeling and the erotic itself through a sensual/sexual encounter.
We can see language one might superficially brand as erotic: “your waiting body,” “your
breasts,” “your lips,” “between your thighs the sweet sharp taste.” These phrases almost suggest
the pornographic sense of the erotic that Lorde adamantly rejects.
The genius of this poem, however, is how it subverts those superficial senses of or
expectations for the erotic by aligning her hungering flesh and knowing mouth with the shape
she is seeking for reason. This, I believe, points to her desire to consider her own feelings and
their erotic source as reason itself, or perhaps rather to subvert the traditional hierarchy of
Reason above all by locating the Erotic equally above all, or more precisely deepest within. We
can see this in “Uses of the Erotic,” where she also elevates the erotic above understanding:
Beyond the superficial, the considered phrase, “It feels right to me,” acknowledges the
strength of the erotic into a true knowledge, for what that means is the first and most
powerful guiding light toward any understanding. And understanding is a handmaiden
which can only wait upon, or clarify, that knowledge, deeply born. The erotic is the
nurturer or nursemaid of all our deepest knowledge. (SO 56)
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Here, Lorde says the erotic is true knowledge, and always the first and most powerful source of
knowledge. Understanding (aligned with thinking and reason) is only an addition to erotic
knowledge; thinking can only clarify feeling; understanding can only serve knowing. As such, I
think Lorde suggests that the erotic is an alternative force to reason. Contrary to what many
philosophical traditions suggest, it’s not Reason that guides us to truth, it’s the erotic, and, as
such, poetry.
This is not to say that Lorde doesn’t see Reason as powerful or necessary, but that she
sees the erotic as equally powerful and necessary—just serving different functions and effects. I
think this is why Lorde argues in an interview with Pache and Dackweiler, that poetry is a more
direct force for political change and revolution than thought. There she says:
Poetry works by feeling, mine and yours. It is that poetry … is the most subversive use of
the language because it alters feeling; when it is good it changes the way you feel. I
believe that that change in feeling must predate the thinking in order to make the thought
truly anchored. … I think that there is not a complete separation between thought and
feeling. That changing our thoughts can affect our feeling, but I think that the course is
much longer. (CWAL 168)
Insofar as poetry helps others feel our feelings, then poetry alters feeling itself and thus can
change truth itself because our erotic feelings are our true knowledge. Thoughts can impact our
feelings, but she argues that it takes much longer to change our feelings vis-à-vis thoughts than it
does to change our feelings directly vis-à-vis poetry or the erotic. Thus, the “flesh that hungers”
or the poem about the flesh that hungers much more directly impacts one’s feelings than this
academic paper about the flesh that hungers. Feeling the touch of a lover or reading Lorde’s
poem about it is much more likely to change what you believe to be true than coming to
understand something about the erotic by reading a philosophical analysis of the concept.
I think one reason Lorde makes this argument is because she sees the ongoing failures of
feminist theory to include and address the concerns of women of color as a matter not only of the
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prejudices of white academics but also in the nature of theory itself. Lorde argues in “The
Master’s Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master’s House” that
Those of us who stand outside the circle of this society’s definition of acceptable women;
those of us who have been forged in the crucibles of difference—those of us who are
poor, who are lesbians, who are Black, who are older—know that survival is not an
academic skill. (SO 112)
Lorde rebukes the idea that thought or thinking can resolve the challenges of difference among
women (and people at large). Rather, she argues, that work must be founded in feeling. At the
end of this paper, she says to the crowd gathered, “I urge each one of us here to reach down into
that deep place of knowledge inside herself and touch that terror and loathing of any difference
that lives there. See whose face it wears. Then the personal as the political can begin to
illuminate all our choices” (SO 113).
Reading this in the context of Lorde’s discussion of thought and feeling, we can see it as
a moment in which Lorde urges listeners to begin their political work with their feelings and to
anchor their thoughts there in the deep, dark place of the erotic, rather than in academic ideas and
theories. Political change, she believes must come from feeling rather than thinking if it is to
“give us the energy to pursue genuine change within our world” (SO 59).
And while Lorde perhaps suggests in “Poetry Is Not a Luxury” that poetry is the only or
best way to do this, in “Uses of the Erotic,” she broaches the idea that there are many ways for
the erotic to emerge in our actions and interactions. There she says, “yes, there is a hierarchy.
There is a difference between painting a back fence and writing a poem, but only one of quantity.
And there is, for me, no difference between writing a good poem and moving into sunlight
against the body of a woman I love” (SO 58). Painting the back fence, writing a good poem, and
moving against the body of a woman are all possible moments of and connections to the erotic
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for Lorde, and thus are all personal and political acts. This is how I read her poem “Recreation,”
with which I’ll conclude:
Coming together
it is easier to work
after our bodies
meet
paper and pen
neither care nor profit
whether we write or not
but as your body moves
under my hands
charged and waiting
we cut the lease
you create me against your thighs
hilly with images
moving through our word countries
my body
writes into your flesh
the poem
you make of me.
Touching you I catch midnight
as moon fires set in my throat
I love you flesh into blossom
I made you
and take you made
into me. (BU 81)
In this poem, Lorde describes the erotic as writing the poem with bodies rather than words. This
moment is deeply personal, but it’s also always political. The two are “moving through our word
countries,” as they share this connection, reminiscent of the line in “Bicentennial Poem
#21,000,000,” where Lorde says, “I know / the boundaries of my nation lie / within myself” (BU
90).
Every personal moment of bridging the distance between people vis-à-vis the erotic is
also a political moment of bridging the difference between people vis-à-vis political solidarity
and coalition building. Every moment of self-connection is a moment of self-connection shared.
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Every poem is an erotic bridge. And every erotic bridge is a poem. The ease of articulating this is
not meant to suggest that this task is easy. As Olson writes, “For Lorde, sisterhood is not simply
demographic (women), geographic, or even relational (oppression). Rather sisterhood is
contingent, and it is enacted in ways that demonstrate a communal commitment to doing
something about transforming oppression while encouraging oppressed women to embrace each
other within and across national boundaries.”92 These are the lessons and the imperatives we can
learn from Lorde and carry into our own theoretical and activist work. These are the erotic
teachings that can help us cultivate moments of deep resistance that result in life-affirming
transformations.
3.3 From Lorde to Schiller: From the Erotic to the Aesthetic
So far in this chapter, I have worked to thematize and organize Lorde’s work around her
conceptions of thinking, feeling, poetry, and the erotic. In doing so, I have explored how she
founds personal power, interpersonal relationships, and political action in our feelings and the
erotic, thus always furthering the mantra she proposes as a counterpoint to Descartes’ cogito
ergo sum: “I feel, therefore I can be free” (SO 38).
Before I turn to Schiller, I want to briefly retrace the steps that we’ve taken so far to share
again and connect the conclusions they yield. I began this chapter by organizing Lorde’s work on
feeling, thinking, and poetry through four theses that I saw woven through her thought: (1)
feeling is a mode of knowing best communicated through poetry, (2) thinking is a mode of
understanding emphasizing rationality and prized by contemporary society, (3) speaking is a
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necessary act of resistance, and, finally, (4) poetry is not simply a matter of poems, but also a
way of being.
In developing each of these themes, I was able to tease out a number of important points.
First, feeling, for Lorde, is pre- or extra-linguistic and thus outside the external force and
oppressive structure of white/european/masculine language and culture. This makes it uniquely
suited to critique and go beyond that oppressive system, but in order to do so, feeling must first
come into that world without being totally diminished by that system. This, for Lorde, is the role
of poetry. Poetry must—and only poetry can—make words hold feelings.
Second, while Lorde elevates feeling and its poetic expression as most important for
this/our time, she does not simply invert the thinking/feeling dichotomy to become
feeling/thinking. Instead, she rejects this dichotomy entirely and argues for a fusion of thinking
and feeling that can eventually recombine and redistribute these modes such that neither is
predominantly valued in our society. This is an important point, because many read Lorde as
elevating feeling above all else for all time, and this fails to address the nuanced relationship to
thinking in her work.
Third, in discussing feeling, thinking, and poetry, Lorde isn’t simply speaking to a
philosophical or literary way of life as a poet. She sees feeling and poetry as deeply connected to
our lived experiences and the possibilities of our liberation. Poems, according to Lorde, must be
spoken aloud, and poetry is a way of life. In this, I see a soft tension that Lorde develops
throughout her work as she builds the levels of the feeling, the body, the poem, the erotic, and
more. In her work, I think she’s always holding together the seemingly contradictory points that
poetry isn’t simply poiesis, it’s poems; yet of course poetry is poeisis, it’s poems. She is literal in
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her love of poems (words stacked together to express feelings), but she also sees poems
everywhere.
To attend to (but perhaps not resolve) this nuanced position, I turned to the erotic next in
the chapter. In explaining the erotic, I proposed considering it in three ways that gathered
together its many functions: (1) the erotic as a source of power, (2) the erotic as a connection to
that source, and (3) the erotic as a mode of connecting to others. As we saw throughout that
discussion, the erotic, for Lorde, is an energy, a force, and a resource. It is a power that lives
deep in us and to which we must connect, and a mode of connecting that is as much a going
within ourselves as an extending out to others. Unpacking the personal and political valences of
this led me to argue that every moment of self-connection is a moment of self-connection shared.
Thus, every poem is an erotic bridge, and every erotic bridge is a poem.
There is more to say and unpack about the erotic, but I will return to that at the end of the
chapter, when I bring Lorde back into conversation with Schiller. But first, I need to turn to
Schiller to explore how his philosophical writings can also be seen, in some sense, as supporting
the mantra “I feel, therefore I can be free”—not through discussion of feeling and the erotic, but
through an articulation of drives and the aesthetic. Following this deep excursion into Schiller’s
work, I will bring the two thinkers together by aligning Lorde’s conception of the erotic with
Schiller’s discussion of the aesthetic.

3.4 A Call to Freedom: An Aesthetic Disposition/Dimension, the Play Drive
and the Aesthetic State in Schiller
While I argued in the introduction that scholars do themselves a disservice in treating
Schiller simply as a reader of Kant, I now have to admit that my own reading of Schiller does
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begin by understanding his reading of Kant and how he attempted to reconfigure Kant’s aesthetic
system for what I see as creative and unique ends. While highly impressed with Kant’s work,
Schiller argues that Kant’s articulation of aesthetic judgment has only considered the beautiful
object from the position of the subject, leaving the object itself largely untreated and therefore
failing to solve the question of the judgment of taste in its entirety.93
In the first Schiller section here, I will trace how he reconfigures Kant’s articulation of
reason in an effort to establish the importance of the beautiful object in aesthetics and underscore
how he ultimately fails to produce an objective aesthetics (to counter what he sees as Kant’s
subjective aesthetics). In the next section, I will then explain how I think Schiller does succeed in
developing an idea of an aesthetic disposition in which the encounter with the beautiful object
inaugurates a new relationship with all objects that Schiller later comes to call the aesthetic state.
This requires developing a reading of Kallias in which I structure Schiller’s articulation of the
encounter with the beautiful object into three moments: (1) reason lends the object a will; (2) this
lending must be concealed so as to appear natural; (3) the object appears to present its freedom
and calls to us to respect it.
After exploring how these three moments inaugurate the aesthetic disposition/dimension I
see in Schiller’s early aesthetic thought, in the last section of the chapter I will turn to the Letter
on the Aesthetic Education of Man to explore how Schiller develops this implicit discussion of
an aesthetic disposition/dimension into a nuanced conception of the play drive and the aesthetic
state. Ultimately, I will cite critics of the aesthetic state to address some of Schiller’s further
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failures and return to the aesthetic disposition/dimension to illustrate what I see as his foremost
contribution to aesthetics.

3.4.1 Schiller’s Reconfiguration of Reason for a (Failed) Objective Aesthetics
Schiller’s project of developing an objective aesthetics begins with a reconfiguration of
Kant’s articulation of reason. To best trace this project, one must turn to Schiller’s 1793 letters to
Gottfried Körner which begin to articulate the themes of his never-finished work that was to be
entitled Kallias. In these letters, specifically the second letter dated February 8, 1793, Schiller
appeals to Kant’s distinction between theoretical and practical reason to situate his own project.
Following Kant, Schiller argues: “Reason connects either representation with representation to
gain knowledge (theoretical reason) or representation with the will in order to act (practical
reason)” (K 149). Theoretical reason is the pursuit of knowledge garnered either immediately as
intuition or through the mediation of a concept. It is contingent whether theoretical reason find
agreement between representation and intuition, but necessary that theoretical reason find
agreement between representation and concept. In contrast, practical reason is concerned with
the will and free or unfree actions. It is contingent whether practical reason produces agreement
between the will and unfree actions (such as actions in accord with laws of nature), but any
action acting in accord with practical reason must be free.
As Beiser argues, Schiller’s conception of reason is much broader than Kant’s and this
allows Schiller to compare judgments in new ways. Beiser explains, “Schiller takes reason in a
very general sense as the power of combination or synthesis, a power which unites all kinds of
representations among themselves, and even representations with other faculties, such as the
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will.”94 Beiser continues, “whether strictly Kantian or not, Schiller’s general concept of reason is
strategic and significant: it allows him to bring all forms of judgment within the general domain
of reason.”95 By subsuming all forms of judgment under the domain of reason, Schiller is able to
compare logical, teleological, moral and aesthetic judgments as analogous applications of reason
in alignment with the configuration of theoretical and practical reason as outlined above.
For Schiller, theoretical reason is the realm of logical and teleological judgments because
in those judgments “reason thus adduces an end of its own devising for the object and decides
whether the object is adequate to that end” (K 150). In contrast, moral and aesthetic judgments
are functions of practical reason. As opposed to theoretical reason which makes the object a
means to its end, Schiller argues that “practical reason abstracts from all knowledge and has to
do only with the determination of the will, with inner actions” (K 150). Where theoretical reason
relates representations to reason by way of intuitions or concepts, practical reason always relates
the will directly to representations of reason. Schiller argues that this means that practical reason
relates the will to reason “to the exclusion of every external principle of determination … To
adapt or imitate the form of practical reason thus merely means not to be determined from the
outside but from within” (K 150). Practical reason allows for self-determination of the object of
thought. In the case of moral judgment, human actions determine themselves freely from within.
In the case of aesthetic judgment, objects in the natural world appear to determine themselves
freely.
There are a few important implications of Schiller’s conception of practical reason and
subsumption of aesthetic judgment under it to consider: (1) the way in which it disrupts the
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disinterestedness of Kantian aesthetic judgment; (2) the interest it develops in resisting
conceptualization and the emphasis placed on this resistance; and (3) the definition of beauty as
the appearance of freedom. These three moments will be explored in turn.
First, in his reconfiguration of reason, Schiller disrupts Kant’s conception of the
disinterestedness of aesthetic judgment. As Beiser recounts, Kant prohibits a connection between
practical reason and aesthetic judgment because “while practical reason has an interest in its
object, whether as the useful or good, aesthetic judgment has no interest whatsoever in its object;
it simply asks whether its perception produces pleasure.”96 But, in subsuming aesthetic judgment
under practical reason, Schiller suggests there is an interest inherent in aesthetic judgment. For
Schiller, aesthetic judgment must entail more than just the recognition of pleasure without
interest in the object.
This leads to the second implication of Schiller’s reconfiguration of reason and judgment:
the determination of this interest. As traced here, practical reason allows for self-determination.
In moral judgment, this entails the self-determination of human actions. In aesthetic judgment, it
entails the subject’s recognition of the autonomy of the beautiful object. In doing so the subject
judges the object as self-determined. But this is not merely an allowance of the subject. Rather,
Schiller argues that the beautiful object itself resists conceptualization by the subject: “For
beauty presents itself in its greatest splendor only once it has overcome the logical nature of its
object, and how can this be done if there is no resistance?” (K 147). The beautiful object,
therefore, resists conceptualization and cannot be made a means to an end. Aesthetic judgment
meets this resistance and the faculties remain suspended in free play. The pleasure resulting from
this lingering, then, contains an interest in remaining in that moment of free play and thus in
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resisting conceptualization. Aesthetic judgment, Schiller seems to suggest, belies an interest in
resisting any logical concept of an object and lingering in the moment of the free play of the
faculties in the face of the self-determining beautiful object.97
This interest in resisting determination will be explored more in a moment in the
elaboration of the aesthetic disposition Schiller articulates, but before leaving the discussion of
practical reason, it is important to explain the third implication of Schiller’s subsuming aesthetic
judgment under practical reason: the question of the appearance of freedom. In the case of a
moral judgment, practical reason recognizes the action as pure will and thus as fully identical
with reason itself. Thus, as Schiller tells us, “reason demands imperatively of acts of will, or
moral acts, that they exist through the pure form of reason” (K 151). With aesthetic judgments,
however, the object is not a human action and cannot be identified with reason, thus “reason can
only wish (not demand) that natural effects be through themselves, that they show autonomy” (K
151). Reason cannot verify the autonomy of the object objectively; it can only do so subjectively
through the pleasure it produces in the subject. Therefore “if practical reason observes of a
natural being that it determines itself it ascribes to it … similarity to freedom … all that matters
here [is] that the object appears as free not that it really is so” (K 151). The object appears to be
free. This is why the faculties linger in consideration of it, producing the pleasure of selfreflection, and leading us to the judgment that the object is beautiful. “Beauty,” Schiller tells
Körner, “is thus nothing less than freedom in appearance” (K 152).
Schiller’s reconfiguration of aesthetic judgment and practical reason, therefore, does turn
toward the object that he argues Kant had failed to account for, but it fails to produce an
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objective account of that object—or as Frank puts it “no contribution is made in it to the
cognizing determination of an object.”98 Schiller has not established objective freedom as the
reason that we find an object beautiful. He has not proven that the object determines itself.
Rather, at this point in the argument, the object still merely appears to be free as perceived by
the subject. We find an object beautiful because we ascribe autonomy to it and render it
beautiful. As we found following Kant, we are left unable to say anything about the object that
has initiated the aesthetic encounter except that it is beautiful, which now means that it appears
to be free.99

3.4.2 The Encounter with the Beautiful Object: From “May it be what it will!”
to “Be free like me!”
Many scholars have commented on Schiller’s failures in developing an objective
aesthetic. Even Beiser, a generous and thorough reader of Schiller, evaluates Schiller’s objective
aesthetic as follows: “At its best Schiller’s analysis had shown that beauty means the same thing
as freedom in appearance.”100 Schiller’s contribution to Kant’s system and aesthetic theory as a
whole, therefore, is not the articulation of the objective constitution of the beautiful. Rather,
Schiller contributes a better understanding of the objective character of the subjectivity of
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aesthetic judgment. As Dieter Henrich explicates, in the aesthetic encounter “the subject plays
itself entirely into the object. The intentional state of the subject is an objective one.”101 102
I would like to call this objective state of the subject an aesthetic disposition that opens an
aesthetic dimension.103 Schiller’s aesthetic disposition/dimension is a new way of being in which
the subject conceives of its relationship to the beautiful object as one of mutual respect for
freedom rather than conceptualization of the object by the subject. I call it a disposition so as not
to lose sight of the fact that it is a subjective state. However, insofar as it inaugurates a new kind
of relationship with the beautiful object, I think it is also a dimension in which the subject and
beautiful object relate aesthetically. I’ll explain this aesthetic disposition/dimension and how it
constitutes a new or different relationship with the beautiful object by analyzing the shift
between two exclamations in Schiller’s Kallias letters: the move from the subject proclaiming of
the object “May it be what it will!” (K 154) to the object calling to the subject to “Be free like
me!” (K 155).
In order to understand the shift between these two exclamations we must consider the two
sides of the aesthetic encounter that Schiller is developing: the subjective and the so-called
objective. This encounter seems to take place in Schiller’s argument in Kallias in three steps:
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(1) reason lends the object a will; (2) this lending must be concealed so as to appear natural; (3)
the object appears to present its freedom and calls to us to respect it. I’ll consider these three
moments in turn.
First, in the letter where Schiller first defines beauty as freedom in appearance (the
February 8, 1793 letter), he argues that “reason lends the object (regulative and not, as with
moral judgements, constitutive) a power to determine itself, a will, and then examines the object
under the form of that will (not its will, since this would yield a moral judgement)” (K 151).
Reason is able to recognize the appearance of freedom, because it has leant freedom to the
object. As we saw above, Schiller does not develop a constitutive principle of beauty – proving
that there is beauty in an object. Rather, he provides a regulative conception of beauty. Here this
means that reason ought to lend certain objects a will with which to appear to determine
themselves, thus appearing as beautiful. Because the freedom “is merely lent to the object by
reason,” the freedom is merely an appearance of freedom (K 151).
But having articulated this idea of reason lending a will to the object, Schiller also
develops an objective side of this moment in the following letter dated February 18, 1793. There
he argues that Kant’s entire philosophy can be understood in the simple dictum to “determine
yourself from within yourself” (K 153). Here, Schiller argues that “this great idea of selfdetermination resonates back at us from certain appearances of nature, and we call it beauty” (K
153). The direction of beauty seems to have shifted from a subject lending an object a will to an
object reflecting freedom back at the subject – and not even reflecting but resonating, an auditory
rather than visual metaphor that suggests listening rather than seeing.
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In the next paragraph, Schiller argues that “there is a view of nature, or of appearances, in
which we demand nothing other than freedom from them and where our only concern is that they
be what they are through themselves” (K 154). Here Schiller seemingly opens an aesthetic
disposition/dimension by way of practical reason. The aesthetic encounter is no longer only
reliant on the beautiful object, but also on a responsibility of the subject and her attention to
practical reason. The judgment of taste is no longer only a statement of “this x is beautiful;” it
entails the call, “May it be what it will!” (K 154).
Schiller still recognizes that the natural object does not have its own will. But here that
recognition is a recognition of the object’s relationality. Schiller argues that each object “exists
through another, each exists for another, none has autonomy” (K 154). But rather than being a
statement of how unfree the object is, there is a new, positive character to this statement. What is
at stake is not the freedom of the object, but the ability of the subject to lend a will to the object
and respect this appearance of freedom in relation to herself. In a strikingly phenomenological
statement, Schiller argues that “everything changes if one leaves theoretical investigation aside
and takes the objects only as they appear” (K 154). If one does so, then one must “regard every
being in aesthetic judgment as an end in itself, [for] it disgusts us, for whom freedom is the
highest thing, that something should be sacrificed for something else, and used as a means” (K
159). The object cannot be a means to a concept; it must be leant a will with which to resist
objectification or conceptualization.
But something happens between reason lending the object a will and regarding the object
as an end in itself. This is the second step of the aesthetic encounter, where the lending, Schiller
tells us, must be rendered invisible, because “we never want to see coercion,” Schiller argues,
“even if it is reason itself which exercises it” (K 159). Schiller parses this through his discussion
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of autonomy and heautonomy, which he adapts from the first introduction to Kant’s third
Critique (CJ 27-8). Autonomy, for Schiller, is freedom. As Dieter Henrich defines it, “Freedom
here means to be completely self-determined, to develop according to inner necessity
independent of external influences.”104 Heautonomy is self-determination that is also self-given.
It is an intensification of autonomy in which the subject not only develops according to its inner
necessity but also develops that inner necessity willingly. Autonomy is the realm of the moral,
when an action is freely determined by the human actor. Heautonomy is the realm of the
beautiful, because not only is the action freely determined by the actor, it also appears as an
immediate product of nature. Thus, Schiller will argue that “a free action is a beautiful action, if
the autonomy of the mind and autonomy of appearance coincide” (K 159).
When the direction of beauty shifts, as mentioned previously, not only freedom but also
beauty is reflected back on the subject, and the encounter itself must become beautiful. This
means that aesthetic judgment must not only be free but also beautiful, presenting not only
autonomy but heautonomy. It cannot simply be the case that reason has intentionally decided to
respect the self-determination of the beautiful object by lending it a will. This would be a moral
judgment. Rather it must appear that it is in reason’s nature to respect all beautiful objects. Thus,
Schiller tells us that the aesthetic judgment is only beautiful if the subject has “forgot[ten]
himself in his action” and “fulfilled his duty with the ease of someone acting out of mere
instinct” (K 159). As Schiller puts it, it must be that “duty has become its nature” (K 159).
Reason ought to lend objects a will with which to appear to determine themselves. Only when
the subject conceals this lending can the object appear to be free. And only in forgetting this
lending, can aesthetic judgment itself become beautiful. This is what Schiller will call the
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“objective ground” of beauty: that the representation of the object “simply necessitates us to
produce the idea of freedom from within ourselves, and to apply it to the object” (K 160-1).
Schiller’s objective ground is a necessary, subjective state, a state so necessary that we recognize
it as our own nature.105
This leads us to the third moment of the aesthetic encounter: the object calling to us to
respect its autonomy. Schiller foreshadowed this point in a section previously quoted from the
February 8, 1793 letter where he argued that the “idea of self-determination resonates back at us
from certain appearances of nature” (K 153). Schiller expands on this notion of resonance in the
February 23, 1793 letter. There he argues that “the thing itself, in its objective constitution,
invites us, or rather requires us to notice its quality of not-being-determined-from-the-outside”
(K 161). The beautiful object invites or requires us to recognize its freedom and, therefore, its
beauty. It demands that we lend it a will with which to determine itself and then conceal that
lending so that the object can appear beautiful and even forget that its will is borrowed so as to
make the aesthetic judgment beautiful. In this dual concealing-forgetting, we find that the
beautiful object appears beautiful not as a result of our reason but as a product of its own nature.
The object no longer appears to be free but makes its freedom appear. As Acosta astutely notes,
“the very notion of appearance has also been transformed in the process.”106 These are two
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different notions of appearance: the first a matter of deception, the second a matter of
presentation. As a result of the shift, the encounter appears to begin from the object’s exhortation
to “be free like me” (K 173). It is no longer only a matter of the object being what it will. In the
exchange of will, freedom, and beauty in the aesthetic encounter, the object comes to call to and
demand from the subject whose freedom is then intertwined with the freedom of the object.
Therefore, Schiller tells us that “in this aesthetic world … even the gown I wear on my body
demands respect for its freedom from me … In exchange, it promises to use its freedom in such a
way that it will not curtail my own freedom; and if both keep their word, the world will say that I
am well dressed” (K 170).
In the aesthetic dimension, the subject works in conjunction with the object to ground
both subject and object in freedom. First the subject’s practical reason lends the object a will to
resist the conceptualizing force of theoretical reason. Then the subject conceals this lending so
that the object can appear to be free (beauty as freedom in appearance). The subject then finds
that the object comes in upon her presenting its freedom (beauty as the exhibition of freedom),
and she forgets that she has leant the object a will, establishing her own freedom again in
heeding the call of the object to “be free like me” (K 173).
In this articulation of the aesthetic encounter, we can see that while Schiller’s explication
of aesthetic judgment does not necessarily establish an objective aesthetic, in Schiller’s
reconsideration of an emphasis on the object, the impetus or responsibility of the aesthetic seems
to shift from the object to the subject: it is not the object that must be beautiful, but the subject
that, in viewing the object aesthetically, must then produce its freedom. Pleasure results from
yielding to the apparent freedom of the object in its self-determination and, therefore,
remembering the ground of one’s own freedom.
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The aesthetic dimension, therefore, is the relationship that opens up between the subject
and the object during this encounter and which is held open as long as the subject hears and
heads the call to “be free like me.” In the aesthetic dimension, the object demands the utmost
respect. It must always be treated as an end and thus never made a means to a concept (an end)
by theoretical reason. This may not be the objective aesthetic that Schiller set out to create, but it
does reorient aesthetic experience around the object in such a way that centers the role of the
object rather than the subjective nature of the encounter.

3.4.3 The Aesthetic Dimension and the Play Drive
While I’ve just outlined how Schiller produces an aesthetic dimension in Kallias, in his
Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man, he works to understand this dimension on a larger
scale that leads him to formulate his concept of the aesthetic state. In order to understand what
Schiller intends by “aesthetic state,” we must first understand his development of the play drive.
To begin exploring the development of the play drive, Schiller opens the Letters with a
colorful critique of a certain mode of thinking:
For alas! Intellect must first destroy the object of inner sense if it would make it its own
… In order to lay hold of the fleeting phenomenon, he must first bind it in the fetters of
rule, tear its fair body to pieces by reducing it to concepts, and preserve its living spirit in
a sorry skeleton of words. (L 87-8)
Here we can see an echo of Schiller’s division between theoretical and practical reason and
emphasis on practical reason as refusing this sort of reduction to concepts. Throughout the
following letters, Schiller sets up a conflict between reason and sense or the formal drive and the
sensuous drive. Reason is the domain of form, the universal, a determining, active state of the
mind and laws. Sense is the domain of matter, the contingent, a receptive, passive state of
particular cases. Sense contemplates the natural world while reason lays hold of the fleeting
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phenomena. Schiller sees reason and sense as two fundamentally opposed drives that often
appear irreconcilable: “at first sight nothing could seem more diametrically opposed than the
tendencies of these two drives, the one pressing for change, the other for changelessness” (L
121).
In the Letters, Schiller is primarily concerned with two things: (1) developing the role of
sense and (2) understanding the relationship between these drives. To consider the role of sense
first: Schiller opens this text on drives with an epigraph from Rousseau: “Si c’est la raison, qui
fait l’homme, c’est le sentiment, qui le conduit” (L 86). If it is reason that makes man, it’s feeling
that drives him. In the eighth letter, Schiller argues that “The development of man’s capacity for
feeling is, therefore, the more urgent need of our age, not merely because it can be a means of
making better insights effective for living, but precisely because it provides the impulse for
bettering our sights” (L 107). It’s not that Schiller doesn’t think both reason and sense are
important—he does. However, he is concerned with the isolation of reason and sense from each
other and what happens when reason overpowers sense. He writes that “only through individual
powers in man becoming isolated, and arrogating to themselves exclusive authoring, do they
come into conflict with the truth of things, and force the common sense … to penetrate
phenomena in depth” (L 102). For Schiller, it is not in the nature of common sense to penetrate
phenomena in depth. This again is the destruction of the object of inner sense—the tearing the
fair body of the fleeting phenomenon to pieces. Schiller’s goal in writing the Letters is to attempt
to avoid the destruction of the object of sense by the intellect, to resist penetrating phenomena in
depth and to begin thinking how we might relate to objects and others otherwise.
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To accomplish this task, Schiller posits a third fundamental drive in the thirteenth letter
that will reimagine the relationship between the two drives, so as to reconcile (in a certain sense)
their differences. Schiller calls this the play drive. The role of the play drive is “first, to preserve
the life of sense against the encroachments of freedom; and second, to secure the personality
against the forces of sensation” (L 122). The play drive establishes a relationship between sense
and reason, but the form and function of this relationship is of much debate in secondary
scholarship—likely because Schiller describes it in a few different ways himself that I’ll now
discuss.
In a footnote to the thirteenth letter, Schiller argues that the relationship between reason
and sense must be one of reciprocal subordination. He says:
Once you postulate a primary, and therefore necessary antagonism between these two
drives there is, of course, no other means of maintaining unity in man than by
unconditionally subordinating the sensuous drive to the rational. From this, however,
only uniformity can result, never harmony, and man goes on forever being divided.
Subordination there must, of course, be; but it must be reciprocal. … Both principles are,
therefore, at once subordinated to each other and coordinated with each other, that is to
say, they stand in reciprocal relation to one another. (L 121)
This reciprocal subordination makes the enactment of both drives simultaneous. In this
reciprocally subordinate relationship, both reason and sense are operating at the same time.
Schiller argues that this experience is inaugurated through the perception of the beautiful object
and that is when we are most human and when human nature is most complete:
Should there, however, be cases in which he were to have this twofold experience
simultaneously, in which he were to be at once conscious of his freedom and sensible of
his existence, were, at one and the same time, to feel himself matter and come to know
himself as mind, then he would in such cases, and in such cases only, have a complete
intuition of his human nature, and the object that afforded him this vision would become
for him a symbol of his accomplished destiny. (L 126)
Some scholars argue that in this discussion of the simultaneity of the drives, Schiller suggests a
harmony or balance of drives that creates a sort of middle drive between the two. This is what
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someone such as Eagleton will propose when he argues that for Schiller “the aesthetic … is
simply a way-stage or passage to the non-sensuous imperatives of practical reason. … it breaks
down the tyrannical dominion of the sense drive not by the imposition of some external ukase,
but from within.”107 Schiller, however, denies this sort of interpretation. While he says that it
may seem like there is a “middle state that beauty transports us” to, he argues that “beauty links
the two opposite conditions of feeling and thinking; yet between these two there is absolutely no
middle term” (L 137).
This simultaneity of reciprocal subordination of drives, therefore, is not simply a middle
passage or state between reason and sense. That said, Schiller further complicates this claim in
the twentieth letter where he argues that through the play drive, “Our psyche passes, then, from
sensation to thought via a middle disposition in which sense and reason are both active at the
same time” (L 145). Having rejected the idea of a “middle state” that beauty transports us to
previously, now he argues that there is a “middle disposition” activated by the play drive. I think
we can make sense of this through a clue in the sixteenth letter. There he says:
We have seen how beauty results from the reciprocal action of two opposed drives and
from the uniting of two opposing principles. The highest ideal of beauty is, therefore, to
be sought in the most perfect possible union and equilibrium of reality and form. The
equilibrium, however, remains no more than an idea, which can never be fully realized in
actuality. For in actuality we shall always be left with a preponderance of the one element
over the other, and the utmost that experience can achieve will consist of an oscillation
between the two principles. (L 132)
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This passage relies on his distinction between equilibrium and oscillation. Schiller seems to see
equilibrium as a sort of static union, and in contrast he describes oscillation as a “releasing and
tensing effect” (L 132) that sets limits on the boundaries of each drive. The “middle state” then
seems to characterize this static sense of equilibrium and the “middle disposition” that active
character of releasing and tensing. Schiller explains
further, “beauty is to release by tensing both natures
uniformly, and to tense by releasing both natures
uniformly. This already follows from the concept of a
reciprocal action, by virtue of which both factors
necessarily condition each other and are at the same
time conditioned by each other” (L 133). Here, Schiller
explains how beauty is not simply a matter of harmony
or a pleasurable state. Rather, as he argues with the
experience of the Juno Ludovisi, in the experience of
beauty “we find ourselves at one and the same time in a
state of utter repose and supreme agitation, and there
results that wondrous stirring of the heart for which

Figure 5: Juno Ludovisi (also called Hera
Ludovisi). Photo by Jastrow, courtesy of Museo
nazionale romano di palazzo. Public domain.

mind has no concept nor speech any name” (L 132).
In this way, the play drive (as activated by the experience of beauty) becomes the live
pulse of human experience. It is not a balanced, middle state that one can arrive at, but rather the
simultaneous experience of oneself as matter and mind. The play drive opens the possibility that
the subject can feel sensuous matter and know it without determining it. This is what Schiller
calls the aesthetic: “if we are to call the condition of sensuous determination the physical, and the
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condition of rational determination the logical or moral, then we must call this condition of real
and active determinability the aesthetic” (L 145). And if we think back to the previous discussion
of the Kallias letters, we can again see how it is in aesthetic experience that the subject can allow
the object to be what it will while hearing the call to be free like it.

3.4.4 The Aesthetic State and its Critics
At this point, we can begin to understand how Schiller develops what I’ve called the
aesthetic disposition/dimension implicit in the Kallias letters into his articulation of the aesthetic
state. In this section I will explain how Schiller transitions from the aesthetic
disposition/dimension to the aesthetic state and then highlight a few problems with (and, I think,
ultimately failures of) his articulation of the aesthetic state, particularly through the work of
Eagleton and de Man.
In Kallias, Schiller’s analysis emphasized the role of the object in aesthetic experience
but ultimately remained within the realm of the individual subject and her experience of beauty.
By attempting to critique the too-subjective nature of Kant’s aesthetics and develop the role of
the object in the aesthetic encounter, Schiller opened an aesthetic disposition/dimension that
reshaped how the subject might relate to beautiful objects as heeding their call to “be free like
me,” thus reshaping what aesthetics is and the kind of relationality it can open up.
In the Letters, however, Schiller wants to speak not only to individual experiences of the
beautiful, but also to make a larger argument about human nature and society. While his original
articulation of the play drive in the early Letters could perhaps be mapped onto his
reconfiguration on Kant’s conception of reason and discussion of free play, at the end of the
fifteenth letter, Schiller announces his ultimate goal:
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For, to mince matters no longer, man only plays when he is in the fullest sense of the
word a human being, and he is only fully a human being when he plays. This proposition,
which at the moment may sound like a paradox, will take on both weight and depth of
meaning once we have got as far as applying it to the twofold earnestness of duty and of
destiny. It will, I promise you, prove capable of bearing the whole edifice of the art of the
beautiful, and of the still more difficult art of living. (L 131)
Here Schiller announces that his goal is to understand how play makes man “fully a human
being” and that in doing so he will show that this is the key to understanding the “more difficult
art of living.” This is why it’s so important to Schiller (as shown in the previous section) to
illustrate that the play drive is not simply a static, middle state between the formal and sense
drive, but actually a simultaneous experience of the two that makes humans fully human for the
first time in bringing the drives together. In doing so, he moves beyond Kant’s conception of the
free play of the faculties as a matter of harmonious pleasure experienced in the face of the
beautiful object (although we have seen in the last chapter that this is a rather reductive reading
of Kant). He instead argues that the experience of the beautiful invokes both utter repose and
supreme agitation as the drives of reason and sense tense and release. The play drive illustrates
that aesthetic experience is not simply a matter of the individual relationship to a beautiful object
or objects but about the fundamental human experience of matter and mind.
For Schiller then, the aesthetic state is the activation of the play drive considered on
anthropological and political levels. As Rancière argues in “Schiller and the Aesthetic Promise,”
this anthropological transposition [of free play to the play drive] is itself ruled by a
thoroughly political exigency. The power of form over matter that is suspended by the
third drive—the play drive—is directly translatable into political terms. It is the power of
universality over the anarchy of individuals and the masses. This power itself realizes
another: the power of “culture” over “nature,” which is to say of the leisure class over the
classes—natural or savage—of work and simple reproduction.108

108

Jacques Rancière, “Schiller and the Aesthetic Promise,” trans. Owen Glyn-Williams, in Aesthetic Reason and
Imaginative Freedom, eds. María del Rosario Acosta López and Jeffrey L. Powell (Albany, NY: SUNY Press,
2018), 127.

210

Here Rancière alludes to Schiller’s disillusionment with the French Revolution, where Schiller
saw the revolution as resulting in yet another reproduction of the universal over the particular, or
of reason over the sensuous (see Letter VII for this discussion).109 What Rancière argues this
points to—and I agree—is that for Schiller the aesthetic state is always a matter of maintaining
the simultaneity of drives in the play drive and the tension of repose and agitation that yields.
Rancière says:
The Kantian “free play” of the faculties, the resolution of the opposition between formal
instinct and the sensible instinct in the play instinct is, in Schiller, no longer a peaceful
agreement. It manifests a tension in which passive power and active power are together
suspended at the extreme of their opposition and transformed into their contrary … This
tension that characterizes free appearance does not resolve itself in the calm assurance of
the judgment of the beautiful. It is translated into a sensible state of exception. The
subject does not peacefully enjoy form. He or she is taken up in an internal conflict.110
Whether on the level of the political or the individual, the aesthetic state is held open by the
tension between passivity and activity, between the sensuous and reason. While Schiller sees this
as having collapsed in the span of only a few years in the case of the French Revolution, we can
transpose this back to the level of the experience of Juno Ludovisi to see the potential Schiller
still sees for the aesthetic state vis-à-vis the aesthetic dimension. In describing Juno Ludovisi,
Schiller argues that when we observe her face:
While the woman-god demands our veneration, the godlike woman kindles our love; but
even as we abandon ourselves in ecstasy to her heavenly grace, her celestial selfsufficiency makes us recoil in terror. The whole figure reposes and dwells in itself, a
creation completely self-contained, and, as if existing beyond space, neither yielding nor
resisting; here is no force to contend with force, no frailty where temporality might break
in. (L 132)
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This passage illustrates that a primary tension of the aesthetic dimension is the self-sufficiency of
the work of art in conflict with one’s own force or reason. Transposing this back to the level of
the aesthetic state, Schiller argues that a primary tension there is the relationship between one’s
humanity and one’s individual freedom:
Our psyche in the aesthetic state does indeed act freely, is in the highest degree free from
all compulsion, but is in no way free from laws; and that this aesthetic freedom is
distinguishable from logical necessity in thinking, or moral necessity in willing, only by
the fact that the laws according to which the psyche then behaves do not become
apparent as such, and since they encounter no resistance, never appear as a constraint. (L
143)
Here Schiller is arguing that in the aesthetic state our psyche is free, but that doesn’t mean the
aesthetic state is lawless. Rather, there the will of the individual and the will of society are one
because in the activation of the play drive, universality and particularity have been united and
this allows us to access our full humanity and thus humanity itself:
For as soon as we recall that it was precisely of this freedom that he was deprived by the
one-sided constraint of nature in the field of sensation and by the exclusive authority of
reason in the realm of thought, then we are bound to consider the power that is restored to
him in the aesthetic mode as the highest of all bounties, as the gift of humanity itself. (L
147)
For Schiller, the aesthetic state is the state in which man can be “enlarge[ed] into a representative
of the species” (L 158) such that “the possibility of sublimest humanity, is thereby actually
proven” (L 165). It is the political reality of a pervasive play drive and the utmost
accomplishment of the beauty of art.
While Schiller seems to find his aesthetic state rather triumphant, scholars like Eagleton
see his rendering of the aesthetic state as highly problematic. Eagleton argues that by embedding
humanity within the individual and arguing the influence of humanity on the individual psyche
does not become apparent, Schiller makes a deeply ideological turn that makes it impossible to
distinguish between ideology and individual freedom. Eagleton argues that “what Schiller terms
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the ‘aesthetic modulation of the psyche’ in fact denotes a project of fundamental ideological
reconstruction. The aesthetic is the missing mediation between a barbaric civil society given over
to pure appetite, and the ideal of a well-ordered political state.”111 In the end, Eagleton sees this
as a matter of political power “implant[ing] itself in subjectivity itself” so that “its dominance is
to be secure;” this process, he says, “requires the production of a citizen whose ethico-political
duty has been internalized as spontaneous inclination.”112
Eagleton finds evidence for this in Schiller’s text “On Grace and Dignity,” where Schiller
argues that: “As much as deeds performed from inclination and deeds performed from duty stand
opposed to each other, this is not so in the subjective sense, and the person not only may, in fact
bring desire and duty into connection: he should obey his reason with joy” (GD 364). While this
quote does appear to elevate reason above the sensuous (as Schiller argues against in the Letters),
Schiller amends this to be about a mutual enervation of reason and sense a few paragraphs later,
saying:
Only when it flows forth from his entire humanity as the united effect of both principles,
when it has become nature for him, is his moral way of thinking secure from danger. For,
so long as the moral mind still applies force, natural impulse must still have power to set
against it. The enemy merely cast down can arise again, the reconciled is truly
vanquished. (GD 365)
Here, like in the Letters, Schiller argues that both principles must be united in order for his
freedom to be secure. He once again posits this tension between moral mind (reason) and natural
impulse (sensuous) as a necessity for our full humanity. Even with this addition, however, it’s
challenging to understand how or why Schiller goes on to describe this analogously to a
monarchic state:
If a monarchic state be so administered, that, although everything happens according to
one single will, yet the individual citizen can convince himself, that he lives according to
111
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his own inclination, then we call this a liberal government. But, one would have
considerable reservations, either if the regent asserted his will against the inclination of
the citizen, or if the citizen asserted his inclination against the will of the regent; for in the
first case, the government were not liberal, in the second, it were no government at all.
(GD 360)
Schiller is providing an analogy for how it is that one’s political duty might be internalized as
natural inclination, and he chooses the monarchic state—the state in which the monarch’s will is
the only will and the individual citizen must “convince himself that he lives according to his own
inclination”—as his analogous case.
While, of course, Schiller here intends for the monarch to be standing in in the stead of
all humanity, I agree with Eagleton that this doesn’t feel like the sort of radically free aesthetic
state Schiller seems to be promising in the Letters. Plus, it’s this monarchic inclination in
Schiller that leads de Man to compare Schiller to Goebbels at the end of his oft-cited lecture
critiquing Schiller for masking mastery as freedom.113 And it’s the conversations arising from
these two critics of Schiller and others that leads Acosta to argue that “when rereading Schiller
today, one has to be aware that the question raised by the relationship between the aesthetic and
the political is unavoidable.”114
My goal for this section is not to rescue Schiller’s conception of the aesthetic state from
its critics, but rather to pay attention to this unavoidable relationship between the aesthetic and
the political in Schiller as I think, agreeing with Acosta, any twenty-first century reader must do.
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In my mind, much like Schiller’s attempt to develop an objective aesthetic, his attempt to
articulate the character of freedom in the aesthetic state largely fails to justify his transposition
between the individual and societal levels without appealing to a position that sounds
precariously ideological. Where Kant’s transcendental articulation of common sense and sensus
communis allowed for an understanding of how society is evoked in each individual aesthetic
judgment—and perhaps failed to address our material and political realities directly enough in
the process (as argued in the last chapter)—Schiller’s transposition of aesthetic experience from
the individual experience directly to social and political structures too quickly moves between
and collapses the individual and societal levels of experiences without considering their real
differences.
We can see this in the difference between his example of Juno Ludovisi and the monarch.
In the case of Juno Ludovisi what’s so critical about our aesthetic experience of her beauty is that
she remains self-contained and distant from us even as we find ourselves in repose and agitation
as a result of her beauty. As Rancière says, “She is an idle figure, defined by a pure quality of
separation.”115 At the same time, Schiller describes aesthetic experience as a matter of “letting
her come in upon us [rather than] thrusting ourselves out upon her with all the impatient
anticipations of our reason” (L 123). Juno Ludovisi remains separate from us, but also comes in
upon us as we revel in her beauty. This tension is what holds open the play drive, and it cannot
be resolved, or the experience would no longer be aesthetic.
In the example of the monarch, however, I think Schiller too quickly collapses the tension
of this difference that holds open the play drive and would mark the experience—or in this case
the state—as aesthetic. He says that living in the aesthetic state would be like living in a
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monarchic state where the will of the monarch is so thoroughly pervasive that each individual
convinces himself he lives according to his own inclination (even though that is the inclination of
the monarch). Here, the distance between the monarch and the individual collapses. It’s not that
the individual maintains the self-contained separation of the monarch and allows her to come in
upon her (as in the case of Juno Ludovisi), but that the will of the monarch and the will of the
individual become one. When Schiller transposes his aesthetic system to the level of the state, I
think he risks losing the critical factor that makes his system valuable—the emphasis on tension
and difference—and replacing it with harmony and sameness.
Therefore, while I do find it important to discuss Schiller’s conception of the aesthetic
state in any extended conversation on his aesthetic system, I’m also happy to agree with his
critiques that the aesthetic state is problematic and then to reorient the conversation around the
aesthetic disposition/dimension which I find to be a much more valuable contribution to
aesthetics. So, having completed this relatively brief discussion of the aesthetic state, I will now
conclude this portion of the chapter on Schiller by returning to the discussion of the aesthetic
disposition/dimension I articulated earlier.

3.4.5 Returning to the Aesthetic Disposition/Dimension
At the very end of the Letters, Schiller argues that “in the aesthetic state everything –
even the tool that serves – is a free citizen, having equal rights with the noblest; and the mind,
which would force the patient mass beneath the yoke of its purposes, must here first obtain its
assent” (L 178). While I’ve just critiqued Schiller’s conception of the aesthetic state, I think the
power of this quotation is how it hearkens back to an extended quote from Kallias, previously
cited in part:
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When does one say that a person is well dressed? When freedom suffers neither through
the clothes on the body nor the body through the clothes; if the clothes look like they
have nothing in common with the body and still fulfil their purpose completely. Beauty,
or rather taste, regards all things as ends in themselves and will not permit one to serve as
the purpose of another, or to be under its control. Everyone is a free citizen and has the
same rights as the most noble in the world of aesthetics, coercion may not take place even
for the sake of the whole—everyone must consent. In the aesthetic world, which is quite
different from the most perfect Platonic republic, even the gown I wear on my body
demands respect for its freedom from me, much like a humble servant who demands that
I never let on that he is serving me. In exchange, it promises to use its freedom in such a
way that it will not curtail my own freedom; and if both keep their word, then the world
will say that I am well dressed. (K 170)
What I find radical in Schiller’s aesthetics is how he centers the role of the beautiful object and
painstakingly works to show how we must consider each object a free citizen in the world we
inhabit together. Being well dressed is a matter of cultivating the right kind of relationship with
one’s garments. This relationship, as was just cited, is about “letting her [the object/the garment]
come in upon us [rather than] thrusting ourselves out upon her with all the impatient
anticipations of our reason” (L 123). It is this sort of encounter with the beautiful object that
opens the aesthetic disposition/dimension and allows us to hear and to heed the call of the object
to be free like us. The aesthetic disposition/dimension returns us to the ground of our freedom by
way of the beautiful object, bringing the beautiful object back with us as we allow it to come in
upon us. It establishes autonomy alongside relationality, and in that way opens the play drive.
In the three-fold movement of aesthetic experience that creates an objective ground to our
subjective experience (as I argued previously), I do think the aesthetic encounter inaugurates a
certain kind of politics that opens up space for difference and critique. As Cadahia argues,
It is the distance that the aesthetic dispositif establishes with respect to the field of
representation that allows for a repolitization of what is presented as given. In other
words, the aesthetic dispositif deactivates the reification function of positive society and
gives us a dialectical image of it in return. By making visible the field of forces in dispute
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that are configuring the fragile present, that which exists ceases to be the crushing weight
of a dead tradition and a reality organized on the bases of that same rigid past.116
In the aesthetic disposition/dimension, we allow the beautiful object to come in upon us in order
to reestablish our own freedom without reducing her particularity or difference to our own
conception of her. This is how the aesthetic disposition/dimension repoliticizes our field of
representation—it makes us relate to each given object as a fellow subject. This is what’s
necessary, Schiller argues (and I agree), in order for us to learn to “mak[e] other people’s
feelings our own” (L 124). We have to be able to let them come in upon us rather than thrusting
ourselves out upon them. We have to cultivate autonomy and relationality with equal emphasis
releasing and tensing them in oscillation. We have to play on our own and together with objects
and others to cultivate and hold open our aesthetic disposition/dimension. This is what I think
Schiller contributes to aesthetics—not a clear and correct articulation of an aesthetic state, but a
disruptive and hopeful concept of an aesthetic disposition/dimension through or in which we can
cultivate better relationships in our political world. This is the vision of Schiller that I now hope
to carry back to my reading of Lorde so as to consider them together.

3.5 Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Woman:
Lorde and Schiller in Conversation
Having now provided my readings of both Lorde and Schiller, in this third portion of the
chapter, I intend to retrace the steps of the arguments I just made in order to make visible what I
see as analogous impulses and arguments in these two very different thinkers. My goal here is
not to reduce or diminish them to each other (as if that was even possible), but to show how
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reading Lorde and Schiller together helps me attend to and clarify specific aspects of their
thought with more care and consideration.
Most generally, my argument is that while they are centuries and continents apart, Lorde
and Schiller both argue—in equally important ways—for the role of feeling, others, and learning
from poetry at the heart of any philosophical/political endeavor. As cited previously, Schiller
opens the Aesthetic Letters with the following epigraph from Rousseau: “Si c’est la raison, qui
fait l’homme, c’est le sentiment, qui le conduit.” In writing the letters, Schiller takes the
“sentiment” here to heart—quite literally, he writes in the first letter that he “shall be pleading
the cause of beauty before a heart” (L 86). Almost two hundred years later, Lorde writes in
“Poetry Is Not a Luxury” that: “The white fathers told us, I think therefore I am; and the black
mothers in each of us—the poet—whispers in our dreams, I feel therefore I can be free” (SO 38).
Her direct critique of Descartes here takes on a similar premise as Schiller’s intention in quoting
Rousseau—to emphasize feeling hand-in-hand with reason, and she goes on to develop a theory
of poetry as a way of being that posits a fusion of feeling and thinking necessary for solidarity
and coalition.
Taking these shared provocations in hand, I intend to discuss the alignment between these
thinkers on three points: (1) their shared critiques of reason alone and heightened attention to
sense/feeling; (2) their desire to resolve those critiques through an understanding of the
oscillation and/or fusion of opposing drives; and (3) how they see poetry and aesthetic education
as key to building a better world. Each of these will now be considered in turn.
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3.5.1 Critique of Reason Alone and Heightened Attention to Sense/Feeling
Both Lorde and Schiller are critical of the tendencies that they see in political society and
in academic philosophy to value rationality and reason over feeling and sense. In their writings
they critique these tendencies and offer explanations for why they think it is so important to
attend to the role of feeling and the sensuous in addition to that of reason.
For Schiller, this is a matter of considering the role of the object in aesthetic experience
and reckoning with the damages of reason when it functions alone. As cited previously Schiller’s
colorful critique of intellect alone begins in the first letter of the Letters:
For alas! Intellect must first destroy the object of inner sense if it would make it its own
… In order to lay hold of the fleeting phenomenon, he must first bind it in the fetters of
rule, tear its fair body to pieces by reducing it to concepts, and preserve its living spirit in
a sorry skeleton of words. (L 87-88)
Schiller attributes this sort of thinking to conceptions of knowledge which divide the powers of
judgment between what he calls the “formal drive” (reason) and the “sensuous drive” (sense). He
argues that when reason is left alone it becomes pure intellect and lays hold of fleeting
phenomena, tearing “fair bodies to pieces.” In contrast, sense alone risks caprice and the
solipsism of the psyche. Thus, Schiller argues that “one-sidedness in the exercise of his powers
must, it is true, inevitably lead the individual into error” (L 103), and therefore both powers must
be exercised simultaneously, transforming each other in the process as sense reshapes reason and
reason reshapes sense into something entirely new. (This is, as we know from the previous
section, what Schiller calls the play drive, which will be discussed in the next section here.)
While Schiller argues for the necessity of simultaneously utilizing reason and sense, he
also admits in the Letters that “the development of man’s capacity for feeling is, therefore, the
more urgent need of our age, not merely because it can be a means of making better insights
effective for living, but precisely because it provides the impulse for bettering our insights” (L
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107, emphasis added). On the one hand, I think this proceeds from Schiller’s critique of the
French Revolution. As Acosta compellingly argues, he sees the bloody results of those years as
an instance of the exclusive elevation of reason in politics representing as "the last stage of the
experience undertaken by Rousseauian Enlightened project."117 On the other hand, as James
Parsons notes, Schiller “stresses that the self-cultivation of Enlightenment entails not only a
merging of heart and mind but a fusion of those forces that motivate humanity as part of the
earthly now and as moral beings, that is beings who aspire to the infinite.”118 Schiller sees the
fusion of heart and mind as necessary for the development of humanity, but he also argues that
“the way to the head must be opened through the heart” (L 107), because “it is this drive alone
that awakens and develops the potentialities of man” (L 119). Thus, there is something about
both the historical specificity of the moment and the conditions necessary for human
development that makes developing the capacity for feeling more urgent to Schiller. He sees the
simultaneous enervation of reason and sense as necessary to avoid the dangers of either acting
alone, but he emphasizes the role of sense throughout his argument.
For Lorde, the critique of reason alone and heightened attention to sense in her work
centers around the way that white/european/masculine perspectives have been elevated for so
long above black/non-european/feminine perspectives in our society.
In “Poetry Is Not a Luxury” Lorde argues that “When we view living in the european
mode only as a problem to be solved, we rely solely upon our ideas to make us free, for these
were what the white fathers told us were precious” (SO 37). As we know from the first half of
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this chapter, “ideas” here are aligned with thinking and contrasted with feeling and knowing (or
knowing our feelings). Lorde’s project is to reject the societal pressure to rely solely on ideas and
to recover the ancient and hidden possibilities of feeling/knowing that have been so maligned by
the societal emphasis on thinking as it emerges under patriarchy. Therefore, in “Poetry Is Not a
Luxury” she asserts:
As we come more into touch with our own ancient, non-european consciousness of living
as a situation to be experienced and interacted with, we learn more and more to cherish
our feelings, and to respect those hidden sources of our power from where true
knowledge and, therefore, lasting action comes. (SO 37)
Here Lorde contrasts the european mode of knowing that reveres ideas as solutions (what
Schiller might call the formal drive) with an ancient, non-european mode of knowing that
experiences the world through feeling and sense (what Schiller might call the sensuous drive). In
this quotation (and throughout her work), she seems to favor feeling over thinking. One reason
for this is because of the historical and political marginalization of black, non-european women
and the feelings they were associated with:
For within living structures defined by profit, by linear power, by institutional
dehumanization, our feelings were not meant to survive. Kept around as unavoidable
adjuncts or pleasant pastimes, feelings were expected to kneel to thought as women were
expected to kneel to men. (SO 39)
This is why for Lorde, the work that must be done immediately is the reclamation and elevation
of feeling/knowing as a feminine mode. That’s the only corrective to the white supremacist,
capitalist patriarchal system in which feelings (like women) have been forced to kneel to
thinking (and its masculine status). That said, her reasoning for favoring thinking isn’t simply a
matter of social and political positioning. In the above quotation, she also posits feeling as
connected to “true knowledge” and “lasting action”—seemingly in a way that thinking is not.
For Lorde, feeling is deeply connected to the erotic which she identifies as the source of our most
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powerful connections and choices. In feeling our feelings “not only do we touch our most
profoundly creative source, be we do that which is female and self-affirming in the face of a
racist, patriarchal, and anti-erotic society” (SO 59).
Thus, like we saw for Schiller, there is something about both the historical specificity of
the moment and the conditions necessary for human development that makes developing the
capacity for feeling more urgent to Lorde. She is both responding to the marginalized conditions
of Black women in her time, and speaking to something more essential about feeling/knowing in
relation to our humanity. For her, feeling/knowing must be reclaimed so as to resist patriarchy,
and our feelings are also the key to true knowledge and lasting action, which are both necessary
for reshaping the world and making more of us free.119
Having briefly considered how Schiller and Lorde both provide a critique of reason alone
and pay special attention to the role of sense/feeling in their work, in the next section I will
consider how Schiller develops an idea of oscillation of reason and sense in his discussion of the
play drive in relation to how Lorde expresses the fusion of feeling/knowing and
thinking/understanding in her conception of the erotic.

3.5.2 The Play Drive and the Erotic
Insofar as Lorde and Schiller both critique the emphasis on reason over sense in their
contemporary worlds and attempt to rewrite that balance by focusing on sense and feeling, they
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also present solutions to that critique that involve a unique fusion of reason and sense that
emphasizes the relationality between oneself and others. To discuss Schiller first:
As we know from the previous section, Schiller refers to a specific relationship between
the formal drive and the sensuous drive in which they are enervated simultaneously as the play
drive. The role of the play drive is “first, to preserve the life of sense against the encroachments
of freedom; and second, to secure the personality against the forces of sensation” (L 122). In the
play drive, the subject develops capacities for both feeling and reason. As both reason and sense
linger in free play, the subject experiences herself as both matter and mind. She plays.
Because the play drive is both sensuous and rational for Schiller, it produces a new
relationship to objects of thought and the world. Schiller argues that where “the sense drive
wants to be determined, wants to receive its object; the form drive wants itself to determine,
wants to bring forth its object” (L 126). In that the play drive has both desires simultaneously,
then, it will, “endeavor so to receive as if it had itself brought forth, and so to bring forth as the
intuitive sense aspires to receive” (L 126). For Schiller, this means that the play drive opens an
aesthetic relation to the world or an aesthetic dimension of life as “living form.” This does not
involve the subject claiming to “know” objects through reason or sense, but rather experiencing a
newfound aesthetic disposition/dimension in which she relates to all objects as free citizens in a
shared world because she hears and heeds the call of those objects to “be free like me.”
As I elaborated in the previous section, the play drive is not a static state of equilibrium
for Schiller, but an oscillation of releasing and tensing reason and sense that he characterizes as
“reciprocal subordination” (L 121). Schiller argues that “precisely because the other two drives
cooperate within it, [it] would be opposed to each of them considered separately and could
justifiably count as a new drive” (L 126). The play drive is a third drive constituted by both
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drives—not simply in additive relation but as they are transformed through each other—and it is
in the play drive that the aesthetic disposition/dimension is inaugurated. The play drive allows
for the newfound relationship between the subject and object in which the subject allows the
beautiful object to come in upon her instead of thrusting herself out upon it. As I wrote in a
previous section: The aesthetic disposition/dimension returns us to the ground of our freedom by
way of the beautiful object, bringing the beautiful object back with us as we allow it to come in
upon us. It establishes autonomy alongside relationality, and in that way opens the play drive.
And as we saw at the end of that section, Schiller then translates this to our relations with other
people, arguing that in the aesthetic disposition/dimension we become able to make other
people’s feelings our own (L 124). Thus, the play drive is about the relationship between the two
drives and also the relationship between subject and object or subject and other. The play drive is
Schiller’s solution to what the relationship between reason and sense should look like as well as
the foundation for the relationship he thinks should be fostered between human beings.
Lorde also develops her articulation of the fusion of reason and sense into a relationship
between self and other in her conception of the erotic. While we saw in the last section how
Lorde seems to favor feeling over thinking, in that same passage from “Poetry Is Not a Luxury,”
she also argues that “at this point in time, I believe that women carry within ourselves the
possibility for fusion of these two approaches so necessary for survival” (37). Here Lorde
advocates for a simultaneous mode– a “fusion”—of what she calls european and non-european,
or masculine and feminine, approaches.
Throughout her work, I think Lorde locates this fusion (or at least its beginnings) in the
erotic. As I articulated in the first half of this chapter, for Lorde, the erotic is a source of
information deeply rooted in feeling that yields force and power. It is also the connection to that

225

source, or “a measure between the beginnings of our sense of self and the chaos of our strongest
feelings” (SO 52). Here I’d also like to add that Lorde describes this connection to source as “a
conscious decision” that one must make (SO 55). Connecting to the erotic and maintaining that
connection is something that each individual must do when living in a society that diminishes the
power of the erotic. As a measure of our feelings and a decision to celebrate them, then, the
erotic evokes both the sensuous and the rational simultaneously. As I cited previously, she
writes:
Beyond the superficial, the considered phrase, “It feels right to me,” acknowledges the
strength of the erotic into a true knowledge, for what that means is the first and most
powerful guiding light toward any understanding. And understanding is a handmaiden
which can only wait upon, or clarify, that knowledge, deeply born. The erotic is the
nurturer or nursemaid of all our deepest knowledge. (SO 56)
Our deepest knowledge, then, is nurtured by the erotic, and the role of understanding is to clarify
the knowledge that is deeply born within the erotic. Both feeling (aligned with knowing and
sense) and understanding (aligned with thinking and reason) are active in this process—it is a
fusion of the two—but for Lorde, feeling and the erotic are most essential. This is both because
of the history of the desecration of feeling and femininity (as previously discussed) and because
of the relationship that feeling has to our erotic relationships with others.
If we remember from the extended section on Lorde’s conception of the erotic, I argued
that the erotic is (1) source, (2) connection to source, and (3) connection with others. So far here,
we have seen that the erotic is deeply rooted in feeling for Lorde, but in providing a certain kind
of connection to source, the erotic also fuses feeling and thinking in order to guide our deepest
knowledge to the light. The third essential feature of the erotic, however, is that it is a mode of
connection with others through, as Lorde put it, “self-connection shared” (SO 57). Once in touch
with one’s own erotic source, Lorde argues, there is a desire to and necessity of sharing it with
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others. This comes from both an internal motivation and a political impetus. In “The
Transformation of Silence into Language and Action,” Lorde shares an anecdote from her
daughter to describe the internal motivation:
My daughter, when I told her of our topic and my difficulty with it, said “Tell them about
how you’re never really a whole person if you remain silent, because there’s always that
one little piece of you that wants to be spoken out, and if you keep ignoring it, it gets
madder and madder and hotter and hotter, and if you don’t speak it out one day it will just
up and punch you in the mouth from the inside.” (SO 42)
Here we see how sharing our erotic feelings with others is a necessity rooted in our inner nature
for Lorde. Once we know our truth, we must share it. She also argues that we have a political
obligation to each other to share these feelings so as to resist marginalization and oppression:
“And where the words of women are crying to be heard, we must each of us recognize our
responsibility to seek those words out, to read them and share them and examine them in their
pertinence to our lives” (SO 43). In these two quotations, we can see that Lorde’s conception of
the erotic is not only a subjective or internalized fusion of thinking and feeling, but also an
impulse to share with others. Like Schiller’s play drive, Lorde’s erotic is an articulation of what
the relationship between reason and sense should look like as well as the foundation for the
relationship she thinks should be fostered between human beings.
While I think the fact of both Schiller and Lorde positing a mutual relationship between
reason and sense that serves as the foundation for aesthetic experience and also our relations with
others is compelling, I do think we can raise the question of whether Schiller’s description of
“reciprocal subordination” and “oscillation” of the drives are the same as Lorde’s sense of their
“fusion.” It’s a challenging question to answer on both sides. First, it’s challenging because
Schiller’s account of the relationship between the formal and sense drives that inaugurates the
play drive can at times be seen to contradict itself. Schiller both rejects the idea that there is a
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“middle state that beauty transports us” to (L 137) and claims that the play drive is a kind of
“middle disposition” (L 145). While I have here argued that we can resolve this through careful
attention to difference between a static sense of a middle state and the oscillating tension of the
middle disposition, perhaps we can still raise the question of what exactly Schiller means by
middle. How is there both a middle and never a middle? How is the play drive a distinct, third
drive and also the relationship between drives? Second, it’s challenging because Lorde’s
description of the “fusion” of white/european/masculine consciousness and black/noneuropean/feminine consciousness is left underdeveloped throughout her work. As I’ve
emphasized here, her primary project is to reclaim the role of feeling and the status of the erotic
for women. While she admits to the fusion of these two perspectives, she does not discuss
exactly what that would look like or how it would happen.
In bringing Schiller and Lorde together, I think Lorde’s use of “fusion” has to be closest
to how Schiller uses the word “union” toward the end of the Letters. In the twenty-fifth letter,
Schiller describes the enjoyment of beauty as an “aesthetic unity, an actual union and
interchange between matter and form, passivity and activity, momentarily tak[ing] place” (L
164-5). Schiller argues that because of this union “beauty provides us with triumphant proof that
passivity by no means excludes activity, nor matter form, nor limitation infinity” (L 164). I think
that the fusion of thinking and feeling in the erotic also provides this proof when it is expressed
through poetry. In poetry, we are able to feel the feelings of another as they are meditated
through words. This evokes both our feeling/knowing and our thinking/understanding, yielding a
profound joy. As Lorde says,
The erotic functions for me in several ways, and the first is in providing the power which
comes from sharing deeply any pursuit with another person. The sharing of joy, whether
physical, emotional, psychic, or intellectual, forms a bridge between the sharers which
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can be the basis for understanding much of what is not shared between them, and lessens
the threat of their difference. (SO 56)
Lorde’s notion of sharing here emphasizes the sharing of joy, a particular affect that can attach to
many vessels and create a bridge between individuals. This bridge, she then argues, lessens
difference as individuals create understandings of each other and their worlds. The erotic is
about sharing feeling, but feeling here is connected to understanding (which is always aligned
with thinking). Thus both feeling and thinking are at play in the erotic bridges we form with
others. While the erotic as source and connection to source may be exclusively about feeling, the
erotic as our connection with others is a matter of the fusion of feeling and thinking.
Schiller also sees this kind of bridging between individuals as a core function of the play
drive: it allows us to enjoy “communal life” (L 157) and our “social character” (L 176) that
results from letting others come in upon us rather than thrusting ourselves out upon them. The
experience of beauty isn’t simply personal; it is also always a social and political experience.
Schiller even claims (perhaps problematically) that the play drive can “enlarge[e] him [man] into
a representative of the species” as it connects the particular to the universal and the individual to
humanity (L 158).
To fuse Schiller and Lorde here, the erotic bridge becomes the space of both coming in
upon and thrusting out – here, however, it is a thrusting that does not have the penetrative force
of reason but rather the joyous force of eroticism. It is a thrusting out that is an expressing and
sharing of feeling combined with an invitation to come in through the new opening to oneself.
The bridge opens and expands through that oscillation between thrusting out and coming in,
which is analogous to the oscillation between reason and sense. As feeling is shared, it can be
clarified by thinking and mutual understanding can form. There is fusion within and between any
two individuals. That’s the unique power of the erotic and of the play drive.
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All of that said, building this erotic, playful bridge isn’t a simple matter, and as already
alluded to here, both Lorde and Schiller speak in detail to how beauty or poetry serve precisely
this function. I’ll turn to their accounts of each in the next section.

3.5.3 A Pedagogical Poetics and the Aesthetic/Erotic State
For Schiller and Lorde, the play drive and the erotic are accessed through aesthetic
experience – in beauty for Schiller and poetry for Lorde.120 It is also the case for each thinker that
this is a process of garnering knowledge, of learning, and thus of education.
Schiller argues throughout the Letters that it is beauty that simultaneously enacts reason
and sense in the play drive. It is the Juno Ludovisi that puts us in a position of both utter repose
and supreme agitation. It is in the oscillation and tension between those feelings that we hold
open the aesthetic disposition/dimension and learn a new mode of relating to objects and others.
He says that “if man is ever to solve that problem of politics in practice he will have to approach
it through the problem of the aesthetic, because it only through beauty that man makes his way to
freedom” (L 90). In this, Schiller means that it is only through the unique relationship between
the formal and sensuous drives in the play drive that man finds wholeness (in the dual enactment
of the drives) and freedom (from the control of reason alone and the corruption of that state), and
it is only beauty that brings the play drive into existence. This isn’t beauty in general, but the
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beauty of a particular object, which once it has “afforded him this vision [it] would become for
him a symbol of his accomplished destiny” (L 126).
Similarly, Lorde argues that the erotic is accessible (at least today) primarily through
poetry. Poetry is the mode of expressing feeling that brings erotic knowledge to light. In “Poetry
Is Not a Luxury,” Lorde argues: “This is poetry as illumination, for it is through poetry that we
give name to those ideas which are – until the poem – nameless and formless, about to be
birthed, but already felt” (SO 36). Poetry allows for the formation and appearance of the erotic
not only in our deepest, darkest places, but in the world we share. And because the erotic is tied
to feminine power for Lorde, poetry, then, is not a luxury for women but the source of their
liberation vis-à-vis their connection to their erotic power and to each other. Poetry’s aesthetic
character, then, is also deeply political.
As I hope has become apparent through the analysis here, this is also the case for
Schiller’s conception of beauty. In a certain sense, any positive sense of politics hinges on beauty
for Schiller, because it is the beautiful object that inaugurates the aesthetic
disposition/dimension. Without their dual enervation in the play drive, reason and sense will
always be in a diametrically opposed and combative relation. Thus, Schiller asks, “What is man
before beauty cajoles from him a delight in things for their own sake, or the serenity of form
tempers the savagery of life?” (L 157). And he vividly answers: “A monotonous round of ends, a
constant vacillation of judgments; self-seeking, and yet without a self; lawless, yet without
freedom; a slave, yet to no rule” (L 157). Because the play drive inaugurates a new relation
between man and the world, the aesthetic dimension is also inherently political for Schiller, and
the status of any politics depends on its relation to beauty.
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When I say that poetry and beauty, for Lorde and Schiller respectively, are deeply
political, I think it’s important to clarify that the notions of the political in both of these authors
respond to very different forms of violence. Lorde is responding to structural and systemic
oppression that results in state violence. For her, politics demands a negotiation of power and
difference. The erotic is a matter of cultivating both in a new way, and it yields freedom insofar
as it creates a new world (what I will call an erotic state) in which feeling can be expressed and
shared without fear, in which difference is no longer responded to with violence. In contrast,
Schiller is preoccupied with the terror of the French Revolution. He sees the dangers of a
political system that elevates Reason above all else, and he wants to recenter the role of sense
and locate a better relationship between sense and reason in a third drive (the play drive) that can
open a new aesthetic state. Freedom, for Schiller, is not a matter of autonomy. As Acosta argues,
“freedom understood exclusively in terms of autonomy, is still caught up in the framework that
freedom itself is supposed to interrupt, namely, a sacrificial framework based on the logic of
means towards ends”121 Instead, freedom, for Schiller, is heautonomy. It is self-given selfdetermination. It is what we learn from beauty. This is only possible, as Schiller sees it, in the
aesthetic state.
For both Schiller and Lorde, then, beauty/poetry becomes a mode of giving birth to the
aesthetic/erotic state.122 Schiller will say, “even before truth’s triumphant light can penetrate the
recesses of the human heart, the poet’s imagination will intercept its rays, and the peaks of
humanity will be radiant while the dews of night still linger in the valley” (L 109). And Lorde
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will argue centuries later that poetry “forms the quality of the light within which we predicate
our hopes and dreams toward survival and change, first made into language, then into idea, then
into more tangible action” (SO 37).
The work of the poet is the work of our aesthetic, and thus political, education. The poet
captures and shapes the quality of light and brings words to feelings, which Lorde argues are our
deepest truths. In an undated manuscript, Lorde wrote:
A poet is by definition a teacher also. If I never teach another class, every poem I create
is an attempt at a piece of truth formed from the images of my experience, and share[d]
with as many others as can or will hear me. This is something poetry shares with other
hard work. Making real power is teaching, digging good ditches is teaching, survival is
teaching. (IAYS 184)
Making real power, digging good ditches, and survival are all political acts—and insofar as they
fuse both feeling and thinking, they’re also poetic acts. Sharing those acts is a matter of teaching,
Lorde argues, and paying enough attention to them such that you can feel them as your own is
what she calls learning. In an interview with Claudia Tate, she says, “learning does not happen in
some detached way of dealing with a text alone, but from becoming so involved in the process
that you can see how it might illuminate your life, and then how you can share that illumination”
(CWAL 90). That process is poetry, whether it be poetry as a poem or poetry as a way of being.
This is why Schiller argues in the Letters that:
It is, then, not just poetic license but philosophical truth when we call beauty our second
creatress. For although it only offers us the possibility of becoming human beings, and
for the rest leaves it to our own free will to decide how far we wish to make this a reality,
it does in this resemble our first creatress, nature, which likewise conferred upon us
nothing more than the power of becoming human, leaving the use and practice of the
power to our own free will and decision. (L 148)
Our experience of beauty creates us again, but only if we choose it—only if we take it to be a
teacher and learn from it how to relate to objects and others through our shared freedom, or as
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Schiller puts it only if we become “in the fullest sense of the word a human being,” which only
happens when we play (AL 131).
For both Schiller and Lorde, beauty/poetry is the key to learning how to finally connect
our whole or many selves—for Schiller this means connecting to our humanity through the play
drive, and for Lorde this means connecting to our femininity through the erotic and then to each
other through poetry. While they raise and address their pedagogical, political, and poetic
questions from very different frameworks, I think they both connect our innermost feelings to
our desires for political freedom, thus both speaking (as I promised very early in this chapter) to
Lorde’s mantra “I feel, therefore I can be free” and helping all of us better imagine the
aesthetic/erotic state in which this becomes possible.

3.6 Conclusion
While I argued at the beginning of this chapter that I would be taking a pedagogical
approach to bringing Lorde and Schiller into conversation, I hope it’s clear now that that didn’t
mean sacrificing the depth or extent of the analysis. In this chapter, I’ve attempted a number of
(perhaps too many) things. First, I thematized and organized Lorde’s work to show how she
centers feeling, thinking, poetry, and the erotic in her writings. I presented four theses that
explored these concepts across her corpus: (1) feeling is a mode of knowing best communicated
through poetry, (2) thinking is a mode of understanding emphasizing rationality and prized by
contemporary society, (3) speaking is a necessary act of resistance, and, finally, (4) poetry is not
simply a matter of poems, but also a mode of being. As a result, I was able to show how she
argues for a “fusion” of thinking and feeling and a poetic way of living.
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I also argued that we can understand Lorde’s conception of the erotic as organized around
three functions: (1) the erotic as a source of power, (2) the erotic as a connection to that source,
and (3) the erotic as a mode of connecting to others. In doing so, I was able to bring to light how
the erotic, for Lorde, is an energy, a force, and a resource. It is a power that lives deep in us and
to which we must connect, and a mode of connecting that is as much a going within ourselves as
an extending out to others. Unpacking the personal and political valences of this led me to argue
that every moment of self-connection is a moment of self-connection shared; thus, every poem is
an erotic bridge, and every erotic bridge is a poem.
From there, I turned to Schiller to present my reading of his aesthetic system. I traced
how Schiller reconfigures Kant’s articulation of reason in an effort to establish the importance of
the beautiful object in aesthetics and showed how he cultivates an idea of an aesthetic disposition
in which the encounter with the beautiful object inaugurates a new relationship with all objects.
This required developing a reading of Kallias in which I structured Schiller’s articulation of the
encounter with the beautiful object into three moments: (1) reason lends the object a will; (2) this
lending must be concealed so as to appear natural; (3) the object appears to present its freedom
and calls to us to respect it. After exploring how those three moments inaugurate the aesthetic
disposition/dimension I see in Schiller’s early aesthetic thought, in the last section of the chapter
I turned to the Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man to explore how Schiller builds the
implicit discussion of an aesthetic disposition/dimension into a nuanced conception of the play
drive and the aesthetic state.
Having presented these two separate readings of Lorde and Schiller, I then brought them
together to understand what they might have in common and how my reading of each one
impacted my reading of the other. I organized this final section of the chapter into three parts: (1)
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Lorde and Schiller’s shared critiques of reason alone and heightened attention to sense/feeling;
(2) their desire to resolve those critiques through an understanding of the oscillation and/or
fusion of opposing drives; and (3) how they see poetry and aesthetic education as key to building
a better world. I think one of the most successful moments of this comparison was my
articulation of how the play drive and the erotic function similarly. We can learn from Lorde that
the erotic bridge between two people is space of both coming in upon and thrusting out, that this
thrusting out does not have the penetrative force of reason but rather the joyous force of
eroticism. And we can learn from Schiller that the bridge opens and expands through that
oscillation between thrusting out and coming in, which is analogous to the oscillation between
reason and sense. As feeling is shared, it can be clarified by thinking and mutual understanding
can form. There is fusion within and between any two individuals. That’s the unique power of
both the erotic and of the play drive.
As I conclude this third and final chapter, I want to return to the inverse through lines that
I argued shape this entire project to show how each of these thinkers represents the culmination
of their respective line. As I wrote in the introduction, in this dissertation I set out to trace two
inverse through lines in the thought of three German idealist aesthetic thinkers and three
contemporary feminist thinkers. I wanted to explore how the German idealist aesthetic tradition
begins with an attempt to understand the incomprehensibility of certain (beautiful) objects and
works its way to respect for them and their freedom, and (2) how the feminist tradition cited here
begins with the necessity of respect for the position of others and then cultivates new modes of
encountering and embracing incomprehensibility between individuals. Now that we’ve arrived at
the end of the third chapter, I can say that I believe that Schiller is the German idealist thinker
who best shows how aesthetics can be a project of respecting the freedom of beautiful (and even
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all) objects. As I’ve shown here, it is Schiller who works to reorient aesthetics around the object
and who argues that “even the gown I wear on my body demands respect for its freedom from
me,” then goes on to produce a theory of an aesthetic disposition/dimension in which granting
that request is the ground of one’s own freedom (K 170). That said, Schiller could not have
accomplished this without the work of Baumgarten and Kant before him. As I argued at the end
of the first chapter, without Baumgarten, there isn’t a distinct realm of aesthetics for Kant to
assign the power of judgment. And without Kant, there aren’t the traces of free play, of the
sublime disposition, of esteem and resistance, that Schiller can develop into the aesthetic
disposition/dimension and the play drive.
Having read my careful accounts of all three thinkers, I hope now that this through line,
this common theme or trajectory, in which Baumgarten, Kant, and Schiller begin with the
attempt to understand the incomprehensibility of beautiful objects and work their way to respect
for their freedom appears obvious. I’ve done some painstaking work to try to make that the case,
at times risking, I think, making it seem like that was exactly what those three thinkers set out to
do. If one reads their writings, I think they’ll soon discover that’s not obviously the case. This
through line I’ve traced is not most common or obvious way of telling the story of German
idealist aesthetics, but it is my way of telling that story and a story that this dissertation set out to
tell.
In the case of the inverse through line I was tracing between Ahmed, Lugones, and
Lorde, I hoped to show how their feminist projects in some way each begin with the necessity of
respect for the position of others and then cultivate new modes of encountering and embracing
incomprehensibility between individuals. As I argued previously, while I saw the through line
between Baumgarten, Kant, and Schiller as a progressive, evolutionary one, that’s not the case
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with Ahmed, Lugones, and Lorde. Rather, I see each of their bodies of work as tracing this
trajectory in themselves, and I wanted to show how that works in the case of each one.
In the case of Ahmed, I argued that if we are tracing a path from a respect for otherness to
modes and methods of cultivating relation among difference, then she represents the constant
discomfort, disease, and disavowal of norms that that work always requires. She brings to light
how claiming to respect other people requires a deep uncovering and disavowal of one’s own
privilege in relation to them, that the work begins with killing joy so that trust and respect can be
cultivated in coalition from there.
In the case of Lugones, I argued that in the cultivation of loving playfulness, we see a
recognition of the different positions of each individual in an oppressive system and then the
cultivation of an openness to surprise in our encounters with others (particularly other
marginalized and oppressed folks) in different “worlds” that helps us love them there. I think that
“world”-travelling and loving playfulness require a deep respect for others and represent a mode
of encountering and embracing their otherness, as Lugones will put it their opacity, not as
something to be erased or made transparent to us, but as something to be cherished. Complex
communication and the double tongue, then, serve as two more modes of cultivating difference
and methods for communicating across it without diminishing it.
Lorde, then, I think is the thinker who founds her project most firmly on difference and
argues for its uniquely creative and generative force, telling feminists that “difference must be
not merely tolerated, but seen as a fund of necessary polarities between which our creativity can
spark like a dialectic” (SO 111). She argues that we are taught to ignore, copy, or destroy
difference, and thus we must “develop tools for using human difference as a springboard for
creative change within our lives” (SO 115). Feeling is one of those tools. Poetry is one of those
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tools. The erotic is one of those tools. In understanding how the erotic serves the three functions
I’ve argued for here (as a source of power, as a mode of connecting to that source, and as a mode
of connecting with others), we can see how Lorde invites difference into so many levels of our
experience, difference between our feelings and our thoughts, difference between various aspects
of ourselves, difference between ourselves and others. The erotic helps us bridge those
differences without diminishing them to sameness. It helps us do the work of deep coalition and
interdependence.
In tracing this through line between Ahmed, Lugones, and Lorde, I have attempted to
show that if we tell this particular story about otherness, if we track this particular argument
about difference, then we can find it in each of their work. Again, it’s not necessarily an obvious
reading of their projects, perhaps not always even an apt one, but I do think it helps bring them
together even though they write from very different perspectives and frameworks, and in each
case I think it helps illustrate how their projects rely on certain aesthetic concepts and themes to
accomplish their personal and political ends.
I’d like to end this chapter by once again returning to my museum encounter with
Marshall’s painting Untitled (Mirror Girl). It was Lorde that came to me in the moment I was
there in the museum. It was her words I remembered in the face of the painting: “the future of
our earth may depend upon the ability of all women to identify and develop new definitions of
power and new patterns of relation across difference” (SO 123). After writing this chapter, I now
better see how the erotic can serve as that new definition of power and pattern of relation, and I
feel how that calls me to unearth my deepest feelings about the painting if I’m ever able to claim
a real relationship to the woman there. I hear Lorde’s urging from “The Master’s Tools Will
Never Dismantle the Master’s House” when she says, “I urge each one of us here to reach down
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into that deep place of knowledge inside herself and touch that terror and loathing of any
difference that lives there. See whose face it wears. Then the personal as the political can begin
to illuminate all our choices” (SO 113). I take seriously that my work begins with that reaching
down.
I think Schiller also has something to offer me in that moment. In his demand that I hear
the call of the beautiful object to “Be free like me!,” I see the beauty of the painting in a new
way. I understand differently the sentence on the wall that says: “This work, like others in this
gallery, represents a black subject involved in creating her own image, an image associated with
beauty, desire, or joy.” I sense that perhaps the relation I find between myself and the woman in
the painting is a reflection of our mutually constructed freedom, that her creating her own image
is contemporaneous with or even invokes me creating mine. I remember how upon seeing her
mirrored image in the painting, I felt immediately called to capture my own mirrored image as
her reflection.
As I move to the conclusion of this project, I’ll reopen again the question of feminist
aesthetics that I posed in the introduction, and I’ll point to some successes and failures of my
readings here. I’ll retrace and further intertwine the through lines I argue shape this project, and
for the last time, I’ll return to the museum and the classroom where all of this began.
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CONCLUSION

As I was preparing this conclusion and completing revisions on this project, I came
across an interview with Lugones and Ortega that was published just last year. In it, Ortega asks
Lugones about so many of the themes that I had attended to in her work or used as examples. She
asks about her mother. She asks about art. She asks about coalition. Because I’ve read so much
of Lugones’ work to write these pages, I thought I would know the shape of her answers, but I
was pleasantly surprised to find that they were full of new and different ideas.
When asked about her mother, Lugones shared that she overcame her arrogant perception
of her by coming to see her as an artist. She says, “When I traveled to my mother’s ‘world,’ I
perceived her as a painter, a subject in her painting. It was by centering on my mother as an artist
that I could follow her in her everyday resistance to what life placed in her path.”123 In reading
this, I feel even more confident in the work I’ve done here to identify the close relationship
between Lugones’ conceptions of playfulness and “world”-travelling and a Kantian notion of
aesthetic judgment (perhaps leaning toward a Schillerian sense of an aesthetic
disposition/dimension).
Ortega continues the interview by asking Lugones about art and aesthesis. To begin her
response Lugones says, “thinking about aesthesis, I think about the body and permeability and all
that permeability allows us to reconceive about the world we live in.”124 In this, I hear echoes of
how I found provocations in Lugones’ work to attend even more carefully to the role of the body
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in Kant’s work and to seek out his treatment of health and the feeling of life there. Lugones,
however, takes this sense of aesthesis in an entirely different direction. She argues that
decolonial aesthesis must deconstruct the privileging of the senses in aesthetics and she sees
mycelia, the fungi that constitutes a third of the world’s beings, as the way forward here: “I
choose mycelia to think about permeability, because they are not as socially normed as many
other organic and inorganic living beings. They exhibit clearly the porosity of our habitat, not
just their own permeability. Thus they exhibit the porosity of the habitat itself.”125 Lugones then
connects this to gender and coloniality. She says, “I have been thinking with some tenacity about
how to do away with gender and its insidious intromission into all of our lives. The coloniality of
gender has been an extremely successful way of harming the possibility of communality in every
kind of relation.”126
I share this interview and these quotations here for two reasons. First, because they’ll
help me better speak to the claim that I made in the introduction that this project is working
toward feminist aesthetics but is not yet a work of feminist aesthetics. (I’ll speak to that in a
moment.) Second, because they help me address what it’s felt like and meant to finish this
dissertation during a global pandemic that requires social distancing. I’ll share that first.
After she speaks to the possibility of communality as it’s harmed by gender, Lugones
says: “I feel solitude [soledad] as a disintegration of my communality. Sensing, living, one’s
communal ‘I’ as reduced, as a difficulty to imagine having a communal intention toward
liberation, is a spring toward coalitional liberation. The communal self needs company.”127
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Reading these lines while under orders to stay at home and practice social distancing is
challenging. What so many of us are feeling right now is precisely this challenge to our
communality, this reduction of our “I”. But Lugones argues that it will lead us toward each other,
and she finds examples of this in art and how it can evoke a collectivity. Speaking of two Cuban
films she’s studied, she says:
The collectivity is in the maker of poetry, film, theater, painting, and philosophy when it
is decolonial. That is my own view. Sometimes the communal is in the present in the
continuity with the past in a challenge to the coloniality; sometimes the communal is the
communal doings, beings, imaginings which themselves are tied to the past in ways that
are neither linear nor obvious.128
Here, Lugones locates many possibilities for communality in art. All of them hinge on porosity,
permeability, and connection of multiple senses and selves (our own selves, as well as ourselves
and other selves), and all of them relate to opening ourselves to different notions of temporality
that invite disruption, interruption and suspension.
For me, finishing this dissertation in relative solitude has meant turning to art to find the
collectivity that I previously found with colleagues and mentors. It’s why I’ve gone time and
time again here to my experience facing the woman in Untitled (Mirror Girl). It’s also why I’ve
worked so hard to show how German idealist aesthetics marks an opening to a kind of
collectivity in philosophy.
In Baumgarten’s, Kant’s, and Schiller’s projects, I see an attempt to reorganize
philosophy around the senses and to reorient our experiences toward the objects and others we
encounter, as we can learn to do from our encounters with the beautiful and the sublime. I see the
moment that Baumgarten claims aesthetics to be a sister science to logic, as a break, a fracture in
the all-encompassing power of logic which Kant can further crack open by developing the power
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of judgment founded on the universality of sensus communis, and into which Schiller can step by
foregrounding the resistance of the beautiful object to our conceptualization process. In that
progression (which I’ve called here a through line), I do see a gesture toward collectivity based
on a valuation of incomprehensibility that I’ve marked as analogous to the gestures I’ve traced in
Ahmed’s, Lugones’ and Lorde’s projects of deconstructing norms around happiness, travelling
between “worlds” to communicate amidst oppressive discourses, and developing a concept of the
erotic that allows for a deep sense of difference shared without being diminished. In tracing those
latter projects, I was able to find moments of intersection between these gestures and to reflect
feminist questions and concerns back into the work of the German idealist thinkers I was reading
and point to ways we could critique, interrupt, or expand their work when considering these new
(feminist) notions of happiness, materiality, and difference. Occasionally, I was also able to do
the same in the opposite direction.
In considering feminist provocations to German idealist aesthetics, I think this project has
succeeded. I feel like I’ve shared novel and interesting readings of Baumgarten, Kant, and
Schiller and showed how reading them alongside Ahmed, Lugones, and Lorde respectively
allowed me to attend to particular moments of their thinking and make critical interventions
there, at times through creatively and performatively feminist readings. It’s only in doing this
work, only in tracing this particular through line, that I think the gesture toward collectivity (to
borrow Lugones’ term but only in a very loose sense) in Baumgarten’s, Kant’s, and Schiller’s
aesthetics becomes apparent.
That said, I still do not think it is a work of feminist aesthetics. As I wrote in the
introduction, I want the term “feminist aesthetics” to represent philosophical and artistic work
that deeply integrates gender at the core of aesthetic experience. Having done all of this work, I

244

think I could now argue that aesthetics is integrated at the core of Lugones’ and Lorde’s (less so
Ahmed’s) feminist projects through their respective commitments to poetry as a way of life and
to “world”-travelling as an expansive, in some sense artistic, endeavor. But I certainly don’t
think I can argue that gender is an important component of Baumgarten’s, Kant’s or Schiller’s
projects—in fact, I have largely left out their problematic and/or overtly sexist statements about
women here. I don’t know how to reconcile them with what I want to say about their work. So I
did what I was taught to do at an early age when I spotted historical (or even contemporary)
examples of sexism: I ignored them, brushed them off, or even apologized for them. But I know
that a feminist killjoy would go to those places and make trouble. I believe that a work of
feminist aesthetics would have to deal with them differently.
I don’t say this to undermine the contributions of my project, just to underscore that I
think they’re contributions made to aesthetics more than to feminism. I think that’s partially
because working with these German idealist thinkers, even in a feminist way, has required me to
attempt to produce feminist work without a theory of gender, or, more specifically, to utilize a
theory of gender that conceptualizes gender as simply a matter of power and oppression—
degendering gender in the process. At times I think it’s why the chapters can read as always
pointing toward a moment that never comes. As I wrote, I felt like I was always trying to get to
gender, to get to feminism, to get to feminist aesthetics. Only in these final pages do I feel able to
reflect on why and how that happened, as well as why and how I never got there.
So where did we get? In the final sentence of Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes, Lugones raises
the question, “Within which conceptual, axiological, institutional, material set of limitations is
the meaning of the possible being constructed?” (PP 131) I think the possibilities of this
dissertation have been constructed within the realm of aesthetics, but I think the feminist
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provocations I’ve raised here with the help of Ahmed, Lugones, and Lorde, have stretched that
realm. They’ve questioned if its reliance on harmony and happiness is only a ruse and invited in
new attention to tension and resistance there. They’ve considered to what extent it includes
material conditions and muddied the status of its transcendental and universal claims. They’ve
attempted to see how surfacing living bodies and relationships between people in aesthetic
experiences will require clarifying what sense of politics is at stake or embedded in an aesthetic
state.
As I move forward from this project, I feel myself returning again not only to my
memory of Untitled (Mirror Girl) but to so many other galleries, museums, and moments where
I’ve lingered in front of paintings and works of art. I wonder if the next step toward feminist
aesthetics is taking all I’ve learned from lingering in front of those paintings and turning toward
the other people in those spaces, in opening to other people in the world in the ways I opened
myself to that girl in the mirror—in other words, in putting these aesthetic lessons into personal
and political practice, carefully gathering my theory of gender/race/ability/identity/etc. along the
way.
I’d like to conclude by taking up one more time Lugones’ example of her mother, and
comparing it to the example of my own. In the wake of this pandemic, my mother has taken up
drawing and painting. I’ve seen her purchase watercolors many times in my life, but I always
later found them tucked into closets around the house, cast off unopened when work or
caretaking had to be attended to. But now, she shares pictures with me of what she’s been
prompted to dream up in her virtual drawing class. She tells me about the things she plans to
paint.
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I never thought of this in a feminist context until I read Lugones’ account of learning to
appreciate her mother by learning to see her as a painter. Finally considering her mother an artist,
Lugones says, “[then] I could understand her actions, her words, her gardening, as ways of
resistance.”129 My mother has frustrated me for much of my life with her nonlinear thinking and
strong emotions, and in my coming to consciousness as a feminist, I became very critical of what
I saw as her complicity in patriarchy through her “subservience” to my father. But Lugones’
sharing her story of arrogant perception and how she recovered from it by travelling to her
mother’s “world” in which she was an artist helped me find my own way down that path, a path
I’d long sensed but which just recently became clear when my mother finally began painting, a
path that I hope can serve as what Lorde calls the “necessary polarities between which our
creativity can spark like a dialectic” (SO 111).
No matter the questions I’ve raised in this conclusion about the relationship of this
dissertation to feminism and to aesthetics, I still believe that the key to bringing them together
lies in these moments: in learning to see and love my mother in this way, in travelling to her
“world” and recognizing her struggles, her gender, her forms of resistance there, in seeing our
differences as creative and nourishing rather than divisive. I need Baumgarten, Kant, Schiller,
Ahmed, Lugones, and Lorde to make sense of how to do all of this. That’s why I wrote this
dissertation. That’s why these are the efforts and moments I hold on to. That’s the only way, I
think, that this is feminist aesthetics.
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